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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines a component of Short Term Memory that is responsible for 
automatically tracking important stimuli in our immediate environment. The component 
has been termed the "Current State Buffer" (Abeles and Morton, submitted; Barreau, 
1997; Barreau and Morton, submitted-, Morton, 1997), and it is argued that current 
conceptions of the Working Memory model (e. g. Baddeley & Mtch, 1993) do not 
adequately specify its role as a separate functional element of Short Term Memory. 
A Developmental perspective was adopted for investigating the Current State Buffer 
experimentally. The data was collected through the implementation of a novel task (the 
"Tidy Emu Paradigm"), which involved pre-school children watching an Emu glove 
puppet tidy away toys into receptacles. The paradigm employed dual-task 
methodology, consistent with many other studies of Working Memory. 
The empirical work reported falls into three principal stages. The first demonstrates the 
Current State Buffer's existence as independent to Working Memory. The lack of 
interference between performance on a Current State Buffer task and a Visuospatial 
Sketchpad task was taken as evidence for this. Other explanations for the finding are 
considered, and further experiments replicate the basic finding. 
The second stage analyses the architecture of a system that comprises a Current State 
Buffer and Working Memory. In brief, the data are best described by an architecture 
where information enters an Environmental Input Buffer, and depending on the nature 
of the stimulus, it passes either into the Current State Buffer, or into an Interpreter 
Buffer (Working Memory). At retrieval, the contents of these buffers can independently 
proceed to an Output Buffer. 
The final stage explores the effects of increasing the load of the Current State Buffer 
task. This revealed age-related capacity limitations in Current State Buffer function, and 
that subjects used age-related strategies to deal with the increase in character load, 
involving interactions between the Current State Buffer and Working Memory. 
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Chapter 1: "The Mirrors of the Present" 
CHAPTER1 
"The Mirrors of the Present" 
1.1 Introduction 
"More time has been spent in the attics of memory than in the 
contemplation of the mirrors of the present" (Richard Condon, A 
talent for loving, Book 2, Chapter 6). 
The distinction between the "attics of memory" and the "Mirrors of the present" is a 
compelling one. Regardless of whether people spend more time in one than the other, 
one feels that these are indeed two separate entities. Memory for things that are in the 
past are stored away high up in the attic. However, the "mirrors of the present" directly 
reflect the current reality, and are presumably in a well-lit place, available for 
"contemplation". ' The contrast here is between Long Term Memory and Short Term 
Memory'. 
1.1.1 Thesis Outline 
In this thesis I examine an aspect of Short Terrn Memory that is responsible for 
automatically encoding and tracking the important aspects of our immediate personal 
environment. This component has been termed the "Current State Buffer" (Morton, 
1997). 1 argue that these representations are a part of Short Term Memory. No model of 
Short Term Memory to date has specified the nature of, or indeed the need for, what 
seems to be such a vital component of the Memory System. The empirical work 
establishes a new visuospatial task for pre-school children that is able to demonstrate 
the independence of the Current State Buffer from other known components of Short 
Tenn Memory. The characteristics of the Current State Buffer are then explored using 
this novel paradigm. 
In this first chapter of the thesis, I will be exploring the concept of Short Term Memory 
as a separate entity, and consider some of the models that have been constructed to 
account for it. The basic Short Term Memory phenomena are discussed, and key 
problems with earlier models of Short Terrn Memory are highlighted. Baddeley and 
Hitch's (1974; 1993) Working Memory model is then presented, as it seems to rectify 
many of the inadequacies of former models. This particular model is then examined and 
Perhaps this is the irony which is pointed out by Condon. 
I shall capitalise "Short Term Memory" and "Long Term Memory" when I refer to constructs that 
reflect different parts of the memory system. When not capitalised, the reference is to the paradigm of 
immediate testing versus delayed testing respectively (which have become associated with the 
constructs). 
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evaluated, and I shall claim that it can be used as a helpful heuristic in understanding 
Short Term Memory. 
The second chapter investigates how the Working Memory model has been applied to 
cognitive development, focusing particularly on visuospatial tasks. The third chapter 
introduces the Current State Buffer formally, and discusses the one study that has 
employed this notion (Barreau and Morton, submitted). I then motivate how it may be 
possible to demonstrate the Current State Buffer's independence from Working 
Memory, and I justify my choice of subject population and task (the "Tidy Emu 
Paradigm"). In the fourth chapter I document how I used the "Tidy Emu Paradigm" to 
dissociate the Current State Buffer from Working Memory. This chapter ends with a 
discussion of some alternative explanations to the set of results obtained in the chapter. 
Chapter 5 considers the altemative explanations to the basic finding of the previous 
chapter by documenting two further experiments that were carried out to counter these 
claims. Chapter 6 then considers the nature of the architecture of a system that includes 
a Current State Buffer, and the penultimate chapter investigates the capacity of the 
Current State Buffer and its interactions with Working Memory. The final chapter 
contains a summary of the thesis, and some concluding remarks relating to some of the 
issues generated by the work. 
1.2 Short Term Memory 
1.2.1 Short Term Memory as a Separate Entity 
1.2. LI Early History and Early Mode Is 
John Locke (1690) was probably the first to distinguish between Long and Short Tenn 
Memory on introspective grounds, when he discriminated between a "storehouse of 
ideas" and the "idea in view". The concept of a distinct Short Term Memory emerged 
again a few centuries later in the writings of Galton (1883) where he referred to an 
46 ante-chamber" of consciousness. William James (1905) contrasted what was 
remembered from current consciousness - "primary memory" and what involves 
knowledge that has been absent from consciousness - "secondary memory". Neither 
Locke, Galton nor James specified the nature of the these components of Memory, but 
it was clear to these authors that some memories are permanent records of the past, 
whereas others are a temporary representation of "the specious present" (James, 1905). 
Hebb (1949) developed the possibility that there might be two distinct 
neurophysiological structures in the brain that are separately responsible for the two 
13 
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types of memory. One involved temporary reverberating circuits, and the other formed 
what Hebb called "cell assemblies" of permanent links between cells. 
Broadbent (1958) specified the first information processing model of Short Term 
Memory in his seminal book Perception and Communication. He explicitly assumed the 
need for two separate memory systems. A short-term system of a limited capacity held 
temporary memory traces which would spontaneously decay unless they were 
rehearsed. The long-term system was not limited in its capacity, and forgetting occurred 
when items interfered with one another at retrieval. Broadbent (1958) specified that 
there were two sub-components of the short-term system, the S and the P Systems. The 
S system was capable of receiving sensory input in parallel from various sources. The 
information could then be fed into the P system which had a limited capacity for storing 
and processing information. With time, the information would then decay unless it was 
rehearsed (Broadbent, 1963). The P system fed directly into Long Ten-n Memory, 
which was not subject to decay, but to the interference of interpolated or similar items. 
At this stage in summarising the history of Short Term Memory, it is worth mentioning 
that a controversy arose in the 1960's regarding the need to fractionate Long and Short 
Term Memory at all. This was largely based on the assertions of Melton (1963) who 
focused on the particular assumption of Broadbent's model that information in Short 
Term Memory would decay unless otherwise rehearsed. Melton claimed that traditional 
Short Tenn Memory tasks were governed instead by the tenets of interference theory. 
Since Long Term Memory phenomena were underpinned by interference theory, it 
seemed that there was no need for a theoretical distinction between Long and Short 
Tenn Memory. It is interesting to note that the basic thrust of the argument against a 
dichotomy, namely that Long Term Memory processes seem to underpin Short Term 
Memory, is still prevalent today, nearly forty years later (e. g. see Nairne, 1996). The 
validity of this argument is questioned a little later on, when I summarise the 
considerable evidence in favour of a dichotomy. 
Melton's (1963) argument stimulated Waugh and Norman (1965) to make the important 
distinction between a hypothetical Short Term Memory store which they labelled 
Primary Memory (reviving William James' term), and the experimental short ten-n 
memory paradigm that may sometimes underpin it. What is important here is that a 
short ten-n memory task does not have to be a pure measure of Primary or Short Tenn 
Memory. Performance on short term memory tasks may reflect both "Primary Memory" 
and "Secondary Memory" systems, while delayed recall is likely to exclusively reflect 
"Secondary Memory". Primary Memory for Waugh and Norman was of fixed capacity, 
as in Broadbent's model, but it suffered from the displacement of older items by new 
14 
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material. In this model, the contents of Primary Memory are safeguarded if they are 
maintained by verbal rehearsal, which was also a mechanism through which 
information could be copied into Secondary Memory. 
1. The Modal Model 
Models of Short Term Memory then proliferated to such an extent that Baddeley (1986) 
conjectures that there were well over 25 models by the beginning of the 1970's. 
However, these models shared so many common features that they could be 
approximated to what was the most widely quoted model of the era, namely the model 
of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). This model was thus referred to by Murdock (1974) 
as the "Modal Model" as it contained the essence of all of these models. In effect, the 
Modal Model itself had many features in common with Broadbent's (1963) earlier 
model (Baddeley, 1990). 
The Modal Model (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968) consisted of three separate stages of 
inforination flow. Input from the environment entered into a bank of modality-specific 
sensory buffer stores, (broadly corresponding to Broadbent's S system). All 
information then flowed through to the second stage, a limited capacity Short Term 
Store which could hold, manipulate and communicate information with the permanent 
Long Term Store. Transfer to the Long Term Store was a direct function of how long 
the information was kept in the Short Term Store. Control processes governed rehearsal 
of the contents of the Short Tenn Store, allowing information to stay there longer and 
increase the chances of transfer to the Long Term Store. Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) 
model dealt almost exclusively with the processing and storage of 
auditory-verbal-linguistic information. Although they did naise the possibility of a 
separate visual Short Term Store with rehearsal properties, it has become widely 
interpreted as a model comprising a single Short Tenn Store, because at the time, there 
was so little evidence to support this view (Logie, 1996). Note the crucial importance of 
the Short Term Store in the model, since without it information cannot get into or out of 
the Long Term Store. 
2. Production-System Models 
In their attempt to simulate human cognition using computer models, Newell and Simon 
(1972) developed an account of human problem solving. They postulated a Short Term 
Memory as a part of their "Production- System". Briefly, a Production-System is a 
collection of rules, an interpreter that decides when and how to apply the rules, and a 
Short Term Memory which holds data, goals, and intermediate results. Each rule 
consists of a set of conditions or premises, together with a set of actions or conclusions 
to be implemented or inferred if the relevant conditions hold. 
15 
Chapter 1: "The Nfirrors of the Present" 
Newell and Simon (1972) thus defined their component of Short Term Memory as the 
collection of information of which a subject is aware at any particular moment in time. 
Newell and Simon (1972) assumed that Short Tenn Memory contained a small number 
of symbolic expressions or "chunks", each of which could be a complex configuration 
of elements. Newell even entertained the notion that Short Term Memory was 
indefinitely large but unreliable, so that with longer sequences of items there would be 
an increasing probability that elements would be lost, which would lead to an effective 
limit on storage capacity as opposed to an absolute limit. 
1.2.2 Evidence for Short Term Memory as a Separate Entity 
1.2.2.1 Introduction 
Thus far, I have supplied a brief history of Short Term Memory, and how the early 
models of Short Tenn Memory have described this construct. I have kept this 
discussion purely at a theoretical level, mentioning no evidence for the dichotomy, nor 
for the specific features of the models themselves. What immediately follows therefore, 
is a review of the evidence in favour of having a separate Short Term Memory system. 
Once this has been presented, the status of these early models can be evaluated through 
a consideration of these and other Short Term Memory phenomena. 
1.2.2.2 Evidence for a Separation 
1. Some Neuropsychology 
The most powerful indication of a separation between Short and Long Tenn Memory 
comes from Milner's (1958) observations of patients with anterograde amnesia. If one 
asks these patients to immediately recall lists of items in the order they were presented 
("serial recall"), such that the number of items in the list is short enough to allow perfect 
recall on a very high percentage of trials, they perform as well as normal adults. With 
the proviso that one tests them immediately after the study phase, one can say that these 
patients perform normally on span tasks. Similarly, one can have a normal conversation 
with an amnesia sufferer without suspecting any mental abnormalities (until one leaves 
the room and returns to find they have forgotten who you are). Milner (1958) 
interpreted the syndrome as reflecting a fundamental inability to transfer information 
into a distinct Long Term Memory System. Because span tasks and ordinary 
conversation only require the ability to hold on to information for a short time, Milner 
asserted that these patients have intact Short Term Memory, although they were unable 
' One of the most "famous" of these type of patients was HM, who became amnesic following bilateral 
hippocampal and temporal lobe excision that was carried out to relieve an intractable epilepsy (Nolilner, 
1966). 
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to transfer information into Long Term Memory. Della Sala and Logie (1993) note that 
these are not isolated cases, and cite other patients with a similar pattern of selective 
impairment. 
2. Coding 
There are also apparent differences in the nature of the coding of items in Short and 
Long Tenn Memory. When Conrad (1964) asked his subjects to learn a string of letters 
in order, he found that memory performance was poorer when the letters sounded very 
similar to one another. Thus a sequence such as D, C, B, T, P, V was more difficult to 
retain than a sequence like L, W, K, F, R, T. Conrad discovered that this acoustic 
similarity effect disrupts the order of recall of the letters for Short Term serial recall, 
regardless of whether the items are read or heard by the subjects. Baddeley (1966) 
contrasted the recall of short sequences of acoustically similar words such as 'mad map 
man' and acoustically dissimilar words such as 'bus clock spoon, ' with the recall of 
short sequences of semantically similar words such as 'hug big great'. He found that 
with short term recall, the sets of acoustically similar words were less well recalled than 
were acoustically dissimilar words. However, the semantically similar words resulted 
in recall performance that was very little different from recall of semantically distinct 
words. In contrast, after a delay, the effect of acoustic similarity disappeared, but an 
effect of semantic similarity was still evident, with semantically similar words recalled 
less well than semantically different words. Since acoustic similarity appeared to affect 
short term storage and semantic similarity appeared to affect long term storage, it 
suggested that a short term storage system retains words in terms of their sounds (even 
with visually presented words) while the longer term system retains words in terms of 
their meaning. 
On a more historical note, Morton (1964) had suggested at the time, that Conrad's 
results were in fact better termed "articulatory" errors rather than acoustic errors since 
the errors were phonological, rather than related to sound per se. Nevertheless, the 
effect is still widely termed an "acoustic" similarity effect. 
3. Recency 
The results of standard free-recall procedures can provide another important argument 
for the Short/Long Tenn Memory distinction. The free-recall task was first reported 
over a century ago by Nipher (1878). In it, subjects are presented with a long list of 
items and required to recall them in any order. The standard pattern of data is that 
subjects are more successful at recalling items that featured early on in the list, and late 
on in the list. The "recency effect" is the term used to describe the superior recall of the 
last few items relative to the middle items, and the "primacy effect" is the term used to 
17 
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refer to the superior recall of the first few items relative to the middle items. Relevant to 
the Short Term versus Long Term Memory distinction, is the finding that if recall is 
delayed by a distracting task, the recency effect is disrupted, whereas the primacy effect 
remains at the same level (Glanzer and Cunitz, 1966). 
At its most simple understanding, the recency effect arises because the last few items 
are present in Short Term Memory at the time recall begins (Watkins, 1974), and decay 
or become displaced soon after. Similarly, the primacy effect is explained simply by 
positing that the earlier items in the list have been recalled from Long Term Memory. 
This notion is further supported by the fact that only the earlier items in the list are 
affected by variables that are known to influence Long Tenn Memory (e. g. rate of 
presentation, age of subject, word frequency and imageability (Glanzer, 1972)), 
whereas the recency effect is only sensitive to delay. 
This explanation of the recency effect is not the only way one can explain these curves. 
It is true that recency effects are not just confined to the conventional free recall task' 
(Bjork and Whitten, 1974), and they also seem to occur in recall of events that occurred 
weeks or months earlier (Baddeley and Hitch, 1977). Recency may be attributable to 
the use of temporally based strategies for retrieving items from memory in general. 
Given that this is the case, some have claimed that it is not necessary to conceive of a 
dichotomy between Short and Long Term Memory (Crowder, 1993 ). 5 
4. More Neuropsychology 
The argument against a separate Short Term Memory based on this alternative 
explanation to recency effects sounds reasonable, but it fails to take into account certain 
empirical facts which argue in favour of the Short/Long Term Memory distinction. 
Baddeley and Warrington (1970) documented that anterograde amnesics show an intact 
recency effect but typically recall little else from the remainder of the list. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that amnesics have an intact Short Term Memory, but are 
unable to transfer items to Long Term Memory (see above). It is not clear how a 
retrieval strategy explanation would account for this. In addition, it is not clear how 
proponents of this position would explain the disruption to the recency effect when a 
distracting task precedes free recall (Glanzer and Cunitz, 1966). 
' The recency effects found in conventional free recall tasks however, are susceptible to delay: whereas 
the other effects are not susceptible to delay. One may argue therefore, that we are dealing with two 
separate phenomena. 
' Note the logic of this argument. Because recency also exists in Long Term Memory, there is no need 
to invoke the concept of a separate Short Term Memory system. In obviating the need for two Memory 
Systems this logic is similar to Melton's (1963) reasoning against having two systems in saying that 
interference is in common with both Long and Short Term Memor-Y. 
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The most compelling counter-argument to a "one system" view though, is the behaviour 
of patients who have suffered brain damage which leaves them with a digit span of only 
one or two items. According to a dual-memory theory, this reflects a defect in (verbal) 
Short Term Memory. Furthermore, these patients also have peculiarly shaped recency 
effects, decreased to little more than the last item of the list (Shallice and Warrington, 
1.979). 
Finally, consider what happens when these patients are tested in the situations that 
produce the long-term recency effects described above. In these tasks, the patients' 
perforrnance seems indistinguishable from normals (Vallar, Papagno and Baddeley, 
1991). It is difficult to interpret these findings without somehow postulating a distinct 
Short Term Memory responsible for the conventional free recall recency effect. Thus 
the recency data seem to provide support for the traditional interpretation of recency in 
free recall, and taken together with the other evidence, it provides good evidence for the 
Short/Long Term Memory distinction. Long-term recency effects may turn out to have a 
different source than the conventional recency effect. 
5. Capacity and Speed of Processing 
Further evidence for the distinction between separate storage systems stems from 
findings suggesting differences in capacity and speed of processing between the two 
structures. Short Tenn Memory has a limited storage capacity and a relatively rapid 
input and retrieval, in contrast to Long Term Memory, which has an enormous capacity 
but is slower to register information, and the information is more slowly retrieved from 
it. 
Arguments for the limited capacity of Short Term Memory come primarily from tasks 
such as digit span. Miller's (1956) classic paper, The magic number seven, revealed 
that there was a limited Short Term Memory span of about seven plus or minus two 
7 In further defence of using recency as a support for a separate Short Term Memory system, it is worth 
briefly discussing two findings by Baddeley and Hitch (1977) that are often quoted as evidence against a 
Short Term Memory account of recency. They found that performing articulatory suppression (e. g. 
saying "the, the, the'ý or carrying out a span task while reading a list did not wipe out the recency 
effect. As Pashler and Carrier (1996) point out, articulatory suppression may not fully suppress 
articulation and so may leave some of Short Term Memory free for encoding which in turn produces a 
recency effect in free recall. Their proof of this inadequacy of articulatory suppression is that if one 
perfonns articulatory suppression whilst reading a list of words, it is still possible to make rhyming 
judgements. In terms of the span task, Pashler and Carrier (1996) are quick to mention that the span list 
was presented in a different modality to the word list and as discussed later, could have allowed the 
recency items to inhabit a different Short Term Memory subsystem to the subsystem involved in the 
span component of the task. A more elegant explanation for this finding is explicitly addressed by Della 
Salla and Logic (1993), and it will be mentioned later in the discussion of the Baddeley and Hitch 
(1977) finding in section 1.3.2.3. 
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alternative chunks of information. Similarly, the recency effect in free recall is typically 
limited to about three items (Craik, 197 1 ), as if constrained by a limited capacity. 
Evidence that the input of data to Short Term Memory is rapid is supported by Murdock 
(1965). In his study, subjects sorted a deck of cards based on colour, suit, or by the 
properties of a card's number, at the same time as they heard a series of words for 
subsequent free recall. As a variable, Murdock varied the complexity of the categories 
into which the cards were to be sorted. The results of the study indicated that the greater 
the sorting load, the poorer the performance of subjects for all except the most recent 
items. The implication is that when receiving input into the Short Terrn Memory 
system, less attention is demanded than is necessary for long term learning. 
Evidence for the rapid retrieval from Short Term Memory was provided by Waugh 
(1970), using the digit probe task. In the digit probe task, subjects are presented with a 
sequence of 15 or 20 numbers, or other items. The sequence is followed by a probe 
item taken from the sequence and subjects must say which item followed the probe. 
Waugh (1970) noted that not only were more recent items more likely to be correct, but 
also that correct items from the recency portion of the curve were produced more 
rapidly than correct items from the earlier primacy component. The implication being, 
that the most recent items were stored in Short Term Memory, and that their retrieval 
from there was faster than for the items stored in Long Tenn Memory. 
1.2.2.3 Evaluating Early Models of Short Term Memory 
The models of Short Tenn Memory that I have mentioned in section 1.2.1.1 are 
supported to the extent that there is a separable Short Term Memory component. 
However certain aspects of the data actually go against the specifics of these models, 
and other evidence also raises problems with them. I will now discuss the problems 
with these models that are raised by the data. 
The major limitations of Broadbent's (1958) and Waugh and Norman's (1965) models 
were that these models only really dealt with verbal rehearsal and storage, and failed to 
specify alternative strategies for coding and retrieval. Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) 6 
model therefore aimed to revise and extend these models, and to this end, most 
criticisms of the Modal Model (see below in section 1.2.2.4) would also apply to these 
other two models. 
In terms of Production-Systems models, although they did pay attention to control 
processes, they were only really capable of simulating human behaviour if the number 
of "slots" available was increased far beyond any reasonable estimate of the immediate 
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memory span (Rumelhart and Norman, 1983). For example, OhIsson (1987) advanced 
a Production- System model of logical reasoning that incorporated a Short Term 
Memory of about 75 elements. Although the initiative for having slots in these systems 
emanated from the idea of chunking set forth by Miller (1956), subsequent research has 
suggested that chunking and other devices for enhancing memory performance actually 
enriches the organisational structure of Long Term Memory rather than that of Short 
Term Memory (Ericsson and Pennington, 1993). 
1.2.2.4 Problems with the Modal Model 
1. Neuropsychology 
A major problem with the Modal Model stemmed from the neuropsychological 
evidence. If the Short Term Store was a crucial system that is necessary for long term 
learning, then why should some patients with massive Short Tenn Memory 
impairments nonetheless show normal long term leaming? According to the Modal 
Model, the reduced auditory memory span of the patient with intact long-term learning 
ability (Shallice and Warrington, 1970) presents such a contradiction. 
2. Transfer to Long Term Memory 
A second problem for the Modal Model concerned its assumption that the probability 
that an item will be transferred to the Long Term Store will be a direct function of its 
time of maintenance in the Short Term Store. Tulving (1966) asked his subjects to 
repeatedly read through a list of words which were then included in a larger subsequent 
list which subjects had to study. There was no indication that the previous repetitions 
had enhanced subsequent learning: simply repeating the words did not increase their 
accessibility, whereas active subsequent learning did. Similarly, Morton (1967) 
demonstrated that when subjects were asked to reproduce the pattern of numbers and 
letters on the British telephone dial, they were unable to do so. Here was another 
example of how repeated exposure does not ensure entry into the Long Term Store. 
3. Recency Effect 
Regarding the recency effect, the Modal Model offers a simple and straightforward 
account, by assuming that it represents the immediate output of those items currently 
held in the Short Term Store. This would account for the lack of recency in free recall 
tasks for patients with an impaired Short Term span, and for normal subjects who have 
done a distracter task before test. However, the results of the Baddeley and Hitch 
(1977) study (mentioned in the footnote to section 1.2.2.2), where recency remains 
despite a concurrent digit span task, questions the Modal Model's explanation. Both 
span and recency should have competed for the same limited capacity Short Tenn Store. 
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4. Retrieval from Long Term Memory 
Further evidence from dual-task methodology questioned the assumption of the Modal 
Model that the Short Term Store was responsible for retrieval from Long Tenn Memory 
as well as for storage. Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge and Thomson (1984) found that a 
concurrent task (such as digit span or articulatory suppression) during the retrieval of a 
list of 32 words that subjects had previously learned, had no effect on the accuracy of 
performance. If the Short Tenn Store was involved in retrieval, surely it should have 
been pre-occupied with storing digits, and therefore be unable to retrieve the words 
from Long Tenn Memory. 
5. More Dual-task Methodology 
In a similar vein, more data from Baddeley and Hitch (1974) presented problems for the 
Modal Model. These authors tried to disrupt the operation of the Short Term Store by 
requiring subjects to remember sequences of up to six digits at the same time as they 
performed each of a range of Short Tenn Store tasks. In one study, they presented 
subjects with sequences of 16 unrelated words for free recall. Subjects heard the words 
and were simultaneously presented visually with groups of nought, three, or six digits, 
which they were required to recall immediately after the end of the free recall of the 
word list. In another study, words were presented visually and the digits in an auditory 
modality. 
Predictions from the Modal Model on the performance on the words are clear - the digit 
span task should depend on the Short Term Store, with three digits using up a 
substantial amount of it's resources and six digits being near span, virtually wiping it 
out. This in turn, should lead to a substantial impairment in performance on recall of the 
primacy items of the word lists (as transfer to Long Term Memory would be blocked), 
and to a total abolition of the recency effect (as the Short Term Store would be 
otherwise engaged). The obtained results went against these predictions. Three digits 
caused no significant impairment, whereas six digits led to a moderate but significant 
impairment in the primacy part of the curve, but did not impair the recency component. 
6. Visuospatial Short Term Memory 
Finally, evidence from Baddeley, Grant, Wight and Thomson (1975b) raises 
difficulties with the Modal Model. The Modal Model is able to deal with their finding 
that tracking a spot of light causes a marked impairment when subjects concurrently 
perform a visuospatial task. This is because, according to the Modal Model, their 
limited capacity Short Term Stores cannot cope with both tasks. However, what is 
puzzling according to this interpretation is that when their subjects' Short Terrn Stores 
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were engaged once again in the tracking task, they were now successful at concurrently 
performing a rote verbal memory task. 
1.2.3 Levels of Processing as an Alternative to the Modal Model 
As problems with the Modal Model began to accumulate, interest in Short Term 
Memory declined because many of the main researchers in the area moved into other 
areas (Baddeley 1990). The field seemed to be becoming increasingly fragmented with 
an excess of techniques and of individual models, but a lack of any overall generally 
agreed framework. 
The Modal Model had been an essentially structural model: it did have functional 
components such as control processes and encoding activities, but these were 
conceptually less important than the overall structural architecture. Craik and Lockhart's 
(1972) influential paper on Levels of Processing reversed this emphasis by 
playing-down structure and in stressing processing, suggesting that trace durability was 
a direct consequence of the processes of encoding, with deeper and more elaborate 
encoding leading to more durable memory traces. 
The attack of the Levels of Processing framework on the Modal Model was targeted 
mainly at the learning assumption made by the Modal Model. As mentioned above, 
studies showed that long-term learning did not necessarily involve transfer from the 
Short Term Store and the probability of transfer was not necessarily proportional to the 
time information spent in the Short Term Store (Craik and Watkins, 1973). 
The Levels of Processing framework absorbed much of the research effort that had 
previously been directed to understanding Short Term Memory (Baddeley, 1990). In 
some cases the familiar argument emerged that the new framework obviated the need 
for a concept such as Short Term Memory (Postman, 1975). However, Craik and 
Lockhart themselves continued to assume a Short Term or Primary Memory System 
that played an important part in the process of encoding and recoding. Although the 
theoretical power of Levels of Processing has been questioned (e. g. Baddeley, 1978), it 
remains a useful broad framework that ties together a good deal of evidence on the 
relationship between coding and Long Tenn Memory (e. g. Hyde and Jenkins, 1969; 
Craik and Simon, 1979). 
At the same time as Craik and Lockhart were developing and elaborating their approach, 
Baddeley and Hitch were attempting to tackle the problem of developing an adequate 
model of Short Term Memory from a somewhat different viewpoint (Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1974). In particular, they were concerned with the question of whether Short 
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Term Memory acted as a "Working Memory". The term Working Memory implies a 
system for the temporary holding and manipulation of information during the 
performance of a range of cognitive tasks, such as comprehension, leaming and 
reasoning. The model successfully takes into account much of the traditional Short 
Tenn Memory data as a separate Short Term Memory system that faces capacity 
limitations. 
1.3 Working Memory 
1.3.1 Overview of the Model: Fractionating Short Term Memory 
Although Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) had previously raised the possibility that Short 
Term Memory was not unitary, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that the concept of 
a unitary Short Tenn Memory system be completely abandoned, and replaced by a 
tripartite system. Baddeley and Hitch's model assumes the attentional controller, the 
Central Executive, aided by two "slave systems", each of which being able to actively 
maintain information of a particular kind. The Visuospatial Sketchpad' is assumed to 
hold and manipulate information about objects and locations, while the Phonological 
Loop is a system that is assumed to be capable of storing and manipulating 
speech-based information. Digit span is assumed to depend principally on this latter 
system, although executive processes will be required to maintain the operation of the 
Phonological Loop when task demands are sufficiently high (Hitch and Baddeley, 
1976). Similarly, the involvement of the Central Executive in Visuospatial Sketchpad 
functioning would also hold for equally demanding visuospatial tasks. 
Note that with this analysis, even when a subject is performing at the limit of span, this 
does not necessarily imply that executive processes are fully stretched. According to the 
model, the level of performance on a task such as digit span (which involves minimal 
complex processing) will be determined by storage limitations in the Phonological 
Loop, with the result that sub ects who are performing at the limits of digit span will j 
still have executive capacity left over for performing other tasks such as reasoning and 
comprehension. It is also important to realise that this part of the system deals with 
Long Term Memory, and that these activities are independent of storage in the slave 
systems. 
7 Although originally labelled the VisuospatiaIScratch-pad, Baddeley (1986) states that "Visuospatial 
Sketchpad" is the prefen-ed term for this component of Working Memory. This is because, according to 
Baddeley, "Visuospatial Skctchpad" denotes storage of purely visual shapes, whereas Visuospatial 
Scratchpad may suggest verbal notes as much as it does visual shapes. 
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The Phonological Loop itself consists of two components: a passive Phonological Store 
and an Articulatory Rehearsal Process 8. Information gains access to the Phonological 
Store either directly, via auditory presentation of speech stimuli, or indirectly, via 
internally generated phonological codes for non-auditory inputs such as printed words 
or familiar objects. Phonological representations of memory items decay rapidly in the 
Phonological Store within two seconds, if unrehearsed (Baddeley, Thomson and 
Buchanaan, 1975a). Subvocal rehearsal occurs serially and in real time, and acts to 
refresh decaying representations in the Phonological Store. 
The Visuospatial Sketchpad's architecture is not as clear-cut as the Phonological Loop, 
and one option is that it is a unitary sub-system with separable dimensions for visual 
and spatial information (Baddeley, 1996). Another possibility is that it has two primary 
subcomponents like the Phonological Loop (Logie, 1994). According to this 
formulation, there is a Visual Store in which the physical characteristics of objects and 
events can be represented, and a spatial mechanism that can be used for planning 
movements and that may also serve a rehearsal function by reactivating the contents of 
the visual store. The evidence for the Visuospatial Sketchpad's architecture will be soon 
be examined. 
1.3.2 New Solutions to Old Problems 
The problems that were raised with the Modal Model are solved with the Working 
Memory model, as outlined below. 
1.3.2.1 Neuropsychology 
The patients with impaired Short Term Memory perfon-nance (Shallice and Warrington, 
1970) whose deficit posed problems to the earlier models of Short Term Memory, are 
explained very neatly by this model. The reason why these patients could function 
relatively well in other cognitive domains could not have been because their whole 
Short Term Memory Systems were impaired. Rather, their performance on the digit 
span tasks reflected a local impairment of their Phonological Loop. This however, will 
not have prevented the Central Executive or the Sketchpad being used by these patients 
for long term learning and general information processing. 
1.3.2.2 Transfer to Long Term Memory 
With the Working Memory Model, there is no need to assume that by simply having Zý- 
information entering Short Tenn Memory, there will be transfer to Long Term Memory, 
as there was in the Modal Model. Recall (from section 1.2.2.4) the evidence which 
" Also termed here the "Articulatory Control Process". 
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showed that repeated exposure does not ensure entry to Long Term Memory posed a 
problem for the Modal Model. With the fractionation of Short Term Memory, 
information can just be stored in a slave system and maintained, and at the discretion of 
the Central Executive, transfer to Long Tenn Memory is possible. 
1.3.2.3 Recency Effect 
Because span and recency should compete for the same limited capacity Short Tenn 
Store, the fact that recency remains despite a concurrent digit span task (Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1977) questioned the Modal Model's explanation. Della Sala and Logie (1993) 
suggest that recency is attributable to the Phonological Store, and that span tasks are 
attributable to the Articulatory Rehearsal Process. They cite evidence for this including 
neuropsychological. evidence of a double dissociation between recency and span 
(Capitani, Della Sala, Logie and Spinnler, 1992), and further evidence that errors in 
recency are phonologically based (Shallice, 1975) whereas span tasks are affected by 
articulatory suppression. 
1.3.2.4 Retrievalftom Long Term Memory 
Baddeley et al. (1984) found that subjects were able to retrieve from Long Term 
Memory at the same time as engaging their Short Term Memory in a concurrent digit 
span task. Recall that the Modal Model would not have predicted this, since the Short 
Term Store is both responsible for retrieval from Long Tenn Memory and short ten-D 
storage. Clearly the Working Memory model has no problem with this, as the Central 
Executive can retrieve from Long Tenn Memory independently to the activities of the 
Phonological Loop, as long as output does not heavily involve the Phonological Loop. 
1.3.2.5 Dual-task Methodology 
The Modal Model made firm predictions in Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) study where 
the load of a digit span task was systematically varied as subjects concurrently engaged 
in learning word lists. Because it contained a unitary Short Term Store, with a load of 
three digits there should have been some interference on performance in the list learning 
task, and with six digits, deleterious consequences. However, the results that three 
digits caused no significant impairment and six digits only a moderate impairment, 
questions whether the two tasks are sharing the same unitary Short Term Store. The 
Working Memory Model allows concurrent processing by the Central Executive during 
a dual-task, and thus list learning (and other more complex tasks) can benefit from 
executive resources. Furthermore, if a slave system is not pushed to capacity, the 
Central Executive will have plenty of free resources and performance will remain 
relatively unimpaired. 
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1.3.2.6 Visuospatial Short Tenn Memory 
The fact that two concurrent visual tasks interfere with one another, but that a 
concurrent visual and verbal task do not impede each other's performance (Baddeley, et 
al., 1975b) is perplexing for the Modal Model. However, given the separate slave 
sub-systems that specialise in the storage of the two modalities of information in this 
study, the Working Memory Model can explain the effect. The interference observed 
when there are two visual tasks is due to the fact that information from both tasks are 
competing for the Visuospatial Sketchpad. However, when one task is verbal and the 
other visual, the Phonological Loop and the Visuospatial Sketchpad can independently 
store the relevant information, preventing interference between the concurrent activities. 
1.3.3 The Components of Working Memory 
1.3.3.1 Introduction 
Now that the Working Memory Model has been presented as a viable model of Short 
Term Memory, I will discuss each of its components in turn. It should be noted though, 
that by far the greatest amount of research has been directed at understanding the 
Phonological Loop. However, because my empirical work deals with an ostensibly 
visuospatial task, I will examine the Visuospatial Sketchpad in the greatest detail. 
1.3.3.2 The Central Executive 
1. The Supervisory Attentional System 
The Central Executive is the most complex and least understood component of the 
Working Memory Model. Initially, the Central Executive was neglected in favour of 
tackling the more tractable slave systems. More recently though, it has been specified in 
a little more detail, incorporating the Norman and Shallice (1980) model of the 
attentional control of action (Baddeley, 1986). Norman and Shallice assume that routine 
activity is controlled by means of a series of over-learned schemata whereby past 
experience interacts with environmental cues and prompts. When two schemata require 
action that is inconsistent, then conflict-resolution procedures come into operation so as 
to allow the schema with the highest priority to gain precedence. However, when novel 
situations arise, either in emergency or through encountering situations that are 
non-routine, a second system comes into operation, the Supervisory Attentional 
System. This system operates by changing the probabilities of actions so as to allow the 
existing schema to be overridden. 
Slips of action are explained on the basis of the triggering of inappropriate schemata. 
For example, setting off to drive somewhere, but finding that one automatically drives 
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to work instead. The routes may have a common start, and if the Supervisory 
Attentional System is occupying itself with other matters, a more frequent work-driving 
plan takes over. 
Patients with frontal lobe damage tend to show a strange combinations of distractibility 
(Shallice, Burgess, Schon, and Baxter, 1989) and perseveration (Baddeley and Wilson, 
1986). The distractibility is illustrated by the phenomenon of utilisation of behaviour, in 
which the patients will respond, often inappropriately, by manipulating any object that 
comes to hand. So if there is a glass on the table they tend to pick it up and drink from 
it, and if there is a pen there they will write with it, and so on. Perseveration. occurs 
when the subject appears to have great difficulty in breaking away from a given pattern 
of responding. An example would be where a patient appears to be stuck in a loop of 
repeating an aspect of a story that they are telling. 
Shallice suggests that patients with frontal lobe damage have a deficit in the operation of 
the Supervisory Attentional. System, which results in difficulty in the attentional control 
of action. Utilisation behaviour occurs because the system is captured by any triggering 
stimulus that occurs in the absence of long-term Supervisory Attentional System 
control. In a situation where there are many stimuli, a succession of different schemata 
are triggered. Perserveration occurs when one schema dominates, and captures the 
attentional system. In its original formulation, two separate subprocesses are proposed 
for routine and novel actions. Later formulations stress that both processes can occur 
together, but routine tasks rely more on schema based control processes, whereas new 
tasks place heavier demands on the Supervisory Attentional System (Shallice and 
Burgess, 1993) 
2. Random Generation 
It was thus proposed that the Central Executive operated in broadly the same way as 
Norman and Shallice's Supervisory Attentional System (Baddeley, 1986). Adoption of 
the model provided an explanation of an otherwise puzzling phenomenon, namely the 
limited capacity for 'random generation'. If subjects are asked to produce a stream of 
random letters at rate of one per second, they rapidly find that they are deviating from 
randomness and producing sequences that follow the alphabetic stereotype (e. g. PQR), 
or generating common acronyms such as USA and BBC. The effect is not due to a false 
concept of randomness, as it disappears if subjects are allowed to respond more slowly. 
It appears to be linked to available attentional resources, as randomness declines 
systernafically with speed of generation. It is also lawfully related to the demands of a 
concurrent task such as choice reaction time. 
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The pattern of results can be explained with the assumption that the selected task 
requires the rapid selection of responses, while avoiding the stereotypy that would be 
produced by existing habits. The greater the capacity of the Supervisory Attentional. 
System, or the more the available time, the better the chance of selecting a novel 
response and avoiding a stereotyped letter, or the repetition of items that are readily 
available because recently used. 
If random generation is dependent in this way on the Supervisory Attentional System, 
then it should prove a powerful way of disrupting the operation of the Central 
Executive. In a range of studies on the role of Working Memory in chess, random 
generation has proved to be a particularly potent way of disrupting performance, 
whereas articulating a predictable stream of spoken items at the same rate has no effect 
(Robbins, Anderson, Barker, Bradley, Fearnyhough, Henson, Hudson and Baddeley, 
1996). The effectiveness of random generation does not depend on using letters or, 
indeed on verbal output. Baddeley (1993) reports the details of a study which explores 
a task in which subjects are required to attempt to generate random key presses. This 
condition is contrasted to one in which the keys were pressed in a systematic order. 
Degree of randomness is substantially disrupted by a range of tasks that would be 
expected to depend on the functioning of the Central Executive, ranging from problem 
solving to generating items from semantic categories. 
3. Role of the Central Executive 
A prime feature of the function of the Central Executive is to co-ordinate information 
from a number of different sources. Baddeley and colleagues have tried to use this 
assumption in designing tests that aim to elucidate the role of the Central Executive in 
Alzheimer's disease (Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Della Sala, and Spinnler, 1986). Earlier 
studies had suggested the possibility of an executive deficit in this disease, and this was 
explored by choosing two tasks that loaded separately on the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
and Phonological Loop, adjusting the level of performance on each so that the patients 
were functioning at a similar error rate to the controls. The two tasks were then 
combined in true dual-task methodology style. Normal elderly subjects are no more 
disrupted by the requirement to combine the two sources of information than are young 
subjects, provided the level of difficulty is matched. On the other hand, Alzheimer 
patients are markedly impaired, with the degree of dual-task disruption increasing 
systematically as the disease progresses, in contrast to their relatively stable 
performance on the individual component measures. 
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1.3.3.3 The Phonological Loop 
1. Phonological Store 
Much of the early work on Short Term Memory focused on the storage of verbal 
information, and these studies can be understood to involve Working Memory's 
Phonological Loop component. Evidence on the nature of the Phonological Store comes 
principally from two phenomena. The first is the phonological similarity effect, 
whereby similar sounding items such as the letters pgvct are harder to remember 
accurately than a dissimilar sequence such as kyrws (Conrad and Hull, 1964). This 
is assumed to occur because the items are stored in terms of a phonological or a 
speech-based code; as the items fade, the similar items have fewer distinguishing 
features and hence are more subject to error. 
A second phenomenon that supports the concept of the Phonological Store is the 
irrelevant speech effect (Colle and Welsh, 1976). If a subject is trying to remember a 
sequence of visually presented numbers, then performance will be disrupted by the 
presence of simultaneous irrelevant spoken material. The disrupting effect is just as 
strong if the irrelevant material comprises nonsense as when it contains real words. 
Even other digits cause little additional problems over and above that of any other 
spoken items. The irrelevant speech effect does not appear to reflect simple distraction 
either, as bursts of white noise have no effect on performance, and neither does the 
intensity of the iffelevant stimulus, provided that it is clearly audible (Salam6 and 
Baddeley, 1982). The effect is explained by the Working Memory model by assuming 
that spoken material gains obligatory access to the Phonological Store, where it is able 
to corrupt the memory trace9. 
2. Articulatory Control Processes 
Characteristics of the Articulatory Control Process are indicated by two phenomena, the 
word length effect and the effects of articulatory suppression. If a subject's memory 
span for words is measured, then it becomes clear that span for long words such as 
opportunity, individual, and university, is substantially less than that for short words 
' It should be noted however, that Jones (1994) has suggested an alternative explanation for the effect 
According to Jones, the effect of irrelevant speech in the serial recall of visually presented verbal 
sequences can be produced with non-speech material such as tones that vary from moment to moment. 
In contrast to this, invariant non-speech stimuli do not result in any disruption of serial recall. Jones 
contends that the irrelevant speech effect can be understood by supposing that the recall of order 
information is disrupted by any auditory stream that changes state, and that it is not specifically a 
speech-based phenomenon. Nevertheless, what should become clear form the evidence reviewed in this 
chapter, is that the specified nature of the components of Working Memory does not depend on the 
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such as sum, harm, and wit (Baddeley, et al., 1975a). This is what is termed as the 
word length effect. Indeed, memory span is linearly related to the spoken duration of 
the constituent items. This leads to consistent differences in digit span across different 
languages, dependent on how long digits take to articulate in that language (Ellis and 
Henelly, 1980). In addition to this, the development of digit span over childhood 
parallels an increase in articulation rate, suggesting that much of the increase may be 
due to the capacity of the child to rehearse more rapidly (Hitch, Halliday, and Littler, 
1984). 1 shall return to this briefly in the next chapter in section 2.2.3.1, during my 
review of Working Memory development. 
Baddeley et al. (1975a) propose that the word length effect occurs because subjects 
maintain the memory trace by recycling the items, with span being set by the joint 
function of the rate of decay of the trace and the speed with which it can be refreshed by 
rehearsal. As rehearsal occurs in real time according to the model, long words are 
rehearsed more slowly, allowing more forgetting and hence leading to a reduced span. 
However, a major part of the word length effect may arise from the delay in recall due 
to longer time taken to produce the 'long word" sequences at recall (Cowan Saults, 
Keller, Johnson, and Flores, 1992). 1 will describe some studies that demonstrate this, 
at the end of the chapter (in section 1.3.4.1). 
If subjects are prevented from rehearsing the material to be remembered, by the 
requirement to repeatedly utter some irrelevant sound such as the word the, then 
performance is impaired (Murray, 1968). This is termed articulatory suppression. Overt 
articulatory suppression, of course, does lead to the creation of irrelevant speech, and 
so it could be argued that the two effects are confounded. However, Gupta and 
Macwhinnie (1995) have shown that suppression has a powerful effect that is over and 
above any influence of irrelevant speech. Suppression also removes the word length 
effect, provided it occurs during both input and written recall (Baddeley, Lewis and 
Vallar, 1984). If the subject is not subvocally rehearsing, then it does not matter how 
long the words are, indicating that articulatory suppression and the word length effect 
emanate from the same source, namely the Articulatory Rehearsal Process. 
Articulatory suppression also interferes with the phonological recoding of visually 
presented materials. Thus, the phonological similarity effect occurs with visual or 
auditory presentation. But when a subject is required to suppress articulation, then 
phonological similarity has no influence on visual presentation, although it continues to 0 
irrelevant speech effect alone. The full implications of Jones's results for the current model of Wo4ing 
Memory remain to be explored- 
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have an effect when presentation is auditory (Baddeley et al., 1984). If the stimuli used 
are such that the subject cannot name the visually presented material, then it must be 
stored in some non-phonological code. With auditory presentation, direct phonological 
representation is guaranteed however, without the need to recode through articulation. 
3. Neuropsychology of the Phonological Loop 
The simple Phonological Loop model offers a clear interpretation of the patients with 
defective Short Term Memory performance (see section 1.2.2.2). Such patients 
typically show reduced memory span, and this is particularly with auditory 
presentation. With visual presentation, they typically show no evidence of phonological 
similarity and no word length effect (Vallar and Shallice, 1990). The Working Memory 
model says that these patients have an impairment in the Phonological Loop system, 
which may reflect either a defective store (Vallar and Baddeley, 1984), or in other cases 
a defective operation of the articulatory control process, usually in association with 
dyspraxia'O (Caplan, Rochon, and Waters, 1992). 
4. Role of the Phonological Loop 
As I have just indicated, the previously described Short Term Memory deficit patients 
appear to have a deficit in the Phonological Loop system (Vallar and Shallice, 1990). 
The assumption has been made that they presumably do not suffer the general cognitive 
disturbance that would be predicted by the Modal Model, because they have preserved 
Central Executive and Visuospatial Sketchpad functioning. On the other hand, the fact 
that such patients appear to have so few problems in coping with everyday life, raises 
the question of the function served by the Phonological Loop. 
A clue to answering this question was given by a study (Baddeley, Papagno, and 
Vallar, 1988), in which a patient with a very pure phonological memory deficit was 
required to learn either pairs of words in her native language (e. g house-dog) or the 
Russian equivalent of familiar words (e. g. rose-svieti). She proved to be normal at 
standard paired associates learning, but was very poor at new phonological learning. 
Later studies (Papagno, Valentine, and Baddeley, 1991) have attempted to simulate this 
using articulatory suppression with normal subjects, and have shown that whereas 
paired associate learning is unaffected by suppression, foreign language vocabulary 
learning is clearly impaired. 
This idea will be touched upon again in the next chapter (section 2.2.3.1), when I 
review the developmental literature on the Phonological Loop. The basic evidence 
" This is a condition characterised by painful movement and difficulty in moving. 
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seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that the Phonological Loop has evolved, 
probably from more basic auditory perception and verbal production mechanisms, as a 
device for language acquisition. Impaired functioning of the Phonological Loop is 
therefore likely to be much more troublesome for a child, who is just leaming language 
and related skills such as reading, than it is for an adult. Hence the Short Term Memory 
deficit in adult patients' cognitive functions are relatively spared only because they have 
already acquired language in their youth. 
1.3.3.4 The Visuospatial Sketchpad 
1. Experimental Dissociations 
I have already mentioned (in section 1.3.2.6) the dual-task study by Baddeley et al. 
(1975b) which demonstrated the independence of visual and verbal Short Term 
Memory. This is just one of a few pieces of evidence that displays the severely 
disruptive effects of concurrent visual tasks on other visual tasks, but not on verbal 
tasks. Recall that Baddeley et al (1975b) used a task that required retention of 
visuospatial images in conjunction with a visual tracking task for "disruption", and the 
tracking task with a concurrent rote verbal memory task for "no disruption". Baddeley, 
Bressi, Della Sala, Logie and Spinnler (1986), for example, demonstrated a further lack 
of disruption using a standard digit span task together with a visuospatial tracking task. 
Other demonstrations of this type include Farmer, Berman and Fletcher's (1986) study, 
where articulatory suppression impaired performance on a reasoning test, but had no 
effect on the performance of a visuospatial manipulation test, known as the Manikin test 
(Benson and Gedye, 1963). In the same experiment, Farmer et al. (1986) showed that 
concurrent arm movement disrupted performance on the Manikin test, but had no effect 
on the reasoning task. The interpretation given in by the authors in these findings is that 
both arm movement and visuospatial processing share a cognitive resource that is not 
required for articulatory suppression, nor for the verbal reasoning test. The latter two 
tasks thus involve the Phonological Loop, a verbal cognitive resource that is quite 
different to that used in the visuospatial tasks. Finally, Logie, Zucco and Baddeley, 
(1990) established that concurrent arithmetic dramatically impairs retention of a visually 
presented letter sequence, but has negligible effects on the retention of a visual matrix 
pattern. Conversely, a concurrent visuospatial imagery construction task interferes with 
retention of the matrix pattern, but has very little effect on memory for a random letter 
sequence. 
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2. Neuropsychological Dissociations 
Data from neuropsychological patients, can also be used to dissociate verbal and 
visuospatial Short Term Memory. This comes from the report of patients with verbal 
Short Term Memory deficits, who perform within the normal range on tests of visual 
and spatial processing. For example, patient KF (Shallice and Warrington, 1970) had 
an auditory digit span of two items, but a visual presentation span of four items. 
Moreover, his errors in recall of visually presented letters tended to be based on visual 
confusions rather than on phonological confusions (Warrington and Shallice, 1972). 
The implication being that he was able to use his Visuospatial Sketchpad, but had 
suffered damage to his Phonological Loop. Saffran and Marin (1975) describe a patient 
IL, who had an auditory digit span of 2.9 and a visual digit span greater than 5. These 
patterns are contrary to those found in normal adult subjects where auditory digit span 
is typically superior to visual digit span (Conrad, 1964). Once again, IL provides 
evidence of someone who was not able to use the Phonological Loop, but was able to 
use the Visuospatial Sketchpad. 
There are also patients who appear to have visual and/or spatial Short Term Memory 
deficits, but who perform within the normal range for verbal Short Tenn Memory 
tasks. De Renzi and Nichelli (1975) document two cases of right hemisphere 
brain-damaged patients with pathologically poor performance on the Corsi span task" 
(score of 2.5), compared with performance well within the normal range on the digit 
span and digit pointing (scores between 6.5 and 7.5). 
3. Localisation within the Brain 
At a general level, it appears that the fight hemisphere is more important in processing 
information that would be handled by a visuospatial memory system (de Renzi and 
Nichelli, 1975). Cortical excisions for temporal cortical epilepsy on the fight hand-side 
impair spatial memory, but do not hamper verbal Short Term Memory (Corkin, 1965). 
A more specific role of the hippocampus has been shown in man (Petrides, 1985), and 
confirmed in animal studies (Olton, Becker and Handelman, 1979). In these studies, 
the authors go so far as to implicate the area of CA3 of the hippocampus, where the 
so-cafled "place cells" are probably located. However, this assumption is still somewhat 
controversial (Jarrard, 1993). 
" This is Corsi's block tapping test, in which the subject is presented with an array of nine blocks 
scattered in a quasi-random manner (Milner, 1971). The experimenter taps a sequence of blocks, and the 
subject attempts to imitate the sequence. As with digit span, performance is measured by the longest 
sequence that can successfully be replicated, and is usually about two items less than digit span. 
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The most frequent lesions noted in patients presenting visuospatial memory deficits are 
in the posterior part of the right hemisphere, namely the posterior parietal lobe near its 
junction with the occipital lobe (Warrington and James, 1967). This is significant since 
this localisation is not only different from that proposed for the Phonological Loop and 
global amnesia, but also from the site implicated in processing visuaRy presented verbal 
material (Kinsbourne and Warrington, 1962). 
4. Architecture of the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
The model for the Phonological Loop that was discussed above emerged due to the 
accumulation of a large body of evidence, which in turn produced a framework within 
which theoretical questions could be asked and explored experimentally. However, the 
relative lack of evidence on the Visuospatial Sketchpad has been accompanied by a lack 
of an explicit model or framework for studying visuospatial Working Memory. 
The basic function of the Visuospatial Sketchpad must be some means by which 
information gets into the memory system from the senses or from longer term storage. 
Given that it holds information on a temporary basis, the system must be subject to a 
process by which information may be lost over time, whether through decay of the 
memory trace or through interference from new material. Such a system must have 
some means to extend the retention of a particular material should this be necessary. 
Finally, given that it is a system that purports to store or manipulate visual and/or spatial 
material, the memory code involved should have some relationship with the 
characteristics of the visual and spatial material with which the system has to deal. 
These are general requirements of any temporary memory system, and probably strike a 
chord with the structure of the Phonological Loop. This is no coincidence. It will 
become clear that the attempt to model the Visuospatial Sketchpad takes the 
Phonological Loop's structure as the starting point. 
Recall that one of the recurring themes in the discussion of the Phonological Loop was 
that there appeared to be an overlap between the speech system and verbal short term 
storage (ie. phonological similarity effect and word length effect). The search for a 
parallel overlap between the visuo-perceptual system and the Visuospatial Sketchpad in 
the Visuospatial Sketchpad will be examined in four different ways. Firstly, through a 
careful analysis of the relationship between visual imagery and visual short term 
storage. Secondly, investigating whether visual and spatial information are dealt with in 
the same way by the Visuospatial Sketchpad. Thirdly, examining whether visual 
similarity of stimuli will result in confusions in memory. Finally, I shall briefly examine 
whether there are visual recency effects, since the verbal recency effect had such an 
impact on research of models of Short Term Memory. 
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a. Visual Imagery 
A theme in studying the link between visual Working Memory and visual imagery has 
been to investigate effects for highly imageable material. One well established finding is 
that concrete words are easier to recall than abstract words. Paivio (1971) has suggested 
that this is due to the possibility of dual coding with concrete words. That is, concrete 
words can be coded in terms of the attributes of the word, such as its sound, length and 
so on. It can also be remembered in the form of a visual image of the class of objects 
named by the words (e. g. table, dog). On the other hand, abstract words are very 
difficult to image in this way and just generate a verbal code. The availability of two 
codes for concrete words, according to Paivio, leads to an advantage in recall for this 
material. 
Baddeley et al. (1975b) set out to explore whether the temporary visuospatial 
processing and storage system is involved in the appearance of the recall advantage for 
concrete words. At first sight it appears that Paivio's verbal code could be associated 
with the Phonological Loop and his visual code could be reinterpreted as visuospatial 
Working Memory. The retention of information may therefore be better when the 
representation includes material held in both the Phonological Loop and in the visual 
and spatial stores. They reasoned that if concrete words were recalled better for this 
reason, then concurrent visuospatial processing should undermine this advantage. The 
hypothesis was tested by trying to induce interference with a concurrent pursuit visual 
tracking task, but there was no such disruption. This lead them to the conclusion that 
the concrete-abstract difference was due to the richness of semantic associations for 
concrete words rather than the use of visual imagery. This conclusion has received 
further support from the work of Jones (1988) who showed that the concreteness effect 
was highly correlated with the ease with which subjects could generate predicates of the 
words or specify ways in which the word could be used 12 . 
12 It may be important to first consider the difference in approach between the visual imagery theorists' 
(e. g. Kosslyn, 1991) idea of a 'Visual Buffer', involved in manipulating visual images, and the concept 
of the Visuospatial Sketchpad in the Working Memory literature. This difference can be summarised as 
follows. In the Working Memory literature, there is an explicit involvement of the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad in a collection of systems involved in temporary storage and processing. The Visual Buffer, 
however, has been regarded largely in the context of its relationship with long term visual memory and 
with visual perception. Different tasks and techniques have been used by the two literatures, and it is 
uncertain whether the same mechanisms are involved in both sets of tasks. For example, in the 
Working Memory literature, there is considerable emphasis on temporary storage of visual and spatial 
information. In the imagery literature, there is an emphasis on the generation and manipulation of 
visual images. This could be put better by saying that a combination of the Visuospatial Sketchpad and 
the Central Executive of Working Memory could incorporate some of the processes and concepts in 
imagery research. Baddeley (1986) has suggested that an imagery task with a relatively precise spatial 
component (like the Brooks matrix task - see main text in this section), is more likely to place huge 
demands on the Visuospatial Sketchpad, as it requires accurate maintenance and rehearsal, whereas a task 
such as a peg Nvord mnemonic (see also this section), will allow considerable "spatial flexibility". 
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From the perspective of Working Memory, a more fruitful approach stemmed from the 
work of Brooks (1968). In one of his studies, Brooks asked subjects to perform either 
a visual imagery task or a verbal task. The imagery task involved asking subjects to 
imagine a4x4 arrangement of squares, which was followed by a sequence of 
sentences describing a path around the squares, and the described path could easily be 
retained by means of visual imagery. Work by Brooks revealed that the spatial 
sequences are better retained when presented auditorily, rather than visually. Brooks 
interpreted his results to mean that the representation of the visual pattern evoked by the 
spatial sequences relies on a visuospatial coding system that mutually interferes with the 
visual processing of written material. 
Baddeley et al. (1975b) combined the Brooks' task with a concurrent tracking task. 
They found that recall of the imageable sequence was disrupted by concurrent tracking, 
but tracking had no effect on recall of equivalent verbal sequences which could be 
retained only by verbal rehearsal. In a follow-up study, Baddeley and Lieberman 
(1980) demonstrated that the Brooks' matrix task was also disrupted by a tracking task 
that was spatial but not visual. This was achieved by having the subject point to a 
moving sound source. Retention of the matrix was not affected by a concurrent purely 
visual task, in which subjects made judgements about the brightness of a field of light. 
This pattern of results led Baddeley and Lieberman to suggest that the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad was indeed a system that was involved in visuospatial retention, and in 
visuospatial perception and motor control. They also concluded that the system was 
most likely to be a spatial system rather than a purely visual or a visuospatial one. 
These conclusions were challenged by Logie (1986). He suggested that Baddeley and 
Lieberman's results could not be generalised on the basis of a single task. Logie used a 
paired-associate leaming paradigm, instead of the Brooks task, in which subjects under 
one condition were encouraged to use a pegword mnemonic. This involved learning 
rhyming imageable pegwords for each digit from I to 10 and forming an image of the 
pegword interacting with the items to be remembered. Performance was compared with 
a condition in which the use of imagery was minimised by instruction and by rapid 
presentation. Logie discovered that a range of visual, but relatively non-spatial tasks, 
would interfere specifically with the use of a mnemonic. While the strongest disruption 
occurred when the subjects passively observed line drawings, significant impainnent 
(Baddeley goes on to concede that the non-spatial characteristics of visual imagery present themselves as 
a puzzling question). Given these differences, both in the theoretical concepts and techniques used, there 
is considerable ambiguity as to whether the two literatures are studying the same phenomena or 
functional mechanism. For these reasons, since this chapter is concerned Nvith Working Memory, I 
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was found even when material that was as non-spatial as patches of colour were used. 
The effect of irrelevant patterns appears to be analogous to the effect of irrelevant 
speech on the Phonological Loop. 
Taken together, these studies establish that the Visuospatial Sketchpad is associated 
with both highly visual and highly spatial imagery tasks. Perhaps more interestingly, it 
has brought up the issue of the characteristics of the Visuospatial Sketchpad. It raises 
the possibility that the Visuospatial Sketchpad itself may be fractionated into separate 
visual and spatial components. I now turn to this issue which centres around the 
essential nature of the Visuospatial Sketchpad. 
b. Visuospatial Sketchpad: Visual or Spatial? 
The argument to posit a multi-component Visuospatial Sketchpad does not end with an 
examination of the literature on visual imagery. Evidence also comes from the 
neuropsychological evidence. Holmes (1918) reports cases of soldiers suffering from 
gunshot wounds in World War One, who appeared to show evidence of a separable 
disruption of visual and spatial coding. Hence one patient was able to locate objects 
accurately ("where"), but not to identify them ("what"), whereas a second showed 
exactly the opposite pattern suggesting separate coding of what and where. More 
recently Farah, Hammond, Levine and Calvanio (1988) reported a patient who 
appeared to have a deficit in the performance of visual imagery tasks, but had spared 
function for spatial imagery tasks. The visual imagery tasks involved judgements of 
colour or size ("which is darker green, the leaves of trees or grass? " or "which is larger, 
a mouse or an ant? "). Hanley, Young and Pearson (1991) described a patient, ELD, 
who appeared to have the opposite deficit, namely a sparing of visual imagery, but with 
a problem in spatial processing. 
Psychophysiological measures involving blood flow within the brain also pinpoint the 
two possible sub-systems that were implicated in visual imagery tasks. Farah (1988) 
reports that one system appears to be dependent on the occipital lobes of the brain and is 
involved in representing the physical appearance of objects such as their colour and 
shape. The other sub-system is responsible for spatial information, and appears to be 
more dependent on the parietal lobes. 
Logie (1989) has in fact conjectured that the retention of visual features and static 
patterns is due to a passive Visual Store (mirroring the Phonological Store) in the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad, and irrelevant visual input is thought to enter into it and disrupt 
shall concentrate primarily on the Visuospatial Sketchpad literature. When there is a clear link with 
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its contents (paralleling the irrelevant speech effect). This visual temporary memory 
system is therefore responsible for merely retaining static images. He also postulates a 
separate spatial rehearsal mechanism (resembling the articulatory control process) which 
is involved in the coding and retrieval of sequences of spatial locations and in planning 
movement. This particular idea remains relatively speculative; it was introduced here 
mainly to demonstrate how the structure of the Visuospatial Sketchpad has been 
influenced by that of the Phonological Loop. 
c. Are there Visual Similafity Effects in the Visuospadai Sketchpad? 
The question is whether confusions arise in memory for visually similar materials. 
There is indeed evidence that visual confusions occur when subjects attempt to 
remember visually presented letters or characters that are visually similar to one another. 
Hue and Ericsson (1988) reported visual similarity effects in immediate recall of 
unfamiliar Chinese characters. Wolford and Hollingsworth (1974) reported visual 
confusion errors in the recall of verbal stimuli that were presented visually, but very 
briefly. Frick (1988) has argued that images in visual Short Term Memory are both 
unparsed and uncategorised. So, for example, Frick reports that when visual confusion 
errors occur in retention of letters, there appears to be independent degradation of the 
parts of the letter. Thus the letter "Y' might be mistakenly recalled as an "R'. Also, 
when subjects are asked to retain visually presented numbers, the font in which the 
number is printed appears to be associated with the incidence of visual confusion rather 
than the number itself. So for instance a square block character for the digit '9' is 
mistakenly recalled as an '8', more often than if the digit '9' is displayed as a 
continuous curve 13 . Despite these confusions, subjects have no difficulty in identifying 
the digits when they are presented in different fonts, confirming the idea that the visual 
confusions arise because of the nature of the code stored in temporary visual memory, 
rather than because of difficulties in perceiving the presented digits. 
There is a lack of data on the visual similarity effect because most visually presented 
material is phonologically recoded, and so Performance will not show sensitivity to 
visual similarity. However, one way to go about exploring visual similarity is to ensure 
that subjects are not using their Phonological Loop. There are two approaches to 
achieving this, one is to get them to perform articulatory suppression whilst performing 
a visual task, and the other is to use a sample of subjects who use their Visuospatial 
Sketchpad in preference to their Phonological Loop. The second approach will be 
expanded upon in the next chapter (in section 2.2.3.1), and it involves using young 
children as subjects (Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal and Schraagen, 1988). 
Working Memory, I will refer to the imagery literature. 
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An example of a study that employs the first approach is reported by Della Sala and 
Logie (1993). These authors recount a study in which letters were selected that are 
either visually similar or different in upper and lower case (e. g. Kk, Cc, Ss, Pp - 
similar in upper and lower case, Qq, Bb, Gg, Rr - different in upper and lower case). 
Subjects were presented with a sequence such as kCsP, or BgrQ, and would have 
to write down the sequence in the correct order, and use the correct case for each letter. 
When subjects had to perform the task and suppress articulation, they had more 
difficulty recalling the case of presentation of the letters drawn from the visually similar 
set. As I discussed earlier, articulatory suppression is thought to inhibit the use of 
subvocalisation, and in the case of letter stimuli, it is thought to inhibit the use of letter 
names. Thus with articulatory suppression subjects are more likely to rely on some 
form of visual code for the letters, and make more errors based on visual similarity. 
So, to return to the question with which this sub-section began. Yes, the data does 
suggest that there appears to be evidence for visual similarity effects, and this supports 
the idea of a temporary memory system that relies on visual codes. However, the effect 
only appears in particular circumstances, such as under articulatory suppression or with 
material that is difficult to name. It is probably for this reason that it has not been 
studied nor replicated as widely as has the phonological similarity effect in immediate 
serial verbal recall. 
Whilst on the topic of visual similarity effects, which seem to emphasise the surface 
properties of visual stimuli in the Visuospatial Sketchpad, an important developmental 
study by Hitch, Brandimonte and Walker (1993) should be briefly mentioned. This 
study highlighted the fact that the Visuospatial Sketchpad retains specifically surface 
descriptions, whereas Long Term Memory preserves both surface and abstract 
descriptions. Hitch et a]. go on to suggest that it is the verbal coding of visual stimuli, 
(that I discussed in the Phonological Loop section of this chapter) which appears to 
encourage the use of abstract visual descriptions. 
d. Visual Recency Effects 
Recall that one of the most robust phenomena studied within the context of verbal Short 
Term Memory was recency in immediate free recall. There have been a few studies 
reporting visual recency effects, the best known of which was reported by Phillips and 
his colleagues (Phillips and Christie, 1977a, b). The paradigm they developed involved 
presenting subjects with a sequence of square matrix patterns, with half of the cells of 
the matrix chosen at random to be filled in. Typically, memory for the patterns was 
13 An example of the digits in a square block font is: 
61 
and in a curved font: 
8 9. 
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tested in reverse serial order, so that the last pattern presented was tested first using a 
visual recognition procedure. They reported a marked recency effect, such that the last 
matrix pattern presented was recognised correctly significantly more often than were 
items presented earlier in the sequence. Performance was just above chance for all of 
the other serial positions, including the first. Notably, there was no sign of a primacy 
effect. Phillips (1983) has suggested that the single item recency effect may reflect the 
operation of short term visual storage, while what is retained of earlier items involves 
Long Tenn Memory. 
This conclusion was reported by Broadbent and Broadbent (1981), who examined 
temporary storage of abstract patterns, irregular patterns and wallpaper patterns. 
Subjects in their experiment were tested using a probe procedure. Broadbent and 
Broadbent found a recency effect for the last three items in the series, in contrast to the 
one-item recency reported by Phillips and Christie (1977a). However, in conu-non with 
the earlier study, Broadbent and Broadbent found no evidence of a primacy effect in 
their task. The overall levels of performance were higher than they were for the Phillips 
and Christie tasks, and this could account for the difference in the number of recency 
items. The advantage for recency items thus is consistent with the involvement of a 
specialised visual short term store, and the Broadbents concluded that their visual 
recency effect appeared to reflect the operation of just such a store. 
Avons and Phillips (1987) presented evidence that subjects could use verbal labelling 
and semantic categorisation in the Phillips and Christie tasks. Broadbent and Broadbent 
similarly argued that verbal labelling could be used for the pre-recency items. If there is 
scope for some form of verbal coding, there remains the possibility that subjects may 
readily retain a verbal code for the last few items in the list, resulting in what is 
essentially a verbal recency effect. 
There was also a question as to whether the visual recency effects might reflect general 
attentional resources rather than a specialised store. In a second set of studies, Phillips 
and Christie (1977b) investigated the effect of a secondary task interpolated between 
presentation of the last item in the matrix series and the probe recognition test. The 
major finding was that the one-item recency effect is removed by a variety of secondary 
tasks, and in particular by mental arithmetic. Phillips and Christie argue that since 
mental aiithmetic is unlikely to rely heavily on visualising, this result suggests that 
visualisation of the last matrix pattern in the series requires the use of general purpose 
resources rather than a self-contained visual Short Term Memory system (such as the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad). 
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Thus the serial position curves for retention of a series of patterns may reflect the 
operation of general purpose resources, plus the use of a specialised verbal rather than 
visual resource. This possibility was explored in the study by Logie et al (1990) 
reported in section 1.3.3.4 in this chapter. They argued that the nature of the 
interpolated task may well be crucial in deten-nining any disruptive effects, and 
contrasted the effects of concurrent arithmetic on retention of visual pattems with the 
effects of concuffent visual imagery tasks. These same secondary tasks were combined 
with temporary retention of a sequence of letters. Recall that there was a significant 
disruption of memory for visual pattems by concurrent mental arithmetic. This result is 
congruent with the impairment by arithmetic of the single item recency effect in the 
Phillips studies. There was also a disruptive effect of the visual imagery task on letter 
span performance. However, the most striking feature of the results was a dmmafic 
differential disruption of visual retention by concurrent visual imaging coupled with an 
equally dmmatic disruption of letter span by concuffent arithmetic. These disruptions 
were much greater than the other two effects. 
Logie concluded that there may have been a general processing load involved, but that it 
was relatively small when compared with the differential disruption associated with the 
nature of the tasks that were combined. The results are generally highly consistent with 
the use of a specialised. verbal Short Tenn Store - the Phonological Loop, for the letter 
span task and a specialised. visual Short Tenn Store - the Visuospatial Sketchpad, for 
the visual span task. The Visuospatial Sketchpad appears to be involved in visualising 
and retaining the visually presented pictures, and the Phonological Loop appears to be 
involved in both the storage of verbal sequences and mental arithmetic. 
5. Summary of the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
These results in summary suggest that visual short term storage does indeed overlap to 
some extent with visual perception and visual imagery. There appears to be privileged 
access to the Visuospatial Sketchpad by visual input. In addition, there appears to be a 
spatial component that is affected by movement, and there is some evidence for two 
separate functions dealing with visual and spatial information. There remains some 
agnosia as to the distinction between the encoding, retention and retrieval of 
visuospatial information. 
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1.3.4 Evaluating Working Memory 
1.3.4.1 Limitations of the Cur-rent Model of Working Memory 
Specific Problems 
Although I have shown that the Working Memory model has been successful in 
accounting for a large amount of psychological and neuropsychological data., the 
Working Memory model is far from perfect. There are broadly two types of limitation 
that one can attach to this model. First, there are criticisms that can be raised at the level 
of the postulated processes involved in the Phonological Loop, or indeed any other part 
of the model. For sake of illustration, serious problems with the Articulatory Control 
Process are now outlined. 
The defined role of the Articulatory Control Process in producing the word length effect 
is complicated by conflicting data. Tirne-limited spans, from the Working Memory 
perspective, arise from failures of the subvocal rehearsal processes to refresh active 
traces within the fixed decay window. But Cowan et al. (1992) have shown that the 
locus of the word length effect may actually be in the output stage, during the time that 
subjects are recalling the to-be-remembered items. In one experiment, subjects received 
random presentations of mixed lists in which word length was varied factorially in each 
half (i. e. there were four types of list: short-short; short-long; long-short; long-long). 
Recall order was also varied randomly: a cue appeared at the beginning of the recall 
period indicating whether the list was to be recalled in a forward or backward direction. 
Long words produced lower performance, as expected, but only if the task required that 
long words be output first during recall. Note that at the point of recall, subjects had no 
way of knowing whether forward or backward recall would be required; thus, the locus 
of the word length effect seems to be during the response output phase. Other evidence 
consistent with this conclusion comes from Avons, Wright, and Parnmer (1994) who 
found that the word length effect is smaller in probed recall (which does not require the 
subject to output the entire list) than it is in spoken serial recall. 
According to Cowan (1993), the critical detertninant of time limits in span is the speed 
or efficiency with which subjects can reactivate items during the pauses that occur 
during the important recall output period. In work with children (Cowan, 1992), he 
found that silent inter-word pause times during recall increased as the length of the 
to-be-remembered list grew longer. He concluded that items are lost, presumably due to 
fixed decay, during the time that other items are being output, but they can be refreshed 
or reactivated (provided that they have not been completely lost) during the period 
separating one recalled item from the next. Final memory performance is therefore a 
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function of pronunciation time, during which decay occurs, and of the efficiency with 
which the remaining items can be reactivated during the response pauses. Most central 
to the present point however, is that covert rehearsal of the type assumed to be 
controlled by the Articulatory Control Process is unlikely to be occurring during these 
inter-response intervals. The pause times are simply too short for rehearsal of the list to 
be occurring, given what we know about covert rehearsal rates (Landauer, 1962). 
Instead, some kind of rapid search or scanning process may be operating (Cavanagh, 
1972). 
There are further results suggesting that memory span and the word length effect are 
actually rather complex phenomena, influenced by multiple factors. Gathercole and 
Adams (1993), for example, reported that young children's digit spans are unrelated to 
their articulation rates. Lapointe and Engle (1990) showed that the elimination of the 
word length effect under articulatory suppression may depend critically on whether lists 
are drawn from a large or small vocabulary. Work by Nairne, Neath and Serra (1997) 
has shown that the word length effect may emerge only when some degree of proactive 
interference is operative; word length effects are not found for the first few trials in a 
session. 
Other examples of this type of limitation have been echoed in this review by mentioning 
debates about the irrelevant speech effect (Jones, 1993) or the ambiguity of the structure 
and rehearsal process of the Visuospatial Sketchpad (Logie, 1989). Similarly, much 
time could have been spent criticising how central a role the Central Executive plays in 
the model, and yet how little is understood about its structure and function. This is an 
important point because I hope to have demonstrated how many of the problems of the 
Modal Model were solved by the idea of the Central Executive. 
2. General Limitations 
A second type of limitation is any outstanding failure of the model to explain short term 
memory phenomena at the functional level. This is not a limitation directed at any one 
component of the model, but these are shortcomings more than anything else. The 
model of Working Memory has actually constantly undergone re-specification and 
modification, and if the current model does not specify how it deals with what seems to 
be a functional necessity of any model of Short Term Memory, then it is limited in its 
power. This thesis highlights one particular omission to specify a vital function of the 
model, and the basic claim is that the current model is not able to explain it. I 
nonetheless use the Working Memory model throughout as a useful heuristic for 
considering the nature of (the remaining functions of) Short Term Memory because, as 
I argue below, it still remains an established and relatively successful framework. 
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1.3.4.2 Working Memory as a SuccessM Model of Short Term Memory 
In this chapter I have reviewed how the Working Memory Model of Short Term 
Memory has evolved as a useful framework for understanding Short Term Memory 
phenomena. The more recent shift away from a passive conception of Short Tenn 
Memory has been well characterised in the 'Working Memory' model (Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1974,1984,1993). The 'working' aspect emphasises the active nature of the 
system. 
A cognitively flexible system has been posited, thanks to the combination of the general 
purpose resources provided by the Central Executive and the more specialised 
processing and storage functions fulfilled by the Phonological Loop and Visuospatial 
Sketchpad. Together they seem to be central to many diverse cognitive domains, such 
as vocabulary acquisition, learning of faces, and consciousness (Gathercole, 1994; 
Engle, 1996). This is most certainly in contradistinction to the rigid structure and the 
predominantly verbal nature of the earlier models of Short Term Memory. 
Another positive feature of the Working Memory model is its application to cognitive 
development (Walker, Hitch, Doyle and Porter, 1994). This will be the topic of the next 
chapter, and I will be illustrate how the model has been invoked to account for certain 
developmental changes. The changes in Working Memory capacity as a child develops 
are thought to underpin the more general changes in cognitive abilities, such as reading 
and arithmetic. A basic assumption, has been that each of the sub-systems has an 
age-limited capacity associated with it that will account for a developmentally 
constrained performance on a given task (Hitch and Halliday, 1983). 
A further strength of the Working Memory model, is that it has close links with the 
dual-task methodology, originally from the domain of attention. The basic rationale 
underpinning this methodology is that if two activities both call upon a common limited 
capacity component of Working Memory, then subjects will be unable to maintain the 
same level of performance which they achieved when carrying out only one of the 
tasks. Articulatory suppression - requiring subjects to continuously articulate irrelevant 
information such as "the, the, the" during a memory task - appears to block the 
operation of the Phonological Loop (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974), or to impede the 
rehearsal process somewhat (Macken and Jones, 1995). Use of the Sketchpad is 
disrupted when subjects concurrently track a moving visual target (Baddeley and 
Lieberman, 1980). Activities that appear to place significant burdens on the Central 
Executive include asking subjects to remember a lengthy sequence of random digits, 
and generating sequences of random letters (Baddeley, 1986). 
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The model is especially compelling as it integrates much of the neuropsychological 
evidence that has been collected, and in so doing it provides predictions for testing 
patients. In a climate of increasing awareness of Cognitive Neuroscience (e. g. Rugg, 
1997), a model that seems to straddle across more than one discipline is most certainly 
encouraging. 
A final feature of the current model's success is its adaptability. Although it hasn't been 
stressed in this chapter, a gradual process of differentiation and refinement has 
occurred 14 , and due to the model's essentially modular nature, it has the capacity to 
preserve its general structure while more local aspects are still undergoing change. 
14 The impression that may have been given in the chapter is that all the details of the described model 
were conceived in the early seventies. This is not the case. The model was updated as new data was 
presented, and the potted summary here tries to describe the currera format of the model. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Developing Working Memory 
2.1 Chapter Outline 
In this chapter, I review the application of the Working Memory model to 
understanding changes in cognitive development. I concentrate mainly on the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad, but I will first summarise work on the Central Executive and 
the Phonological Loop. In the last part of the chapter, I describe the developmental 
literature on short term memory for object locations as a background for my empirical 
work, which involves hiding objects in receptacles and immediately probing for the 
recall of the object locations. 
2.2 Working Memory and Cognitive Development 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter II argued that the Working Memory model can provide a relatively accurate 
account of Short Term Memory. This account was derived from, and mainly dealt with 
the mature adult Short Term Memory system. It should be possible therefore, to ask 
how this system has matured both in terms of its components and in its characteristics. 
By investigating how it evolves in development, one can gain better insight and 
understanding of the adult system. 
The starting point is the observation that performance on most cognitive tasks steadily 
increase with age until it reaches adult levels of competence (e. g. Wilson, Scott and 
Power, 1987). The assumption is that for each of the three components of Working 
Memory, there is an age-restricted operating efficiency and use of strategies. These 
limitations will therefore constrain the information processing tasks that Working 
Memory is assumed to underpin, leading to age-related performance. The gradual 
developmental improvement in these tasks reflects the increasing Working Memory 
capacity and use of strategies with age, until they reach adult levels of competence. 
Most of the research therefore takes the adult phenomena discussed in the previous 
chapter, and examines which components develop at a certain age, and what the 
age-related capacities of these components are. 
2.2.2 Central Executive 
Developmental analyses of the functions conventionally associated with the Central 
Executive have provided evidence for an increased capacity in older children to conduct 
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"complex operations" (Siegel, 1994). Complex operations are tasks which impose 
combined processing and storage demands on subjects. For example, reading and 
listening span are complex operations because the subect has to process incoming j 
information (sentences) at the same time as retaining the sequence of the final words of 
the preceding sentences. Another example of a complex operation is backward digit 
span, where the task is to recall a digit sequence in reverse order. " 
The question is first of all whether the developmental increases in performance on these 
complex operations reflect an increase in the absolute capacity of the Central Executive 
during development. A second question, is given that most of the research on complex 
operations largely involves language processing and comprehension, how do we know 
that these tasks are not simply tapping the Phonological Loop? 
2.2.2.1 Total Resource Increase or Efficiency Increases? 
An explanation of the changes in cognitive functioning that may account for the 
improvements in Central Executive task performance is provided by a neo-Piagetian 
characterisation. of the limited M capacity introduced by Pascual-Leone (1970) and 
developed by Case, Kurland and Goldberg (1982). Case et al. specify that the total 
processing space available to an individual can be flexibly deployed as either processing 
or storage space. They suggest that the total storage space remains constant over 
development, but that the operational efficiency of an individual - at executing strategies 
and processing incoming information - increases over development, which in turn 
releases storage space. 
One task that Case et al. used to explore this theory was counting span, in which 
children counted the number of objects in a particular display, and then attempted to 
recall in correct serial order the number of objects in the preceding displays. The 
combined processing and storage elements of the task mean that it qualifies as a 
complex operation as defined above. Operational efficiency was also assessed by 
measuring the amount of time it took the child to repeat back single words. Since This 
involves both perceptual analysis and motor speech planning activity, it qualifies as a 
measure of operational efficiency. Using these two techniques, Case et al. provided 
evidence for a positive linear association between operational efficiency and memory 
span in children aged between two and six years old: as speed of repetition increased, 
so did this form of memory span. This correlation was consistent with the view that 
with increasing age the processing demands diminish releasing storage space. In 
15 The developmental improvement on higher-order Central Executive tasks related to planning and 
goal-directed behaviour have been re,, iewed by Pennington and Ozonofl'(1996). 
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addition, Case et al. found that the counting span task was positively correlated with 
another measure of operational efficiency, namely the speed with which subjects 
counted the objects in the study. In a further study, Case et al. also found that once 
differences in operational efficiency were controlled across children and adults by 
requiring adults to count the objects in the counting span task in an unfamiliar language, 
span differences disappeared. Again, this fits well with the notion of a constant limit to 
processing space across all ages. Hence adults have better performance on complex 
operations compared to children due to increased levels of operational efficiency, unless 
their operational efficiency is reduced by forcing them to expend extra resources in 
executing strategies and processing (as was the case in this further study by Case et 
al. ). 
In answer to the first question posed above, this particular view argues against an 
absolute increase in capacity of the Central Executive, but rather for an increase in the 
efficiency in deploying the limited resources. It should be noted however, that 
alternative views on the matter exist. One other stand-point mentioned by Gathercole 
(1998), is of course that the absolute capacity of the Central Executive increases with 
age. Due to the lack of research on the Central Executive as a whole, and the 
development of the Central Executive in particular, there is no definitive answer to this 
question at present. 
2.2.2.2 Which Element of Working Memory is Involved in Complex Operations? 
The second issue relating to the complex operation tasks discussed above, is whether 
they actually involve the Central Executive, or whether, because the tasks usually 
require verbal measures, they depend on the Phonological Loop. 
Gathercole (1998) argues that there are five pieces of evidence supporting the idea that 
complex operation measures and immediate verbal memory span tasks do not tap the 
same sub-system. The first of these is from a study by Hitch, Halliday, and Littler 
(1989). The identification time of auditory or visual words were compared with 
articulation rate as predictors of memory span. The results showed that a linear function 
described the variation of span with both age and word-length but there was no 
equivalent relationship between span and identification time. The sensitivity of span to 
word-length was much reduced when rehearsal was prevented by articulatory 
suppression. These findings suggest that variation of span with age and word-length is 
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attributable to rehearsal rather than the availability of a central workspace, which is 
assumed to be involved in the identification time task. '6 
The second piece of evidence cited by Gathercole (1998) which suggests that complex 
operations do not involve the Phonological Loop, is that of Oakhill, Yuill and Parkin 
(1986). They demonstrated that there were no differences between children of good and 
poor reading comprehension abilities (a complex operation) on measures of simple 
memory span (a Phonological Loop task). The third finding noted by Gathercole is that 
complex operation measures show consistently higher associations with language 
comprehension than do simple memory span measures (Daneman and Merikle, 1996). 
The fourth result Gathercole reports is that complex and simple span tasks show 
dissociable ageing effects in adulthood: complex span diminishes from early to late 
adulthood, whereas simple span is maintained (Siegel, 1994). The final piece of 
evidence she cites is Morra (1994). In this study, a wide range of both complex and 
simple working memory tasks were administered to a large sample of children. Mon-a 
(1994) discovered that individual variability in the complex tasks, such as counting 
span and backward digit span, was relatively independent of variability in simple 
memory tasks across children. 
Thus Gathercole (1998) used these collection of findings to argue the case that complex 
and simple memory span appear to have dissociable origins within Working Memory, 
with complex tasks tapping the Central Executive, and simple (verbal) span tasks 
engaging the Phonological Loop. 
2.2.3 Phonological Loop 
2.2.3.1 Lack of Articulatory Rehearsal Process until 7-Years-Old 
Tasks that seem to tap the Phonological Loop, such as digit span show a rapid increase 
in performance over the early and middle years of childhood (Chi, 1978; Dempster, 
1981; Hulme, Thomson, Muir, and Lawrence, 1984). However, as I shall explain, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the Phonological Loop does not develop in a linear 
fashion, but rather there is a specific course of developmental change. Investigations 
have revealed that until the age of seven, the Articulatory Rehearsal Process component 
16 However, to temper the strength of these findings, note that Kail and Park (1994) collected similar 
measures to Hitch et al. (1989), but calculated from their data set that the natural logarithm of age was 
correlated positively with measures of memory span but negatively with measures of processing and 
articulation times. Kail and Park (1994) used causal modelling to demonstrate that age-related change in 
processing time is associated with a decrease in the time required to articulate numbers and letters, 
which determines memory span. 
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of the Phonological Loop is not active, and performance relies exclusively on the 
Phonological Store (Gathercole and Hitch, 1993). Beyond seven years of age an 
adult-like cumulative rehearsal strategy emerges and is used to maximise retention in the 
Phonological Store. Hence nonauditory memory material is recoded into a phonological 
code that is suitable for the Phonological Loop when possible, and the continuing 
increase in articulation rate up to the late childhood years further enhances the 
effectiveness of the Articulatory Rehearsal Process producing additional increments in 
memory span (Gathercole, 1998). 
There are various strands of support for this idea, and many of them stem from the 
observation that children below the age of seven do not spontaneously use rehearsal 
strategies in memory experiments, and two of these are outlined in the next sub-section. 
The core assumption is that rehearsal strategies rely on the subvocal rehearsal process, 
and so if there is no rehearsal at a particular age, one can assume that the subvocal 
rehearsal process element of the Phonological Loop is not involved. 
The other set of evidence comes directly from the Working Memory literature and 
demonstrates a specific pattern of development with respect to adult Phonological Loop 
manipulations such as the word length effect and articulatory suppression. With 
auditory presentation, children's immediate serial recall is sensitive to phonological 
similarity and word length 17 at the youngest age groups tested, which is between three 
and five years of age (Ford and Silber, 1994; Gathercole and Adams, 1994; Hitch and 
Halliday, 1983). If presentation is in a pictorial modality then children of these age 
groups (as compared with seven year olds) are not impaired when items have labels that 
are either lengthy in articulatory duration or are phonologically similar. 
The account given to these two sets of results is that with auditory presentation the input 
can flow directly into the phonological loops of younger subjects, without the need for 
subvocal rehearsal processes. However, when the input is pictorial, younger subjects 
remember the stimuli in terms of their visual characteristics (ie. they encode the input 
using their Visuospatial Sketchpads) rather than recode the pictures into the 
phonological form required for entry to the Phonological Loop (Hitch et al., 1988; 
Longoni and Scalisi, 1994). The reason why younger children perform in this way, 
according to the Working Memory model, is because children lack an Articulatory 
Rehearsal Process before the age of seven. Further evidence for this comes from Henry 
(1991), who has shown that articulatory suppression does not have the reliably 
17 Word length effects arc actually problematic for this account and this issue is raised a little further on 
in this section (the relevant sub-section is entitled "word length effects Nvith young children"). 
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disruptive influence on auditory list recall on five-year-old children as it has with older 
children and adults. 
Another line of evidence from the Working Memory literature that the Articulatory 
Rehearsal Process is not used in early childhood, comes from studies in which 
measures of both auditory memory span and the rate at which children can articulate the 
memory items are recorded. Articulation rate and memory span are positively correlated 
with one another in adults and children over seven but not in children under seven years 
old. Recall that representations in the Phonological Store will decay after 1.5 to 2 
seconds (Baddeley, et al., 1975a) if they are not refreshed by the time-based 
Articulatory Rehearsal Process. Therefore, subjects with faster rehearsal rates should be 
able to retain more words and therefore have a higher auditory memory span. This fits 
with the positive association between the memory span and articulation rate in adults 
and children over seven. The lack of positive correlation in the younger children implies 
that they do not use an Articulatory Rehearsal Process since the rate at which they 
articulate was not connected to their span performance. 
1. Evidence for lack of Rehearsal below 7 Years 
One finding that demonstrates a lack of rehearsal strategies in younger children comes 
from Flavell, Beach and Chinsky (1966). They failed to find any evidence for overt 
signs of rehearsal in children under seven years old, as indexed by a lack of lip 
movements or whispering in the interval between memory presentations in immediate 
memory tasks. Another approach was taken by Johnston, Johnson, and Gray (1987) 
who studied the immediate serial recall of five year old children. When tested with 
sequences of nameable pictures, there was no sensitivity to whether the picture names 
were long or short in articulatory duration. 
However, when Johnston et al. followed this with training the children in the use of 
overt and covert cumulative rehearsal strategies, the children showed superior recall of 
pictures with short names over long names - the word length effect had been induced 
after training. This study provides evidence that subvocal rehearsal is not used 
spontaneously at this age. Furthermore, it shows how this strategy can be induced with 
training, indicating perhaps that the Articulatory Rehearsal Process is in fact present at 
this age, but is not usually operative. 
a. Word Length Effects with Young Children? 
The assertion that the Articulatory Rehearsal Process does not emerge until the middle 
childhood years has been advanced above, but there are still a few problems with this 
view. The first relates back to the finding discussed earlier in this section that even with 
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young children who are not supposed to have a developed rehearsal process, one can 
still obtain a word length effect with auditory presentation in serial recall (Ford and 
Silber, 1994; Gathercole and Adams, 1994; Hitch and Halliday, 1983). This should not 
be the case if children cannot rehearse, as the word length effect has been attributed to 
the Articulatory Rehearsal Process. The most likely explanation is that word length 
effects in Short Term Memory do not come exclusively from rehearsal (Gathercole, 
1998)". 
As noted in the last chapter (section 1.3.4.1), there is sufficient evidence that the greater 
delay in output involved in the spoken recall of lengthy versus short memory items may 
itself be enough to account for extra decay in the Phonological Store and hence impair 
recall accuracy (Avons et al., 1994; Brown and Hulme, 1995; Cowan, Keller, Hulme, 
Roodenrys, McDougall and Rack, 1994). In keeping with this view, children below 
seven years of age do not show word length effects even for auditory material if 
memory performance is not sampled by a serial spoken recall procedure, and hence is 
not subject to differential output delays for short and long items (Henry, 1991). 
b. Memofy Span Increases before Rehearsal? 
Another problem for this particular account of Phonological Loop development is that 
memory span which taps the Articulatory Rehearsal Process, has already increased 
prior to when rehearsal emerges at seven years of age (e. g. Gathercole and Adams, 
1994). One possibility is that the span increase before the age of seven is because as 
children get older they are able to articulate items more rapidly at recall, and they are 
therefore able to reduce the decay of memory items in the Phonological Store prior to 
output. As Gathercole (1998) points out, the lack of fine-grained analysis of 
developmental change in immediate memory span in this pre-rehearsal period means 
that this hypothesis has not as yet been tested. 
2. The Role of Long Term Knowledge in Phonological Loop Tasks 
Thus far, the account of Phonological Loop development has explained increases in 
memory span in terms of increased rates of articulation. If this is true, then one would 
predict that if articulation rates are held constant, then the differences between 
performance on memory span tasks should be eliminated when comparing two different 
age groups. This has been tested in two studies (Henry and NEllar, 1991; Roodenrys, 
Hulme and Brown, 1993) which have shown that articulation rates provide a 
'8 Notc that more extreme positions have been taken on this issue. For instance, Brown and Hulme 
(1995), have concluded that ....... many of the data that have hitherto been taken as evidence for subvocal 
rehearsal can be explained in terms of simple models without rehearsal. " It is not within the scope of 
this discussion, however, to consider other models. 
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significant, yet only partial account of the change in memory span during childhood. In 
other words, Phonological Loop development does not provide a full explanation of 
what changes in childhood. The increase in long term knowledge seems to be the 
additional factor involved in the steady increases in memory span (Gathercole, 1998), 
as I now describe below. 
The contribution of the mental lexicon (the long term store of lexical knowledge) to 
immediate serial recall was demonstrated by Hulme, Maughan and Brown, (1991). In 
their study they found an increase in short term memory performance when lists contain 
words as opposed to non-words. Since the word and non-word memory stimuli did not 
differ in articulation rate and amount of phonological information, this suggests that the 
lexicality effect (ie. the recall advantage of words over non-words) must arise from the 
additional long term knowledge one possesses about the familiar words. Other studies 
by Hulme suggest that the lexicality effect is mediated by phonological knowledge 
rather than nonphonological attributes such as word meaning (Brown and Hulme, 
1992; Hulme et al., 1991). Hulme asserts that stored phonological knowledge about the 
structures of words is used to "fill in" incomplete information in the representations of 
words in the Phonological Store, in a process called redintegration. The poorer memory 
for non-words is because subjects cannot benefit from the advantage of redintegration 
to recover missing information in the Phonological Store. 
Findings by Roodenrys et al. (1993) may lend support to the idea that it is the 
undeniable increase in size of the mental lexicon that contributes to memory span tasks 
as age increases. In comparing 6- and 10-year-olds on memory span, these researchers 
noted a greater lexicality effect in the older group that was not accounted for in terms of 
differences between the two groups in articulatory speed. The results just missed 
statistical significance but they provide encouraging support for the idea that the 
developmental increase in memory span is gained in part by an increasing mental 
lexicon. 
It is not only the fact that children become more familiar with words as they grow up 
that may increase performance on the span task, but an even more basic aspect of long 
term phonological knowledge could also play a part. This is the increase in the 
knowledge about the probabilistic structure of the sound combinations in the native 
language of the child. Gathercole and colleagues have shown in several studies 
(Gathercole, 1995; Gathercole and Martin, 1996; Gathercole, Willis, Emslie and 
Baddeley, 1991) that children are better at repeating multisyllabic nonword stimuli 
when the wordlikeness of the nonwords, as judged by adults, is high (e. g. commerine) 
versus low (loddernaypj). Similarly, English-speaking children recall non-word 
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sequences more accurately if the nonwords contain adjacent phoneme pairs that are high 
in probability of occurrence within English (Gathercole, Frankish, Pickering and 
Peaker, submitted). So even for unfamiliar items, one's existing knowledge about the 
structure of the language can be utilised to improve recall accuracy. Finally, Gathercole 
(1995) has provided further evidence for this by demonstrating that 5-year-olds show a 
greater advantage in repetition accuracy for nonwords of high as compared to low 
wordlikeness than did 4-year-old children. 
3. Specific Language Impairment as a Deficit to Phonological Store 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 1.3.3.3), a primary function of the 
Phonological Loop is to support language leaming (Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993). 
Hence children with specific language impairment (SLI) have been found to display 
extremely poor phonological short term memory function. Briefly, the condition is 
associated with persisting deficits in the production and comprehension of language, 
including particularly poor vocabulary development, immature syntax and impaired 
grammatical morphology (Bishop, North and Donlan, 1996). Although there are a 
variety of accounts for the deficit underlying SLI (see Bishop, 1992, for a review), 
Gathercole and Baddeley (1990,1993) have asserted that the deficit arises from extreme 
limitations in the capacity of the Phonological Store component of the Phonological 
Loop. It is thus the poor temporary storage of incoming speech stimuli that is the basis 
for the difficulties encountered by SLI children in setting up durable long term 
phonological representations of novel words. It should be noted that this hypothesis is a 
little controversial, as there is data which seems to imply that the impairment is actually 
at the level of perceptual processing, and not of memory (Montgomery, 1995). 
2.2.4 Visuospatial Sketchpad 
Although the changes in the Visuospatial Sketchpad have not been documented to the 
same extent as the Phonological Loop, the basic understanding is that younger children 
depend more than older children and adults on using their Visuospatial Sketchpad for 
encoding visual material. This is now expanded upon below. 
2.2.4.1 Younger Children's Reliance on the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
As I mentioned earlier in section 2.2.3.1, Hitch et al. (1988) presented a series of 
pictures of nameable objects for recall and found that 5-year-old children are impaired in 
recalling memory lists in which the objects share many physical features (e. g. pen, 
fork, comb), as compared with objects who share few features (e. g. doll, bath, glove). 
Subjects who are ten years old however, showed no sensitivity in recall to the visual 
similarity of the pictures, but were impaired when the pictures had lengthy names (e. g. 
umbrella, kangaroo, policeman). As I explained, these and other findings reported by 
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Hitch and colleagues (Hitch, Woodin and Baker, 1989) imply that older children adopt 
a strategy of verbally recoding pictures where possible and so use the Phonological 
Loop to mediate performance on a "visual" memory task. As young children are not 
able to generate phonological codes for the visual items (due to their immature 
Articulatory Rehearsal Process), they are forced to rely instead on their recall of the 
purely visuospatial characteristics of the memory stimuli. For this reason, younger 
children are particularly good candidates for studying the Visuospatial Sketchpad, as 
one can be confident that their perfon-nance on visual tasks exclusively reflects this part 
of Working Memory. 
1. Pattern Span Task 
Given that there is this tendency to recode visually presented items from about seven 
years of age, then if one is to chart the development of the Visuospatial Sketchpad, it is 
important to find a visual memory task where this will not happen. One way of going 
about this is to find a memory task in which the stimuli cannot be recoded into a 
phonological form. Wilson et al. (1987) devised just such a paradigm: the pattern span 
task. In this task, a two-dimensional pattern composed of squares that are either filled 
or unfilled is briefly displayed on each trial. The child is then shown the same pattern 
with a single filled block missing, and is required to point to its original location. The 
number of blocks in the test patterns are then increased until memory accuracy falls 
below a specific level (e. g. two consecutive corrects), yielding for each individual a 
span measure of number of blocks reliably remembered. 
Using their technique, Wilson et al. (1987) demonstrated that visual memory span 
increases substantially and regularly between 5 and II years, by which time adult levels 
of performance are achieved. Five-year-olds can manage about four blocks, whereas by 
eleven years of age children can match adult performance (around fourteen blocks). 
Similar patterns of development of visual pattern spans were also obtained by Miles, 
Morgan, Milne and Morris, (1996). In their study, they adapted the standard pattern 
span procedure slightly by introducing a different method of testing. Instead of the 
partial recall procedure in the original paradigm, the method of memory test was 
recognition (participants had to judge which of a pair of patterns had been judged 
previously) and free recall (a blank matrix was presented and subjects had to point to 
the squares that were filled in the test stimulus). In each case, relatively steep 
developmental increases were obtained across groups of children aged 5,7, and 10 t! ý 
years, and adults, with span estimates lower across all ages in the more time-consuming 
free recall condition. The developmental function for the free recall version of the 
pattern has since been replicated (Pickering, Gathercole and Hall, submitted). 
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a. Other Working Memoiy Components in the Pattem Span Task 
It may be appealing to interpret these data from the pattern span task as evidence of 
age-related changes in the capacity of the Sketchpad to retain visual information. 
Despite the apparently nonverbal nature of the pattern span test stimuli, both the Wilson 
et al. (1987) and NEles, et al. (1996) studies actually provide additional evidence that a 
substantial part of the developmental increase in pattern span arises from the 
contribution of memory components other than the Visuospatial Sketchpad. 
Wilson et al. (1987) tested pattern span under a variety of concurrent task conditions, 
and found that interpolating a 10-second interval of spoken arithmetic-related activity 
(counting backwards aloud for older groups, forward counting for the youngest age 
group), between presentation of the pattern and recalling it reduced pattern span 
considerably, and that the magnitude of this disruption increased progressively between 
five and eleven years. Engaging in irrelevant mental arithmetic is widely believed to 
require the involvement of the Central Executive (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974), and 
irrelevant articulation appears to block the Articulatory Rehearsal Process (Baddeley et 
al., 1975a). Therefore, the disruptive effect of spoken mental arithmetic on pattern span 
for older children and adults indicated significant involvement of either or both of these 
two nonvisual components of Working Memory in the pattern span task. At least some 
of the growth in children's ability to remember visual patterns therefore appears to 
miffor increasing use of nonvisual strategies to mediate memory performance rather 
than enhanced visual memory per se. 
The nature of the interpolated task used by Wilson et al. (1987) does not allow one to 
identify whether the older children were using the Phonological Loop to supplement the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad in the pattern span (by verbally recoding stimuli) or the Central 
Executive. Other findings imply that both of these components may be active in the 
task. Firstly, recall from section 1.33A in Chapter 1, that earlier work with adults 
(Phillips and Christie, 1977b) had already established that recall of similar matrix-style 
visual patterns is greatly disrupted by subsequent silent mental arithmetic, implicating 
Central Executive involvement in memory for patterns. Secondly, there were other 
conditions in the Nfiles et al. (1996) study, where concurrent articulatory suppression 
disrupted the visual pattern span (particularly in the recognition and partial recall 
versions) in 10-year-olds and adults, suggesting the additional involvement of the 
Phonological Loop. In addition, the fact that both the Central Executive and the 
Phonological Loop are involved in the visual pattern task is borne out by the fact that 
the concurrent task in the Wilson et al. (1987) study loaded on both the Central 
Executive and the Phonological Loop, resulting in a considerably greater disruption on 
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the visual task than was found in the Wes et al. study in which there was only a 
concurrent Phonological Loop task. 
2.2.4.2 Does the Visual Store or Spatial/Movement Rehearsal Process Account for 
Developmental Changes? 
One issue that has yet to be resolved is to do with the nature of the development of the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad. It will be recalled (from section 1.3.3.4) that Logie (1994) has 
suggested that there are two components which may constitute the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad; a Visual Store (mirroring the Phonological Store) and a 
Spatial/Movement-based Process (mirroring the Articulatory Rehearsal Process). Given 
that the evidence reviewed above suggests that the Phonological Store emerges first in 
development, could it be the case that the Visual Store develops first, followed by the 
other component? 
A possible direction for investigating this issue in a concrete fashion, stems from the 
fact that concurrent task techniques are available that have been shown to disrupt the 
separate components. The Visual Store is disrupted by irrelevant visual information 
(Quinn and McConnell, 1996) and tapping impairs spatial memory (Smyth and 
Pendleton, 1989). By applying these techniques, it should theoretically become 
possible to analyse the contributions of the different components of the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad to the developmental changes in visual memory. 
2.2.4.3 Corsi Block Task 
Another paradigm that has been useful in helping to chart the changes during 
development in the performance of visuospatial tasks has been the Corsi blocks task. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter in the context of the adult Visuospatial Sketchpad 
(see section 1.3.3.4), a three dimensional display of nine blocks is placed in front of the 
participant, who observes the experimenter tapping the blocks in an unsystematic 
sequence. The task is then to repeat exactly the same sequence by tapping the correct 
blocks in the correct order. As in the digit span task, the number of memory items is 
increased systematically up to the point at which the participant can no longer reliably 
reproduce the correct sequence, and a span estimate is obtained. This technique has the 
advantage of being a "purer" measure of the performance of the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
(see section 2.2.4.1), relative to the pattern span task. Similarly, because it bears so 
much resemblance to the standard digit span task, it allows one to understand the 
relationship between the development of the Visuospatial Sketchpad and the 
development of the Phonological Loop. 
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1- Digit versus Spatial Span 
The developmental course of children's memory spans on both the digit span and the 
Corsi blocks tasks was investigated by Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989). In their 
study, children aged between seven and fifteen years were tested for their performance 
on these two measures. Both span tasks showed a regular increase across this age range 
corresponding to about 1.5 items of span, with Corsi span at each age range lagging 
about one item of span behind digit span. 
One interesting feature of the Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989) study was that for 
both tasks, children were tested on their forward and backward recall of the test 
sequences. The results showed that backwards digit span performance was greatly 
reduced relative to the forward span. This is in line with normative data on forward and 
backward digit span provided by standardised ability tests such as WISC-R (Wechsler, 
1982). However, the study revealed that the Corsi span task was equivalent whether 
recall was tested in a forwards or reverse order. This indicates that order information is 
extracted in a fundamentally different manner from spatial memory than how it is 
extracted from the Phonological Loop. It should be noted at this point, that subsequent 
findings from adult data suggest that the contrasting impairment with backward recall 
may be due in part to the differential availability of item information in the conventional 
Corsi blocks and digit span procedures (Farrand and Jones, 1996). The "items" are 
present in front of the subject in the Corsi task, but they need to be retrieved in the 
standard digit span task. 
2.2.4.4 Separating Spatial, Visual and Phonological Working Memory Development 
Pickering et a]. (submitted) investigated children's abilities to retain spatial, visual and 
phonological information in Working Memory. In an initial study, 5- and 8-year-olds 
were tested on the standard pattern task, Corsi block recall and digit span. Scores on 
each task were uncoffelated with one another, which gives reason to suggests that 
spatial, visual and phonological Working Memory capacities are dissociable in children 
of a relatively young age. 
In a subsequent study, Pickering et al. constructed versions of the pattern span and 
Corsi block task that were directly comparable except in terms of temporal order. To 
achieve this, a few modifications to the standard tasks were made. Their pattern span 
stimuli were arrays of squares containing equal numbers of filled and unfilled blocks, 
similar to those employed by Wilson et al. (1987), but the subject was presented each 
pattern for 2 seconds on a computer screen and then had to indicate on an empty square 
the locations of the filled blocks they had just viewed. Note that this technique 
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corresponds to the free recall technique used by Nfiles et al. (1996) which I described 
earlier in section 2.2.4.1. Span was thus measured in the usual way by increasing the 
number of squares until the children were unable to perform accurately. 
For the spatial task, the subjects viewed a computer screen which initiaflyjust displayed 
an empty square which filled with blocks one at a time. The child's task at the end of 
the sequence was to point to the squares that had been filled at presentation, in the same 
order as they had occurred on the screen. Hence this is a two dimensional version of the 
conventional Corsi block task. Across the pattern span and spatial tasks, the item 
content (i. e. the location of the filled blocks in the squares) was made equivalent, as 
was the method of recall. The tasks only differed with respect to the presence of order 
information coupled with the requirement to recall it in the spatial task. Children aged 
five, seven and ten were participants in this part of the study. 
There were two important findings in this part of the study. First, scores on the pattern 
span and spatial span were uncorrelated with each other, despite the close similarity 
between the information content and paradigms employed in the two cases. This pattern 
of data seems to be consistent with the notion that different memory capacities or 
sub-systems may underpin memory for visual material with and without a temporal 
dimension. Similarly, the idea of a distinction between a Visual Store and a spatial 
movement based system in the Visuospatial Sketchpad, in line with Logie (1994), 
receives encouraging support. 
The second important finding that emerged from this part of the study, was that the 
age-related increase in span for both tasks revealed a much steeper function for the 
pattern span relative to the spatial span task. Specifically, whereas the two span 
estimates were similar in the younger age groups, the benefits to pattern span over 
spatial span were very substantial indeed by ten years of age. Hence these differences in 
the developmental functions of the two tasks can be taken as further evidence for two 
separate systems. In addition, the steeper increase in pattern span with age may reflect 
the increasing use by older children of nonvisual strategies to supplement memory for 
the visual patterns (as described above in section 2.2.4.1 in relation to the Wilson et al., 
1987 study and the Nfiles et al., 1996 study), but not for the temporal order of the 
elements in the spatial task. This would imply that memory for spatial information that 
is distributed across time is extremely restricted, and, unlike other slave components, 
does not enjoy the opportunity for other sources of memory support that are available 
for purely visual configurations. Of course the alternative hypothesis to this is simply 
that the two sub-systems have different age-related capacities, as revealed by the 
functions. Once again, the dual-task techniques for disrupting visual or spatial 
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components of Working Memory mentioned at the end of section 2.2.4.2 are needed to 
clarify these issues. 
2.2.4.5 Williams Syndrome 
Gathercole (1998) has argued that an important role of the Visuospatial Sketchpad is in 
mediating the long term learning of the visual and spatial co-ordinates of novel objects, 
in much the same way as the Phonological Loop appears to be crucial in supporting the 
learning of the sounds of new words. This idea receives support from a patient (ELD) 
mentioned in section 1.3.3.4 in the previous chapter (Hanley et al., 1991), who, it will 
be recalled, had very poor performance on the Corsi task and other tests of immediate 
visuospatial memory. More interestingly, ELD was unable to learn new routes such as 
the way back to her new flat and was unable to learn to recognise new faces. 
Based on this, one would have predicted that children with severely compromised 
abilities to retain visuospatial information temporarily should also be impaired on 
leaming new spatial routes and faces. One group of children who provide the 
opportunity for testing this hypothesis are children with Williams syndrome. Williams 
syndrome is a rare genetic disorder leading to leaming disabilities that are considerably 
more substantial in the aspects of visuospatial cognition than language, including 
Working Memory (e. g. Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle and Sabo, 1988). Williams syndrome 
children support the hypothesis that impaired short term visual retention adversely 
effects the long term leaming of visual information on the one hand, in that they are 
certainly impaired in leaming new spatial patterns (Vicari, Brizzolara, Carlesimo, 
Pezzini and Volterra, 1996). On the other hand, the fact that they do not seem to have a 
problem in learning new faces (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant and 
Baron-Cohen, 1995) seems to suggest that their visuospatial impairments reflect a more 
general long term learning deficit. eý 
2.3 Development of Memory for Object Locations 
The Visuospatial Sketchpad seems a natural candidate for the temporary storage of 
object locations. Inspecting the developmental research on memory for locations in a 
small-scale two-dimensional space reveals that there are a variety of methodological 
techniques which are based on one of three theoretical approaches. Firstly there is the 
issue of automatic versus effortful processing of spatial information (Hasher and Zacks, 
1979). Next there is the question of the effect of scene schemata on spatial memory 
(Mandler, 1983), and thirdly, there are the sort of investigations outlined above that are 
trying to specify the nature of the Visuospatial Sketchpad. The relevant results are 
summarised below for the first two classifications, followed by a summary of the 
variety of methodological approaches. Note that there is a lot of work on children's 
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searching behaviour (e. g. Herman, 1980; Herman, Kolker and Shaw, 1982), but this is 
usually in real three-dimensional environments. For the sake of comparison to the 
paradigm that I use in my empirical work, the summary does not include these studies. 
Moreover, these studies on searching behaviour also involve subjects using a fair 
amount of problem solving strategies in addition to any retention of object locations in 
Working Memory. 
2.3.1 Automatic versus Effortful Distinction 
Most of the studies about memory for location are guided by the theory of Hasher and 
Zacks, (1979). In their distinction of automatic versus effortful. processing, the authors 
postulate that time, frequency, and location are automatically encoded attributes of 
items. Hasher and Zacks formulate several criteria for automaticity, among them the 
lack of age-dependent variation in task performance. Hence, in order to evaluate the 
Hasher and Zacks, theory, researchers have examined memory for the locations of 
objects in children (and adults) of different ages. Some evidence has shown that young 
children can be very capable of remembering the association between an item and its 
spatial location, such that improvement in performance has not improved with age 
(Ellis, Katz and Williams, 1987). However, it is also apparent that such improvement 
can occur and can be quite pronounced (Mandler, Seegmiller and Day, 1977; Park and 
James, 1983; Pezdek, Roman and Sobolik, 1986). 
2.3.1.1 Item, Location, and Item-Location Memory 
Among other things, what emerged from the work of Hasher and Zacks (1979) was the 
need to distinguish between three facets of memory when generally dealing with a task 
involving the recall of the locations of objects (Schumann-Hengsteler, 1992). The first 
is a capacity to remember the items themselves (item memory); this would be measured 
by having the subject select the items that had been hidden from a larger set at test, for 
example. The second type of memory is that of the spatial distribution of the items, as 
revealed by a subject's ability to specify which of a set of locations have been used 
(location memory). Thirdly, memory for the actual item-location associations 
(item-location memory), as revealed by the subject's performance on knowing the 
whereabouts of agiven item as being in a given location. Hence, Walker et al. (1994), 
for example, utilised these distinctions in a study which provided evidence against the 
proposal of Hasher and Zacks. 
2.3.2 Effect of Scene Schemata on Spatial Memory 
Mandler (1983) emphasised the importance of general world knowledge in 
remembering the locations of objects, and this has generated studies on children's 
memory for object locations. Mandler (1983) postulates that knowledge is organised in 
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scene schemata. They are activated whenever spatial information is presented in the 
usual, i. e. everyday, way. In this context, two developmental studies (Mandler and 
Robinson, 1978; Mandler and Stein, 1974) demonstrate that organised scenes are easier 
to recognise than disorganised scenes. However, the linear increase of recognition 
performance from 7-year-olds to adults holds only for organised scenes. For 
disorganised spatial information, the performance of children between seven and ten 
years does not vary, and is rather low. Mandler and Robinson (1978) interpret this 
finding in terms of available world knowledge that facilitates the performance in 
visuospatial recognition, even for the youngest age group. This seems to mirror the 
effects of lexical knowledge on the Phonological Loop tasks reviewed (in section 
2.2.3.1) in this chapter. 
2.3.3 Methodological Approaches 
As mentioned above, perhaps in part due to the three different foci of these studies, 
there are a wide variety of methodological approaches to investigating memory for 
object locations in the literature. Some studies have a very short presentation time of the 
material (Hitch and Walker, 1991), whereas others present it for more than one minute 
(Naveh-Benjamin, 1987,1988). Sometimes stimuli are presented serially (Ellis et al., 
1987; Park and James, 1983), and sometimes simultaneously (Mandler et al., 1977). 
Some studies use drawings (Park and James, 1983; Schumann-Hengsteler, 1992), 
others present colour photos (Ellis, 1990) and some use computers for presenting 
coloured shapes (Walker et al., 1994). In some cases, photos are even accompanied by 
the verbal labelling of the pictorial material (Ellis, 1990). Another aspect which varies 
from study to study is the type of response required from the subject (e. g. recognition 
or recall). Additionally, several studies use the same location occupied by different 
items on successive presentations. Finally, the total number of critical loci to be 
remembered in the cited studies varies from two (Park and James, 1983) to twenty 
(Naveh-Benjaniin, 1987,1988). 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
2.4.1 Working Memory as Applied to Development 
As Baddeley (1986) himself has noted, the Working Memory model was not intended 
to explain data from developmental psychology, rather it is a model of adult Short Term 
Memory. However, it has generated numerous studies in developmental psychology; 
most of these studies have attempted to determine whether there are similar effects in 
children. Many of these studies have focused on the phonological domain in trying to 
map the development of the components of the Phonological Loop that have been 
identified in studies with adults. Although some of this particular work converges with 
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Flavell's work on rehearsal from over two decades ago, it is clear that issues relating to 
the development of the components of the Phonological Loop remain controversial. 
Developmental change in Visuospatial Sketchpad tasks has been somewhat less widely 
studied even with respect to the development of spatial span'9. Although it does seem 
clear that children under the age of five depend more than older children and adults on 
using their Visuospatial Sketchpad for encoding visual material. 
As with adult research, the explicit exploration of the Central Executive is even less 
extensive, because of its somewhat more elusive nature as a "conceptual black box" (de 
Ribaupierre and Bailleux, 1994). What does emerge from developmental analyses of 
the functions usually associated with the Central Executive, is that there is some limited 
evidence for an increased capacity to conduct complex operations. No separation of the 
components of the Central Executive (that were found in work with adults) have been 
documented in developmental work. 
What becomes clear, for the sake of this thesis, is that the Working Memory model can 
be applied to development certainly at the gross level of a tripartite system. The nature 
of the maturation of each component, and how these components interact during the 
developmental course is less clear. Nevertheless, the model can be postulated as a 
useful heuristic in understanding development, in that children of a given age will have 
a sub-system that may or may not be involved in a particular task. The subsystem will 
have an age-limited capacity, and this will constrain performance on a short term 
memory task. In addition, this basic structure implies that interference will occur 
between tasks that draw on resources from the same sub-system, in a broadly similar 
way to how this occurs in adults. " As a result of this, one can use dual-task 
methodology to make predictions and to interpret results. 
2.4.2 Development of Memory for Object Locations 
There are three points relevant to my review of the development of memory for object 
locations that I would like to mention here, all of which link up with my conclusions 
and summary of developmental Working Memory. The first relates to the issue of the 
capacity of the Visuospatial Sketchpad: the component of the system that is involved in 
the coding of object locations for short periods. Because there are so many ways of 
measuring the performance of the Visuospatial Sketchpad, unlike the Phonological 
I suggest a reason for this in the next section (2.4.2). 
Note that Hale, Bronik and Fry (1997) have provided evidence that 8-year-olds show a degree of 
interference from concurrent tasks which separately tap the Phonological Loop and the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad. They conclude from this that some executive levels of efficiency in dual-tasks do not reach 
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Loop where digit span has been the main measure, it is difficult to say in a definitive 
sense what the capacity of the Sketchpad is at a given age. Rather, for a given 
visuospatial task, there will be an associated age-related capacity. 
Secondly, since there is a case for young children not being able to generate 
phonological codes for visual items, forcing them to rely on purely visuospatial 
characteristics of the memory stimuli, younger children are particularly good candidates 
for studying the Visuospatial Sketchpad. Therefore in an object location task with 
pre-school children, one can be confident that their performance on this visual task 
exclusively reflects storage in this part of Working Memory. 
Thirdly, much of the work on memory for object locations focuses on children from the 
age of five and upwards, missing out the 3- and 4-year-old age range of the subjects 
tested in my empirical work. The implication of all this, is that in establishing the 
capacity of a 3- or 4-year-old on an object location task, there is a necessity to gain an 
independent measure of the age-related capacity on a specific task through pilot-testing. 
Once this has been done, however, there is a degree of confidence that this will be an 
accurate measure of Visuospatial Sketchpad capacity. As I will mention in the next 
chapter (section 3.5), this rationale plays an important role in the paradigm that I have 
used in order to demonstrate the independence of the Current State Buffer from 
Working Memory. 
adult levels until about ten years of age. This reflects a development in the function of the Central 
Executive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Current State Buffer and Working Memory 
1 Introduction 
During the course of the last two chapters, I have presented the Working Memory 
model (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974,1993) as a viable framework for considering Short 
Terrn Memory experiments. I have also considered how it can be used as a useful 
heuristic for understanding cognitive development. However, the central argument of 
this chapter develops a point that was briefly introduced at the end of the first chapter 
(in section 1.3.4.1). This is that a general limitation of the Working Memory model is 
that it seems to omit a particularly important component of any theory of Short Term 
Memory. This component is discussed, and the above argument is crystallised in a 
discussion of how to demonstrate the existence of such a component experimentally, in 
a developmental context. 
3.1.1 Chapter Outline 
The chapter formally introduces the main subject matter of this thesis - the Current State 
Buffer. I first discuss the concept of a Current State Buffer, motivated by a few 
examples of the possible uses of the Current State Buffer in every-day life. Then, 
moving away from just mere intuition about such a construct, I describe a study which 
has successfully utilised this notion - Barreau and Morton's (submitted) "bag task". I 
then present the thinking behind a novel experimental method which was designed in 
order to demonstrate the existence of such a Buffer as distinct from Working Memory - 
the "Tidy Emu Paradigm". The chapter then continues with a brief commentary on the 
choice of task and subject population involved in the empirical work of the thesis. The 
chapter then draws to a close with some details and predictions of the initial study that I 
designed to demonstrate the independence of the Current State Buffer from Working 
Memory. 
3.2 The Current State Buffer 
The 'Current State Buffer' is responsible for tracking the location and status of relevant 
or important stimuli in an individual's immediate environment (Abeles and Morton, in 
press; Barreau, 1997, Morton, 1997). Of necessity, we must have access to the current 
representation of our personal environment, and not former states of it, in order for us 
to effectively operate in the present. The Current State Buffer is conceived of containing 
the representations of the whereabouts or status of stimuli, such as objects, individuals 
and mental states. Therefore keeping track of one's current environment means that 
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these representations are constantly undergoing destructive updating as their 
whereabouts or status change with time. The representations in the Current State Buffer 
enable an individual to act upon their environment in a rapid and effortless way, and 
may help the individual to anticipate future states of the environment. The Buffer stores 
these representations automatically at the immediate level of attention, and they may be 
seen, to a certain extent, as comprising a part of an individual's consciousness. And to 
recapitulate on a crucial Point mentioned above, the Working Memory model (Baddeley 
and Hitch, 1974) seems to neglect to specify how the model deals with these types 
representations. Interestingly, Baddeley and Hitch (1993) have made mention of a 
roughly similar psychological capacity, although it is not actually a part of Working 
Memory but a function of the ubiquitous recency mechanism. Their account is not fully 
specified, and will be returned to in section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. 
A feature of the Current State Buffer is that it updates the representations of the 
environment that it is constantly registering. Bjork (1978) has also devoted a paper to 
how human memory is updated. He distinguished two mechanisms of updating, firstly 
destructive updating, whereby earlier versions of a representation are completely 
destroyed. The second mechanism is termed structural updating, whereby earlier 
versions are preserved but order and recency information is built into the series by some 
structural principle. Clearly, the first mechanism is similar to the type of updating 
proposed to occur in the Current State Buffer, in that former representations of the 
environment in the Current State Buffer are wiped out in favour of the current state of 
the environment. However, Bjork's notions of updating refer to principles governing 
both Long and Short Tenn Memory. Moreover, when discussing what deten-nines 
which of the two types of updating occur, Bjork states that 
"The more there is some principle that connects or orders successive 
inputs, the fewer are the chances that order information will be lost 
(structural updating). If there is little or no superordinate structure, 
however, order information is lost rapidly" (destructive updating). 
(Bjork, 1978, p. 238; non-italicised words are my annotations) 
In distinction to this, the inputs that are registered in the Current State Buffer, and are 
therefore destructively updated, have nothing to do with lacking a "superordinate 
structure". These inputs are coded in the Current State Buffer due to their importance to 
the individual, and their representations will be destructively updated as their status 
changes with time. 
In further contradistinction to the ideas of Baddeley and Hitch (1993) and of Bjork 
(1978), the Current State Buffer is seen as a separate component of memory that is 
actively concerned with tracking and updating representations. Furthermore, the 
Current State Buffer only deals with the representations of stimuli that are important to 
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the individual's local physical or psychological environment. If the representation of a 
stimulus does not qualify for entry into the Current State Buffer, then that stimulus will 
not have priority for being tracked by the system in this way, although its representation 
may be updated or kept "recent" through some other means. Indeed, it is these latter 
representations that may be governed by the ideas of Bjork or by the recency 
mechanism. 
To portray the functional nature of such a Buffer, and indeed the need for such a 
Buffer, consider the complex environment of a social gathering, such as a party. In a 
strange room, the locations of key objects such as the drinks, the dance-floor, or 
specific friends (or enernies) in the room, are all immediately at hand. If one was then 
given directions to the bathroom, then just maintaining such a representation 
temporarily is not likely to interfere with one's knowledge of these aforementioned 
important stimuli in the immediate environmene'. If it did, our social interactions would 
be adversely affected. Similarly, our orientation within an environment (for example 
negotiating the self same environment to return our glass to the bar before exiting the 
room), would fail. 
The scenario where parents are out on a day-trip with their 2-year-old son, who has a 
habit of wandering-off on his own, is another instance of where the function of the 
Current State Buffer becomes apparent. If one of the places they visit was a museum, 
the parents would constantly have to "keep an eye" on their son as they inspected 
exhibits, or stood by a map to figure out the directions to the caf6. Their immediate 
memory for the information from an exhibit's caption, or for the way to the caf6 would 
not be expected to interfere with the representation of their son's whereabouts. Hence a 
parent would not have any trouble in simultaneously maintaining either of the two 
pieces of information together with a representation that their son was on the car-ride, 
or with the other parent on the other floor, or playing with another toddler by the 
window. In this way, the Current State Buffer would keep track of where the child had 
just wandered, constantly updating his whereabouts. The chances of losing the child 
would increase if the parents did not remember anything but the current representation 
of the child's location. 
Another example which may serve to demonstrate the need for a Current State Buffer to 
maintain our orientation in time and space is that of people seated around a table during 
a game of cards. All the players will have a representation of where each of the other 
21 Clearly this example assumes that learning the route to the bathroom is a novel Short Tenn Memory 
task, although this representation may subsequently be stored in the Current State Buffer. 
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players are seated. Without looking at their cards, they will have a representation of the 
current hand they are holding. They will also presumably have a representation of what 
they think the other players' cards are, and possibly a representation of what they think 
the other players think that their own cards are. If they have drinks at the game, then the 
players will have a representation of whether or not they have any drink left in their 
glass, and where the glass is. Of course these are representations of stimuli (in the 
broad sense of the word) in their immediate physical environment, but other 
representations in their Current State Buffers may include stimuli that are further afield, 
such as what city or town they are in, the location of their coats and where they parked 
their cars. It is apparent from this description that these sorts of representations need to 
be constantly destructively updated in an automatic fashion in order for the system to 
run smoothly; proactive interference does not seem to happen. 
A final illustration that may prove useful in portraying the use of the Current State 
Buffer as something independent of Working Memory22, comes from thinking about a 
hypothetical Short Term Memory experiment. Consider what would happen in an 
experiment where a subject has to remember where various tokens were hidden in 
various different coloured containers. This task would probably involve storage in the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad. If the subject is given the money that they will receive for 
doing the experiment, and if this money happens to be put in one of the containers, an 
interesting situation arises. It is conceivable that the subject's Current State Buffer will 
track the location of the money in one of the containers, even if their Working Memory 
is remembering the location of the tokens in the other containers. I will describe a task 
shortly (in section 3.4) which approximates to this, but it is carried out on young 
children. The use of younger subjects allows one to simulate this sort of situation, but 
strips away some of the more sophisticated aspects of the adult system which 
complicate the interpretation of a task such as this. 
Representations are stored in the Current State Buffer if they are important to a given 
individual's current environment, and hence the contents of Current State Buffers are 
individual -specific. The crucial point though, is that these representations are 
distinct 
from other stimuli that are less important to an individual's current environment. Of 
course it is impossible to know the full contents of an individual's Current State Buffer, 
which may suggest that experimental manipulations concerned with the Current State 
Buffer are difficult to orchestrate. However, if the importance of a stimulus is 
systematically varied, then one should be able to influence whether or not its 
representation ends up in the Current State Buffer. 
22 As I am in fact suggesting in the examples given above. 
69 
Chapter 3: The Current State Buffer and Working Memory 
3.3 Barreau and Morton's Bag Task 
I have now motivated the idea of a Current State Buffer as an important component of 
Short Term Memory, and at least at the intuitive level, it seems to be a useful construct. 
The real test of a new construct however, is whether it can be fruitful on an 
experimental level. An example of an existing study that was designed on the basis of 
predictions made by the destructive updating characteristics of the Current State Buffer, 
is that of Barreau and Morton (submitted) . In their experiment, a manipulation was 
made on the "Smarties" experiment (Perner, Leekam and Wimmer, 1987), commonly 
done on 3- and 4-year-olds. In this classic paradigm, the child is shown a tube of 
Smarties and asked what is inside it, to which they usually respond "Smarties". They 
are then shown the true contents of the tube, namely pencils, and the lid is replaced. 
The child is then asked to say what is now in the tube, and they respond "pencils". 
However, about 75% of 3-year-olds fail to answer correctly what they thought was in 
the tube, and respond "pencils" to this question too. The 4-year-olds, however, have no 
problem with this, and respond, "Smarties". These results are usually explained within 
the "Theory of Nfin&' literature, as being due to some kind of competence deficit for the 
three year olds, for example an inability to represent a false belief (e. g. Perner et al., 
1987). 
Barreau and Morton enabled 3-year-olds to pass the tube task. The manipulation was to 
pour the contents of the tube (i. e. the pencils - although the child has not seen them at 
this stage) into a bag, after the child had been asked, "what is in the tube? ". When the 
3-year-olds are shown the contents of the bag, and are asked about what is in the bag, 
and what they thought was in the bag, 70% respond "pencils" to both questions 
(Gopnik and Astington, 1988). However, when the 3-year-old is then asked to say 
what they first thought was in the tube (which is then produced), 75% correctly 
respond "Smarties". 
Introducing a Current State Buffer into a theory of Short Tenn Memory can help to 
explain why 3-year-olds fail the Smarties task. The theory was used to predict that they 
would succeed when the bag manipulation is appended, as in Barreau and Morton's 
experiment. The central assumption is that the child represents the tube and its contents 
(inferred or otherwise), in the Current State Buffer. This is because they are very much 
in the forefront of the child's attention. Thus when the children are first shown a 
Smarties tube, they form a representation of what they have interpreted from the 
environment around them - namely that there are Smarties in the tube. This is supported 
by their initial response when asked what they think is in the tube (they respond 
"Smarties"). When the true contents are revealed, the previous representation relating to 
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the contents of the tube is destructively updated, and replaced with a representation of 
pencils in the tube, that relates to the new status of their immediate environment. Thus 
when the child is asked what they first thought was in the tube they are incorrect as this 
information had been wiped out, due to its transitory nature. For 4-year-olds, Barreau 
and Morton's account of information flow is exactly the same, but the capacity of their 
memory system is sufficient to compensate this limited capacity (see Barreau, 1997; 
Barreau and Morton, submitted). 
The bag manipulation was employed to force the child to create a more permanent 
representation of the initial state. According to Morton, Hammersley and Bekerian 
(1985), permanent Records are laid down in Long Tenn Memory when there is a 
change of context. When the inferred contents of the tube are poured into the bag half 
way through the experiment, there is a change of context. The representation of the 
child's inferred belief about the contents of the tube that is first stored in the Current 
State Buffer is transferred into Long Tenn Memory. The Current State Buffer is then 
concerned with the contents of the bag, which falls victim to the same destructive 
updating effects suffered by the child in the original Smarties tube situation. 
3.4 Independence of the Current State Buffer from Working 
Memory 
Although the concept of a Current State Buffer had been invoked successfully in the 
Barreau and Morton (submitted) study, I felt that it was still necessary to actually 
demonstrate the existence of such a Buffer, independent of the existing specified 
components of Working Memory. This is what the first part of the empirical work of 
this thesis, in chapters four and five, aims to achieve. I will now outline the technique 
that I used to dissociate Working Memory from the Current State Buffer, notably a 
technique "borrowed" from Working Memory research - dual-task methodology. 
The design involved a new paradigm, the "Tidy Emu Paradigm" used in all of the 
experiments presented in this thesis. The task comprised an Emu glove puppet 
(engineered by the experimenter) tidying away objects (toys) into receptacles (this 
activity is henceforth called pairing). The "story" presented to the children was that this 
Emu was particularly tidy (hence "ridy Emu"), and therefore went about tidying things 
up. On seeing that some toys were left out in a mess, Emu was going to tidy them away 
into the receptacles on the table. The subjects were told to watch this carefully so that 
they would know where the toys were later on. The subjects were 3- and 4-year-olds, 
who were immediately probed for the locations of these objects, following the pairings. 
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This is a task that engages the Visuospatial Sketchpad, and will therefore have 
associated with it an age-related capacity. 
This paradigm first facilitated a way of ascertaining Working Memory capacity (of the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad) for hidden objects in pre-school children in a pilot study. Once 
this capacity was established, the aim was to introduce another pairing that would 
overload this capacity beyond ceiling performance. Hence the addition of another 
pairing would cause interference. However, if this additional pairing engaged the 
Current State Buffer, then the capacity of the child to recall the additional pairing should 
show independence to the Working Memory component of the task, as indexed by a 
lack of interference with it. In this sense, the task employs dual-task methodology, 
which as I have noted in the preceding chapters, has been of vital importance in 
expanding the Working Memory literature and methodology. 
Another way of explaining what the paradigm achieved, is to start by saying that the 
task ostensibly engages a child in a Working Memory task, specifically using the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad to code the location of toys in receptacles. A pilot study had 
revealed that 3-year-olds were pushed just beyond their Visuospatial Sketchpad capacity 
if they had to remember 3 pairings, and 4-year-olds if they had to remember 4 pairings. 
Hence if subjects had their Visuospatial Sketchpads occupied by having to remember 3 
or 4 pairings (according to their age), one more pairing would introduce interference 
into their recall of the object locations. This would be because of their now heavily 
overloaded Visuospatial Sketchpads. However, if an extra pairing is added that engages 
the Current State Buffer instead, then interference with the items in the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad would be avoided because the extra pairing would be stored in a different 
place in the system. So a comparison of the performance of subjects' recall of pairings 
where the additional pairing was either another "Working Memory pairing", versus 
when it was a "Current State Buffer pairing" is critical. If the extra pairing results in 
interference with the other objects when it is a Working Memory pairing, but not when 
it is a Current State Buffer pairing, then it is reasonable to assume that Working 
Memory is separate from the Current State Buffer. 
The critical manipulation through which the additional pairing engages either Working 
Memory or the Current State Buffer, is the final part of the description of the Tidy Emu 
Paradigm. Recall that there are toys that are hidden in various receptacles. If one of the 
toys is a small Teddy Bear (henceforth Teddy), then there is a possibility of making it a 
very important feature of the child's environment by instilling it with animacy, and 
getting the child to interact with it. This could then be contrasted with a condition where 
Teddy was just one of the toys on the table in front of the child. In both conditions, 
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Teddy is an additional pairing and is placed in one of the receptacles. However, it is 
only when he is sufficiently important to be tracked by the Current State Buffer that this 
will offset interference with the other objects. 
3.5 Choice of Subject Population and Task 
The Tidy Emu Paradigm was a visuospatial task for pre-school children, and it was 
designed explicitly to demonstrate the independence of Working Memory from the 
Current State Buffer. The choice of a spatial task with pre-school children was made 
deliberately for three main reasons. First, it was crucial that the whereabouts of the 
representations for the pairings in the system could be confined to one place - the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad. As I have mentioned (e. g. section 1.3.3.4)., studies of visual 
Short Tenn Memory in adults have been confounded by problems stemming from the 
tendency for verbal memory codes to be used in visual tasks (Hitch et al., 1988). The 
use of pre-school children meant that visual-spatial representations of stimuli would 
stay in the Visuospatial Sketchpad. The second justification for choosing 3- and 
4-year-olds as the sample is that the immature visual memory system is presumably 
simpler than the adult system, and presents a more tractable problem for investigation. 
The third argument for the choice of sample was that the age-group allowed optimum 
comparison with Barreau and Morton's study, which as noted before (in section 3.3), 
successfully invoked the concept of a Current State Buffer. 
As I intimated at the close of Chapter 2 (in section 2.4.2), there have been very few 
visuospatial tasks documented for this age-group (e. g. Schumann-Hengsteler, 1992), 
and notably, these tasks were designed for slightly older children (e. g. de Ribaupierre 
and Bailleux; Walker et al., 1994). Nevertheless, the need for the Tidy Emu Paradigm 
was essentially motivated because these other tasks did not present themselves easily 
for a Current State Buffer/Working Memory dissociation. In other words, even if the 
task-specific capacity of an existing task was known, the manipulation to be made on an 
additional item for it to engage the Current State Buffer presented a difficult problem. In 
addition to these reasons for the design of a novel paradigm, the Tidy Emu Paradigm 
also allowed further investigation into issues related to the Current State Buffer, as 
should become apparent further on in the thesis. 
3.6 Experiment 1 
In Experiment I there were two conditions - Character and Object - referring to 
whether Teddy was an animate character or just another toy, respectively. The 
Character condition consisted of Emu tidying away objects into receptacles, with Teddy 
being an additional but animate character who goes to sleep in the same receptacle set. 
The Object condition consisted of the same number of objects being tidied away, but 
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with Teddy as an additional (non-animate) object, who is tidied away with the rest of 
the toys. Teddy became animate by interacting with the subjects before the toys were 
tidied away, in a short episode which also included measuring the subjects' digit span. 
The 3-year-olds watched three objects plus Teddy being tidied away, and the 
4-year-olds watched four object pairings plus Teddy. 
The dependent variables of interest were whether subjects were correct on recall of 
Teddy's location and the object locations". The hypothesis was that the location of 
Teddy would reside in the Current State Buffer in the Character condition, but in the 
Visuospatial Sketchpad in the Object condition. This would mean that there would be an 
extra load for Working Memory in the Object condition, resulting in interference with 
performance on recall of the location of the other objects. In the Character condition 
however, there would be no interference, as the location of Teddy would be registered 
in the Current State Buffer, leaving Working Memory performance untouched relative 
to subjects in the Object condition. Because the whereabouts within the system of the 
representation of Teddy would differ across conditions in this way, better performance 
was also predicted on memory for Teddy in the Character condition, relative to the 
Object condition. 
These predictions were first tested in the experiment reported in the next chapter, 
although the predictions reflect a basic assumption that underpins the entire body of 
empirical work that I report in the thesis. This is that in the Tidy Emu Paradigm, 
subjects store the representation of the location of the objects and Teddy in different 
parts of the system in the Character condition, but that all the representations of the 
locations are stored in Working Memory in the Object condition. 
' To avoid confusion, the dependent variable for the recall of object locations (objects) is dfferentiated 
from the Object condition by the latter being capitalised. Similarly, the Character condition is always 
capitalised in the same way, and discernible from the references to "character" locations, as in Teddy's 
location In Chapter 7, when more than one character is hidden, this particular distinction will become 
especially pertinent, and I will be consistent with this principle in capitalising Character when I refer to 
one Character, two Character and three Character conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Independence of the Current State Buffer 
4.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter contains the first section of empirical work presented in this thesis. 
Experiment I describes how the Tidy Emu Paradigm was employed to show the 
independence of the Current State Buffer from Working Memory. As I have already 
explained, the basic task was for children to remember in which receptacles Tidy Emu 
put various objects, including an additional pairing (Teddy) that either further burdened 
Working Memory, or engaged the Current State Buffer. The main finding in 
Experiment 1 was that memory for the location of Teddy did not interfere with recall of 
the locations of the other objects when Teddy was an animate character, tracked by the 
Current State Buffer. When Teddy was treated as another object, however, recall of his 
location did interfere with the recall of the locations of the other objects. 
The second half of the chapter then considers alternative explanations that one might use 
to account for the set of results. Some are ruled out on purely theoretical grounds, but 
others generate the need to make slight changes to the design. These adaptations are 
realised in Experiment 2, which is then introduced within this context. 
4.2 Experiment 1 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Design 
There were 2 independent variables: (a) age of child (3- or 4-year-olds) f between 
subjectsl (b) Teddy condition (Object - Teddy as Object, or Character - Teddy as 
Character) fbetween subjectsl, and two dependent variables - (a) correctly 
remembering an object pairing (i. e. an object's location in its receptacle), and (b) 
correctly remembering Teddy's location. 
I have hypothesised above that both memory for Teddy and memory for objects would 
be better in the Character condition relative to the Object condition. 
4.2.1.2 ParticipaWs 
The participants consisted of 3- and 4-year-old pre-school children from a number of 
local nurseries in North London, representing a cross section of varied economic status. 
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There were 28 of the 3-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 randomisations for the 2 
conditions) and 28 of the 4-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 randomisations for the 2 
conditions). The mean ages were 3; 10 (range, 3; 1 to 3; 12) and 4; 8 (range 4; 0 to 4; 10). 
4.2.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of 2 'characters' (or I was used in the Object condition), 4 
'objects', and 7 'receptacles', which were manipulated on a desk. 
The character that could be interchanged as an object was a small Teddy capable of 
fitting inside any of the receptacles. The other character was a glove puppet Emu that 
could easily manoeuvre objects with its beak. These two characters are pictured below 
in Photograph 4.1. 
The objects were a toy car, three linked bricks of Lego, a plastic cat, and a crayon. The 
receptacles were a hat, a cup, a little box, a small bag, a sock, a plastic bowl, and a 
basket. Each of the objects could fit into any of the receptacles, thereby hiding them 
from the view of the child. This involved resting a patterned handkerchief over the top 
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of each receptacle in the case of the cup, basket and bowl 24 (three differently patterned 
handkerchiefs were used for this). 
The responses of the child were recorded by the experimenter on a special-ly prepared 
response sheet (see Appendix 4). 
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
1. Setting 
Each child was run individually in a quiet room, with the child and experimenter sitting 
on nursery chairs at a nursery desk. The receptacles were randomly arranged for each 
experimental session along the horizontal, towards the back of the desk, and the objects 
were placed in a pile towards the front of the desk. Teddy featured as part of this pile in 
the Object condition, but was placed slightly to the side of them in the Character 
condition. Emu was kept out of the view of the subject at this stage of the experiment. 
The total number of objects used in each condition was dictated by the number of 
pairings that were to be tested, four for 3-year-olds, and five for 4-year-olds" 
(including Teddy). In the warm-up to the experiment, it was checked that each child 
knew the names of all the objects and receptacles. Where the child misnamed something 
Photograph 4.2: Objects and receptacles on the table 
of the desk. 
' This did not cause extra confusions between these three receptacles. See comment in section 5.4.1.2. 
2'The number of pairings to be done by 3-and 4-year-olds had been explored in the pilot study, which 
established the basic pairing capacities of the 3-and 4-year-olds on the same task. The pilot study 
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(e. g. "pot" for the bowl), that name was then used to refer to that item when testing that 
child. Photograph 4.1 shows a (4-year-old's) subject-eye's view of the table and 
stimuli at this stage in the experimental proceedings. 
2. Digit Span 
In the Character condition, the first phase of the experiment required the experimenter to 
assess the children's digit span. In the Object condition this occurred in the final phase. 
The reason for this difference was that Teddy was used in an animate way in eliciting 
this measure in both conditions. Thus it was convenient for children in the Character 
condition to use this as an opportunity to "get to know Teddy" before the pairings. For 
these subjects, this contributed to establishing Teddy as an animate character at the point 
of his going to sleep. 
To measure digit span, the child was told that Teddy was very popular and had lots of 
friends. In the Character condition, this was preceded by an introduction to Teddy 
("we'll be playing a game with this fellow, he's called Teddy. Say hello to Teddy. 
These are Teddy's toys (pointing to objects on table), and we'll be looking at them a bit 
later"). The child was then told that Teddy was so popular that he needed his own 
telephone and telephone line. The child was then asked to repeat his telephone number 
(specified slowly and clearly by the experimenter) which would be a3 digit string 
excluding zero. The same string length was tested again with the child repeating 
Harry's number (one of Teddy's many friends). If two trials of the same string length 
were correctly repeated, then the string size was increased by one number (using other 
friend's numbers), and the procedure was repeated. If the child got one out of two 
strings correct at any length, a third, deciding, trial was given. The digit span was 
defined as the longest length at which children accurately repeated two trials with this 
procedure. 
3. Teddy Sleeps 
The next stage in the Character condition involved the experimenter commenting to the 
child that all of the toys (i. e. the objects at the front of the desk) belonged to Teddy, and 
that he had been playing with them all morning and so was very tired. Teddy then went 
off to sleep into one of the receptacles. In the Object condition, this phase was omitted. 
revealed that three pairings stretched 3-year-olds beyond ceiling performance, and four pairings stretched 
4-year-olds beyond ceiling performance. 
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4. Emu 
Immediately after this, the experimenter produced "Tidy Emu", and presented him to 
the child, who was encouraged to stroke the puppet, as depicted in Photograph 4.3. 
Photograph 4-3: Meeting Tidy Emu 
The subject was further informed that Tidy Emu didn't like mess, and had a habit of 
tidying things away. Emu was then seen to notice the toys that had been left in a mess, 
and the subject was told that Emu was going to tidy them up into the receptacles at the 
back of the desk, but that they had to remember where all the objects were so that they 
could be found later. In Photograph 4.4, Emu can be seen tidying away the objects 
while a subject watches carefully. 
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5. Pairings 
The next stage varied according to the age of the child and the condition. For the Object 
condition, Emu placed each of the four toys (which included Teddy) in four different 
receptacles (3-year-olds), or each of the five toys in five separate receptacles 
(4-year-olds). In the Character condition, Emu placed three toys in three separate 
receptacles for 3-year-olds, and four for 4-year-olds. Note that Teddy was "fidied" first 
in the Object condition to match the fact that Teddy was always put to sleep first (and 
therefore paired first) in the Character conditions (and this also explains why there was 
one less object pairing relative to the Object condition in this phase of the experiment). 
On each pairing during this tidying phase, the experimenter instructed the child to watch 
carefully. The order of the pairings (and the objects and receptacles used) was dictated 
by the 7 different randomisations. 
6. Testing of Objects' Locations 
The test phase of the experiment was the same for both Teddy conditions. Immediately 
after the pairings had been completed, the child was tested for the location of the objects 
("where is the cat? ") directly by the experimenter (as opposed to role-playing Emu, who 
was placed out of sight from this stage forwards). The questioning was done in the 
same order in which the pairings had been made, except that Teddy's location was 
always asked for last. The children were encouraged to indicate the location of the 
objects with a verbal response, and were encouraged not to touch or point to the 
receptacle where they thought the object was concealed (they were told they could do 
this later). On the few occasions that they made no response or said they didn't know, 
the experimenter moved on to the next pairing. After recording subjects' responses in 
this way, the subjects were then instructed to actually find each of the objects in tum. 
For the subjects in the Object condition, when they found the Teddy, they were 
"introduced" to him and the same procedure to measure digit span as was employed 
with subjects in the Character condition was followed. 
4.2.2 Results 
For each child, the total number of correct responses was noted for the objects 
(excluding Teddy's pairing), along with whether or not they remembered the location of 
Teddy. Table 4.1 shows that every single child in the Character conditions, 3- and 
4-year-olds, remembered the location of Teddy, whereas only half the children in the 
Object conditions recalled Teddy's whereabouts. These differences reached significance 
for each age-group on a Yates correct Chi Squared test (3-year-olds: X' = 8.57 
(df = 1) p<0.003; 4-year-olds X' = 6.86 (df = 1) p<0.009). 
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The means and standard deviations of correct responses in each age-group for object 
locations (i. e. excluding Teddy) are shown in Table 4.2. Children in the Character 
condition seem to recall the toys' locations better than those in the Object condition. 
TABLE 4.1 FREQUENCY OF RECALL OF TEDDY'S LOCATION IN EXPERIMENT I 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Character 14 14 0 
Object 6 
TABLE 4.2 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS (EXCLUDING TEDDY) IN 
EXPERIMENT 1. 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Mean/3 S. D. n Mean/4 S. D. n 
Character 2.00 1.1 14 2.71 1.06 14 
Object 1.00 0.88 14 1.43 1.65 14 
Two-way ANOVAs were computed on the mean object location scores for both age 
groups with age and condition as between subject factors. This revealed a significant 
main effect of condition with 
F(,, 
5, ) 12.46, (p < 0.001). The main effect of age just 
failed to reach significance (F( 1,52) 3.12, p<0.084), and there was no interaction 
(F(1,52) = 0.66; ii. s. ). 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Children in the Character condition performed significantly better than those in the 
Object group on both memory for objects and memory for Teddy. In fact, all children in 
the Character condition recalled Teddy's location correctly. This confirmed the first 
experimental hypothesis. According to this, children in the Character condition 
consistently recalled where Teddy was sleeping because Teddy had become an 
important character in the game and so his location was recorded automatically in the 
Current State Buffer. In the Object condition, Teddy was no more important than any of 
the other objects and so would be represented in Working Memory, and not in the 
Current State Buffer. Since Working Memory was already overloaded by the other 
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pairings, memory for Teddy's location was worse for these children than for those in 
the Character condition. 
Subjects in the Character condition exhibited better memory for objects (supporting the 
other half of the experimental hypothesis) for similar reasons. For them, Teddy's 
location was stored in the Current State Buffer. For children in the Object condition, 
Teddy's location was stored in Working Memory. In effect, these children in the Object 
condition had to store one more pairing than the children in the Character condition. 
Hence the subjects in the Object condition suffered interference from this extra pairing 
on their recall of the other object locations. 
4.3 Other Explanations and Experiment 2 
4.3.1 von Restorff Isolation Effect 
An alternative interpretation of the results which needs some consideration is the 
possibility that better memory for Teddy in the Character condition is due to a 
von Restorff Isolation Effect. Simply put, this effect is the enhanced memory that is 
conferred by a distinctive item in an otherwise homogenous list (von Restorff, 1933). 
In the present study, the very fact that Teddy had become an important character for 
children in the Character condition, relative to the other toys, could be viewed in this 
way. Hence, the relatively worse memory for Teddy in the Object condition, where he 
was equivalent to the other items (objects) in the list. 
Analysis of the von Restorff literature, however, reveals that the finding in this study 
cannot be attributed to a von Restorff Effect. In addition to the facilitation in memory 
for the distinctive item, there is a secondary effect on memory for the homogenous 
items within the "isolated" list. In most circumstances, the tradeoff against the boosted 
memory for the isolated item (the von Restorff Effect ) is a decrease in memory for the 
homogenous items (Wallace, 1965). For example, in a study by Cimbalo, Nowak and 
Soderstrom (1981), notably a study with a similar memory task and sample to the 
present experiment, a von Restorff Effect was found with two age-groups of children. 
The children viewed cards of different line-drawn animals, presented successively, with 
the middle card coloured pink in the isolated condition (and not in the non-isolated list). 
After each card was presented, it was placed face-down in front of the child. When the 
last card was placed down the child was given the name of an animal and told to point at 
the relevant card (i. e. remember the 'location' of the animal). Recall of the isolated pink 
animal was superior to its line drawn equivalent in a non-isolated list - the von Restorff 
Effect. However, memory for the other animals in the isolated list (homogenous items) 
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was worse when compared with memory for the homogenous items in the non-isolated 
Ilse'. 
In the present study, however, if one attributed the better performance by the Character 
subjects in remembering the location of the "isolated" Teddy to a von Restorff Effect, 
then one would also predict the accompanying decrement in performance for other 
objects. Clearly the increase in performance by the Character group on correct object 
pairings (the "homogenous items") that was actually found, rules out the explanation of 
a von Restorff Effect. 
4.3.2 Levels of Processing 
Another possible explanation of the difference between performance on Teddy in the 
two conditions needs consideration. The superior performance in the Character 
condition may be attributable to a Levels of Processing Effect (Craick and Lockhart, 
1972, and see section 1.2.3). The argument would be that because Teddy became an 
important character for subjects in the Character condition, this was tantamount to a 
deep Level of Processing. Subjects in the Object condition therefore, would not be 
expected to perforin as well because they encoded Teddy in a more shallow fashion as it 
just featured as another toy. 
Notwithstanding a number of other theoretical criticisms with the Levels of Processing 
theory (see Baddeley, 1978), it is still difficult to operationalise what might be meant in 
the present study by a deeper Level of Processing for Teddy's location. This is 
especially difficult because most Levels of Processing studies use word-lists that vary 
on a semantic-physical continuum. Similarly, it is not entirely clear how a Levels of 
Processing account would explain the difference in performance on object locations 
between the two groupS27. However, it is still necessary to investigate whether the 
extant literature on the topic would predict a Levels of Processing Effect in the current 
design. 
As previously mentioned, Levels of Processing Effects are usually evidenced 
experimentally with subjects learning word lists in either a deep (e. g. rating 
pleasantness or meaningfulness of words) or physical (e. g. searching for specific 
letters, such as vowels in a word) fashion. In a meta-analysis of these studies, Brown 
26 von Restorff Effects are usually obtained with the isolated item in a central position (as in the 
Cimbalo et aL. (1981) experiment), but Hunt (1995) provides evidence that the effect can equally be 
obtained with the isolated item in the first serial position, as in the present study. 
21 Unless one contends that deep processing resources compete with shallow processing resources such 
that expenditure of deep encoding capacity encroaches upon shallow processing resources. 
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and Mitchell (1994) categorise the way in which the items are varied in processing 
depth as either between subjects or within subjects manipulations. A between subjects 
design is symbolized in box I of Figure 4.1, and would have one group of subjects 
exclusively encoding a given list of words in a deep fashion, and another leaming the 
same list in a shallow manner. Within subjects designs, depicted in boxes 2 and 3 of 
Figure 4.1, use the same group of subjects, by varying the way that they process 
different lists of items and then comparing performance on these lists. Challis and 
Brodbeck (1992) further differentiate the way in which within subjects designs can be 
arranged. Within designs can either be mixed or blocked. In blocked-within designs, 
shown in box 2 of Figure 4.1, all subjects process a block of items semantically, and 
then another block of equal number shallowly (the order is not important). There are 
distinct "sessions" of differential processing ("shallow and deep blocks"). In 
mixed-within designs, portrayed in box 3 of Figure 4.1, subjects are instructed to 
process certain words in a deep way and others in a shallow way in one single 
"session" according to some predetermined signal for the type of processing required. 
Hence, in a mixed-within design, subjects are forced to alternate between semantic and 
non-semantic processing. 
Challis and Brodbeck (1992) noted in their meta-analysis that Levels of Processing 
Effects can only be demonstrated using between designs and blocked-within designs, 
expressed in Figure 4.1 by the ticks in boxes I and 2. The mixed-within design does 
not produce Levels of Processing Effects, denoted by the cross in box 3 of 
Figure 4.1. The authors sought to confirm this by performing a Levels of Processing 
experiment which varied a between, a mixed-within and a blocked-within design. They 
found no Levels of Processing Effect when "deep" items were mixed together in one 
list with "shallow" items (a mixed-within subjects design). Either a between subjects, 
or blocked-within subjects design was found to be necessary for the effect, consistent 
with the results of their meta-analysis. 
In the present study (expressed in box 4 of Figure 4.1), if Teddy featuring amongst 
the objects in the Character condition resembled a n-iixed-within subjects design, the 
Levels of Processing literature would not have predicted an advantage for Teddy, on the 
basis of the design itself. This was probably not the case, however, as it could be 
argued that Teddy's pairing in the Character condition, seconds before Emu had been 
presented and before the object pairings, served to make the design more "block-like". 
This uncertainty is expressed by having a cross and a tick in box 4 of Figure 4.1, 
effectively stating that while a Levels of Processing Effect may be predicted by the 
design, many other differences to standard Levels of Processing experiments exist. In 
Experiment 2 therefore (see Chapter 5), it was ensured that the objects were tidied away 
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immediately after Teddy went to sleep. This was orchestrated by simply having Emu ZD 
introduced to the subjects in the Character condition prior to Teddy sleeping. Thus as 
soon as Teddy went to sleep, the objects were tidied away by Emu. Hence the "deep 
block" is now juxtaposed to the "shallow block" in box 5 of Figure 4.1, and the tick 
now indicates that the Levels of Processing literature predicts no Levels of Processing 
Effect, since Experiment 2 constitutes a mixed-within subjects design. 
Figure 4.1 Designs that may lead to Level of Processing Effects 
Types of designs with Levels of Processing manipulations 
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group 2 shallow 
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4.3.3 Organisation of Stimuli 
One may want to contend that the subjects in the Character condition of Experiment I 
were organising the objects into one "category" and the Teddy into another, whereas 
subjects in the Object condition were not able to categorise their "list" of stimuli in this 
way, as they were all objects. Consistent with many experiments on the effects of 
Organisation on word-lists, it would be predicted that recall of items in the organised 
list presented to subjects in the Character condition, would be superior (e. g. Bower, 
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Clark, Lesgold and Winzenz, 1969) resulting in an increase in the perforniance on 
Teddy's location and on the object locations. 28 
First of all, it is debatable whether one can compare the Tidy Emu Paradigm to general 
studies of Organisation. Does just one item (Teddy as Character) form a separate 
category in the same way as there are separate categories with several exemplars per 
category in the Organisation literature? In addition, the type of Organisation involved in 
the above literature, consisting of semantic categories, is very different to the two 
categories of "toys " and "Teddy". Second, it is questionable whether children as young 
as three or four use Organisational strategies. A frequently cited piece of support for 
this inability is the finding of Moely, Olson, Halwes and Flavell (1969), that only 10- 
and 1 1-year-old children display Organisation at a level that is significantly greater than 
chance. Similarly, there are many other studies consistent with this position (e. g. Arlin 
and Brody, 1976; Cole, Gay, Glick and Sharp, 1971; Lange, 1973). In fact, bearing in 
mind the evidence presented in section 2.2.3.1 of Chapter 2, that rehearsal does not set 
in until the age of about seven, it is not surprising that the discovery or creation of 
semantic relations between items, which seems to be a more complex and demanding 
process than rehearsal, arrives even later in development (Schneider and Pressley, 
1989). 
The third reason to reject an "Organisation of stimuli" explanation is that evidence for 
Organisation at a very young age, when it is found, is where there is a particularly high 
association between items within a category (e. g. l3jorklund, 1985). Lange (1978) has 
argued that this is because recall of any particular item within a category more or less 
automatically triggers recall of closely associated items. One could argue therefore, that 
subjects in the Object condition can use this to their advantage in recalling all the object 
set, whereas subjects in the Character condition must ensure they "remember" the other 
category of Teddy in addition to the object set. Thus, even if they do use Organisational 
strategies, it is not clear why the Object condition should exhibit such a dramatic 
disadvantage to the Character condition. 
Finally, a study by Axia and Caravaggi (1987) seems to argue against the possibility 
that the subjects in Experiment I were capable of semantic Organisation of the stimuli. 
In their study, they provide evidence that younger children (4-year-olds were the 
youngest group) are more sensitive than older ones to the spatial location of items than 
they are to semantic categories. Hence, if the subjects in Experiment I did perform any 
Organisation, they would have had a tendency to have done so on a purely spatial basis, 
"I am very grateful to Graham Hitch for suggesting this possibility to me. 
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and any of these effects would have been cancelled out due to the randomisations of the 
spatial layout of the stimull and receptacles. 
4.3.4 Intentional versus Incidental Learning 
One of the more counterintuitive aspects of the superior performance of the Character 
group on recall of Teddy's location is the fact that children in this condition were not 
instructed to remember Teddy's whereabouts. Instead, they just passively watched 
Teddy go off to sleep in one of the receptacles. However, in the Object condition, 
children were told to remember where Teddy and all the other toys were being tidied as 
they would need to remember this for later. Relevant here therefore, is the distinction 
between intentional versus incidental learning (Greene, 1986). It could be claimed that 
the difference in performance on Teddy in the Character and Object conditions may 
simply be explained by the difference between an intentional (Object condition) and an 
incidental (Character condition) learning situation. 
The validity of this claim can equally be checked by investigating existing empirical 
evidence. Neill, Beck, Bottalico and Molloy (1990) have shown that on an explicit 
memory test, anticipation of the test (i. e. intentional learning) actually facilitates learning 
relative to not anticipating a test. This would then have predicted better performance on 
Teddy for children in the Object condition who anticipated a test. In the present study, 
performance in recalling Teddy's location in the Character condition was facilitated even 
though this was leamt incidentally. This argues against the "intentional versus 
incidental" learning explanation for the results of Experiment 1. 
4.3.5 Long Term Memory 
Another possible argument against a Current State Buffer explanation is that Teddy's 
pairing in the Character condition may be seen as a separate event to that of the other 
object pairings. On the basis of the framework in Morton et al., (1985), the end of a 
Teddy event, signalled by his going to sleep, could trigger the creation of a Long Tenn 
Memory representation of what had just happened. If this were the case, then the 
independence of memory for Teddy and for the objects in the Character condition 
would reflect the difference between Short and Long Tenn Memory and not between 
Short Term (Working) memory and the Current State Buffer. In Experiment 2 
therefore, Emu was introduced to the children prior to Teddy going to sleep, and 
immediately after he does go to sleep Emu tidies up all the objects. The immediate 
temporal proximity of the pairings of Teddy and objects in Experiment 2, would work 
against the creation of a separate event involving just Teddy's pairing. 
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4.3.6 Phonological Recoiling 
As stated in the introductory chapters (e. g. section 2.2.4.1 ), children of this age do not 
usually engage in the phonological coding of spatial information (Hitch et al., 1988). 
However, in the test phase of Experiment 1, children were encouraged to vocallse their 
responses of the locations (see section 4.2.1.4). Since this might have affected 
performance by engaging the Phonological Loop in some way in Experiment 1, 
children were instructed to point or to touch the receptacle when probed during the test 
phase in Experiment 2. In this way, I could be more confident that performance on the 
task would engage the Visuospatial Sketchpad exclusively. 
4.3.7 Subject Conridence 
One further issue is that the poorer performance of children in the Object condition 
might be because they have had less time than the children in the Character condition to 
become comfortable with the experimental situation. " Recall that, in Experiment 1, 
digit span was probed at the beginning of the experimental session for children in the 
Character condition, as a part of the crucial familiarisation with Teddy. In the Object 
condition however, children's digit span was measured at the end of the session, 
following the test-phase. A possible argument is that at the time of the test Phase, 
children in the Character condition will be relatively more familiar and relaxed with the 
experimenter and the experimental set-up, possibly leading to better overall 
performance, relative to the Object condition. In Experiment 2, therefore, the time spent 
in the experimental situation prior to the pairings and testing in both conditions was 
controlled for, by introducing the digit span task at the beginning of the session for 
subjects in the Object condition. This was done by making use of a different character 
to Teddy to elicit digit span, since Teddy must feature as one of the toys, as in 
ExperimentIP-1. A completely new character, Simba, was introduced in Experiment 2 
whose sole purpose was to probe digit span for subjects in the Object condition. 
29 1 am grateful to Alan Baddeley for pointing out this possibility. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Other Explanations 
5.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter first describes Experiment 2, designed to rule out some of the altemative 
explanations to the data from Experiment 1, that were raised in the previous chapter. 
After successfully discounting these other explanations, I suggest that there are still 
further alternative accounts of the data. Experiment 3 is thus presented as a study that 
specifically addresses these remaining alternative explanations. The details of 
Experiment 3 then follow, and I argue that the results are best supported again by a 
Current State Buffer explanation. Thus these two further experiments repficate the 
findings of Experiment 1, and provide more evidence that the Current State Buffer is 
distinct from Working Memory. 
5.2 Experiment 2 
Let me recapitulate the changes made to Experiment 1 that were brought about in 
Experiment 2. First, I varied the order of events in the Character condition by 
TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENT 2 CONDITIONS. 
Character2 
1. Interaction with Teddy 
2. Naming objects and 
receptacles 
Simba 
1. Interaction with Simba 
2. Naming objects and 
receptacles. "objects" include 
Teddy 
3. Introduced to Tidy Emu 
4. Teddy goes to sleep in a 
receptacle 
4. Emu tidies away Teddy 
5. Emu tidies away objects into S. Emu tidies away objects into 
receptacles receptacles 
6. Probed recall of location of objects 
7. Probed recall of location of Teddy 
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presenting Emu to the children before Teddy went to sleep. In addition, all children 
were encouraged to point or to touch the appropriate receptacle when probed rather than 
say where the target was. Third, subjects in the new Object condition inter-acted with a 
baby lion called Simba in exactly the same way as subjects in the Character condition 
interacted with Teddy. A summary of Experiment 2 is sketched in Table 5.1. The new 
Object condition is called Simba, and the new Character condition, Character2. 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2. LI Design 
The design was identical to that employed in Experiment 1. The conditions were 
renamed "Simba" - Teddy as Object, and "Character2" - Teddy as Character. As with 
Experiment 1, it was hypothesised that recall for Teddy's location and recafl for the 
object locations would still be better for subjects in the Character2 condition relative to 
subjects in the Simba condition. 
5.2.1.2 Participants 
The children were 3- and 4-year-old pre-school children from a number of North 
London nurseries. No child had participated in Experiment 1. As with Experiment 1, 
there were 28 of the 4-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 randomisations for the 2 
conditions), and 28 of the 3-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 randomisations for the 2 
conditions). The mean ages were 3; 7 (range, 3; 2 to 3; 12) and 4; 5 (range 4; 0 to 4; 12). 
5.2.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to that employed 
in Experiment 1, with the addition of Simba, 
a baby lion, similar in size to Teddy. Simba is 
pictured in Photograph 5.1. 
Photograph 5-1: Simba 
5.2.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure, outlined in Table 5.1, was 
similar to Experiment 1, but with one major 
alteration to each of the two conditions, and 
one change in the testing phase. The 
procedures before the testing stage for each 
condition will be dealt with separately. The FF 
testing phase - which was the same for both conditions - will then be described. 
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1. The Character2 Condition 
The procedure was similar to that carried out in the Character condition in the first 
experiment, except that the order of events was changed slightly in order to remove the 
time gap between Teddy 'sleeping' and the objects being hidden. The first event 
involved Teddy being introduced and administering the digit span measurement (see 
section 4.2.1.4), following which the child named the toys and receptacles. Next, 
instead of Teddy going straight to sleep, as in Experiment 1, the child was told that 
Teddy was tired and that they would soon see what he would do next. Teddy was then 
placed to the side of the toys on the table. At this stage, Emu is presented, as in the 
previous experiment, with the same commentary. However, just before Emu begins to 
tidy the toys, the child is told that Teddy is going to sleep. Teddy was then placed by 
the experimenter in one of the receptacles as in the previous experiment. Immediately 
following this, Emu begins the pairings as in Experiment 1. 
2. The Simba Condition 
This condition was exactly the same as the Object condition in Experiment 1, except 
that before the naming of the toys and receptacles, the child is introduced to Simba. 
Subjects are told that Simba is very popular, and has so many friends that he needs his 
own telephone line. The digit span procedure, as carried out in the Character condition 
in Experiment 1, is then continued, but using Simba instead of Teddy. At the end of 
the digit span procedure, Simba is placed under the table, out of sight, "as he needs to 
go to sleep". This procedure equalised the amount of time children spent with the 
experimenter in the two conditions prior to the pairings. Emu is then presented as in 
Experiment 1, and the objects are tidied away. Subjects were asked at the end of the 
testing phase where Simba was. 
3 Testing of Toys' Locations 
The test phase was the same for both conditions in Experiment 2, but the instructions 
were slightly different from those in Experiment I in that subjects were told to touch or 
point to the relevant receptacles when probed, as opposed to being instructed to emit a 
vocal response. The order of probing the objects was the same as in Experiment 1, 
namely the objects were probed in the order of hiding, followed by probing Teddy. 
This can be represented by 123(4) Teddy. 
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5.2.2 Results 
The total number of correct responses for each child was collected (out of the number of 
objects paired excluding Teddy's pairing), along with whether or not the subject 
remembered the location of Teddy. Table 5.2 shows that all children in the Character2 
conditions remembered the location of Teddy, compared with about half the children in 
the Simba conditions. Yates corrected Chi Squared tests were carried out to investigate 
whether there was a difference between the Character2 and Simba conditions for each 
of the age groups. Both tests yielded significant differences (3-year-oldS X2=6.86, 
2 df = 1, p<0.009; 4-year-olds , 7=3.9, 
df = 1, p<0.05). 
TABLE 5.2 FREQUENCY OF RECALL OF TEDDY'S LOCATION IN EXPERIMENT 2 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Character2 14 0 14 0 
Simba 95 
The performance of children on object locations (i. e. excluding Teddy) are shown in 
Table 5.3. Subjects in the Character2 condition recall the toys' locations better than 
those in the Simba conditions. Two-way between subject ANOVAs were computed on 
the mean object location scores, revealing an effect of condition on the toys' locations 
F(1,52) = 5.65, p=0.02 1. There was no main effect due to age (F (1,52) = 2.29, n. s. ), 
and no interaction between age and condition (F(1,52) = 0, n. s. ). 
TABLE 5.3 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS (EXCLUDING TEDDY) IN 
EXPERIMENT 2 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Mean/3 S. D. n Mean/4 S. D. n 
Character2 2.21 0.97 14 2.71 1.38 14 
Simba 1.43 1.22 14 1.93 1.33 14 
In the Simba condition, only two subjects (out of 28) failed to recall where Simba was 
at the end of the experiment. 
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5.3.3 Discussion 
Children in the Character2 conditions performed significantly better than those in the 
Simba conditions both on memory for objects and on memory for Teddy. This 
replicated the findings in the first experiment. As before, these data were predicted on 
the basis of the function of the Current State Buffer. For children in the Character2 
conditions, this Buffer would store the location of Teddy, allowing perfect recall, as 
Teddy had become an important character to these children. The children in the Simba 
group however, had to store Teddy's location in their Visuospatial Sketchpad and so 
suffered interference from their recall of the other objects. In addition, Character2 
children had to store one less item in their Visuospatial Sketchpad, and so were able to 
perform better on the objects. Because the children did not produce any spoken 
responses when probed, the possibility of phonological re-coding is very slight, 
allowing one to suppose that the representation of the object locations would be held in 
the Visuospatial Sketchpad. 
It is very probable that Simba was also tracked in the Current State Buffers of subjects 
who were in the Simba condition because, like Teddy in the Character2 condition, he 
had become an important stimulus. The reason why there was not perfect performance 
is probably because when Simba went to sleep he went to sleep under the desk which 
went away from the view of the subject. Whereas most subjects specifically tracked him 
going there, the two subjects who did not remember where he was may just have 
assumed that he "went away" and did not make an effort to notice where he actually 
went to sleep. In the Character conditions, there is perfect recall because Teddy goes to 
sleep in one of the receptacles directly in front of the subject. 
The replication of the basic Current State Buffer dissociation, even after the alterations 
to the temporal order of Teddy's pairing in the Character2 conditions, make it difficult 
to posit that Teddy's location had been stored in Long Term Memory. Teddy's pairing 
occurred immediately before the other object pairings and therefore was unlikely to have 
become a separate event. For the same reason, it is difficult to posit that Teddy's 
increased recall in the Character2 condition was due to a deeper Level of Processing. 
The alterations to the design rule out a Levels of Processing account, as the design 
became a mixed-within (see section 4.3.2). 
The claim that the difference in performance in Experiment I between the two groups 
can be accounted for by the difference in time spent in the experimental situation (see 
section 4.3.7) can also be ruled out. In the Simba conditions, children spent equally 
long in the experimental set-up before they observe the pairings and are tested on them. 
Nevertheless, the established difference in performance was still found. 
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5.3 Experiment 3 
Experiments I and 2 seem to provide a set of results that are best explained by positing 
a Current State Buffer as distinct from Working Memory. However, there still remain 
two further possible explanations for the pattern of data. These are now introduced, and 
Experiment 3 tests predictions stemming from these possibilities. 
S. 3.1 Recency Effects 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the notion of a Current State Buffer has some similarities 
to the way in which a construct is talked about by Baddeley and I-Etch (1993; Baddeley, 
1986). These authors invoke the ubiquitous recency effect to explain one's orientation 
in time and space. The recency effect refers to the increased memory performance for 
the last item (and sometimes items) in a list (Glanzer, 1972, and see section 1.2.2.2). 
Baddeley and Hitch's idea is that we possess recency effects for every aspect of our 
lives; we know what day it currently is, as it is the most recent; we know where we 
parked our car as it is the most recent place that we have parked our car, and so on. The 
implication is that one can have multiple recency effects for all types of event in our 
lives. As part of the support for this contention, a study by Watkins and Peynircioglu 
(1985) is cited, where multiple recency effects were found for different types of 
categories of items. 
It is possible to argue that the results from Experiment I (and Experiment 2) can be 
explained along these lines. The argument would be that when Teddy is animated for 
the Character children, he forms a category of items" that is distinct from the other 
objects (Hitch, personal communication). The question of what criteria are necessary to 
create a separate category for multiple recency effects is in fact raised by Watkins & 
Peynircioglu (1985), and these authors have conceded that the boundary is unclear and 
that they needed to work very hard to design stimuli which gave rise to multiple recency 
effects". For the sake of argument, however, one might assume that the Teddy 
manipulation is sufficient to create two separate categories of items in the Character 
condition; Teddy as one category and the objects as another. This would mean that the 
location of Teddy would have a distinct recency effect associated with it as a member of 
the category of significant objects. Therefore children in the Teddy as Character 
conditions would be expected to recall his location better than children in the Object 
30 It is important to note that with this multiple recency effect interpretation there are problems with 
the numbers of items in the categories. We do not know whether having just one item (Teddy) in one 
of the (multiple) categories, is equivalent to the equal number of items in each category that Watkins 
and Peynircioglu (1985) used in their experiment. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, this 
simplifying assumption is made. 
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group for whom Teddy is just another object. In summary, recency effects would be 
expected for both Teddy-like and object-like items in the Character conditions, but there 
would be just one recency effect for object-like items in the Object condition. 
The aim of Experiment 3 therefore was to assess this claim by inducing a recency effect 
when probing locations, and then compare the predictions of a multiple recency effect 
with that of the Current State Buffer effect. Recall that, in the first experiment, the 
objects were probed in the order in which they were hidden, meaning that the most 
recent object to be hidden was probed the last (excluding Teddy). In order to induce a 
recency effect, the order of probing was designed such that recency effects were 
maximised (these conditions are termed Rec-Char and Rec-Simba). Specifically, the 
order of probing proceeded in the reverse order of hiding, with the last object hidden 
being probed first and so on ((4)321, Teddy). The position of Teddy's hiding and 
probing was kept as it was in the first two experiments. This difference in the order of 
item probing is illustrated in Table 5.4 below, contrasting the order of probing for 
children in Experiment 3 with those in Experiments I and 2. 
TABLE 5.4 ORDER OF OBJECT PROBING IN EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
Experiment number items hidden items 
probed 
4-year-olds Experiments 1 and 2 T1234 1234T 
Experiment 3 Tl 234 4321 T 
3-year-olds Experiments 1 and 2 Tl 23 123T 
Experiment 3 TI 23 321 T 
The nature of multiple recency effects is relevant to assessing this interpretation of the 
results. As stated above, Watkins and Peynircioglu (1985) produced multiple recency 
effects. In their study, they interwove three different categories of lists together into one 
long list, and tested for recall of each category. Their control condition consisted of 
subject just learning an equivalently-sized list of just one category. They documented 
that multiple recency effects resulted in the lower recall of the final ("recency") items by 
the subjects in the multiple category condition, compared with the recall of the final 
3' In diN ulging that they had failed to gain multiple recency effects with many other different types of 
categories, it could be argued that when they did achieve the effect, it was simply the result of a 
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items by the subjects who just learned a single category. In addition, the category that 
was cued first was better recalled. In the present study therefore, it will be important to 
investigate recency effects for the objects in the Rec-Simba condition. These 
approximate to a single category. Similarly, it is necessary to investigate the nature of 
the recency effects for both Teddy and the objects in the Character condition. This 
would approximate, in Baddeley and Hitch's terms, to a multiple recency effect. 
If the findings in Experiment I were indeed simply attributable to a multiple recency 
effect, one would predict, from Watkins and Peynircioglu, that overall performance in 
the single category list (Rec-Simba condition) will be better than that of the multiple 
category list (Rec-Char condition). Next, recall that in Watkins and Peynircioglu 
(1985), the category which was cued first was better recafled. By analogy, this predicts 
that because the Teddy category is cued last in the Rec-Char condition, "recency" will 
be predicted to be lower than the final item of the object category, which is cued first. 
Under the theory of the Current State Buffer, I would predict the opposite result, a 
pattern similar to that found in Experiments I and 2, irrespective of recall order. 
Based on the previous experiments, it is predicted that overall performance in the single 
category list (Rec-Simba. condition) will be worse than that of the multiple category list 
(Rec-Char condition). Similarly, it is predicted that although the Teddy category is cued 
last in the multiple recency situation (Rec-Char condition), "recency" will be higher than 
the final item of the object category, that is cued first. 
5.3.2 Teddy's Toys 
Another possible problem with the results of Experiments I and 2, is that performance 
may be superior in the Character condition simply because the objects involved are 
presented as Teddy's toys (see section 4.2.1.4; "Digit Span"). The fact that in the 
Object and Simba conditions in Experiments I and 2 respectively, the objects do not 
belong to anyone in particular may have resulted in a relatively diminished performance 
in the recall of the items. The claim here is that the more meaningful schema of 
"Teddy's toys" confers an advantage on their subsequent processing. Therefore in 
Experiment 3, to equalise for this across conditions, children in the Simba condition 
are told that the toys belong to Simba. All other aspects, apart from the order of probing 
remain the same as in Experiment 2. 
Type One Error. 
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5.3.3 Method 
5.3.3.1 Design 
The design was identical to that of Experiment 2. The only change was a re-naming of 
the two conditions that manipulated the nature of the extra pairing. The conditions were 
Recency Simba (Rec-Simba) - Teddy as Object, or Recency Character (Rec-Character) - 
Teddy as Character. 
5.3.3.2 Participants 
Individual participants were different to those used in Experiments I and 2, but also 
consisted of 3- and 4-year-old pre-school children from a number of local North 
London nurseries. As with former experiments there were 28 4-year-olds (2 in each of 
the 7 randomisations for the 2 conditions) and 28 3-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 
randomisations for the 2 conditions). The mean ages were 3; 7 (range 3; 0 to 3; 12) and 
4; 5 (range 4; 4 to 4; 12). 
5.3.3.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was exactly the same as employed in Experiment 2. 
5.3.3.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 apart from the order of testing for object 
locations. The order was the reverse order with respect to hiding (see Table 5.1)32. In 
addition, in the Rec-Simba condition, when Simba is introduced to the subjects, they 
are told that the toys belong to Simba, in the same way that they are told in the 
Rec-Char condition that they belong to Teddy. This "story" continues through the rest 
of the experiment for the subjects in the Rec-Simba condition, and so when Emu 
arrives, it is explained to subjects that Simba will need to know where his toys are and 
so they will have to watch carefully where Emu will hide them. 
5.3.4 Results 
The total number of correct responses for each participant was collected (out of the 
number of objects paired excluding Teddy's pairing), along with whether or not the 
participant remembered the location of Teddy. Table 5.5 shows that all children in the 
Rec-Char conditions remembered the location of Teddy, compared with less than half 
the children in the Rec-Simba conditions. 
32 Teddý, 'S location is probed after all the objects, as in Experiments I and 2. 
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Yates corrected Chi Squared tests were carried out to investigate whether there was a 
difference between the conditions for each of the age groups in Table 5.5. Both tests 
yielded significant differences (3-year-olds X' = 10.48 df = 1, p<0.002; 
2 4-year-olds X= 12.6, df = 1, p<0.001). 
TABLE 5.5 FREQUENCY OF RECALL OF TEDDY'S LOCATION IN EXPERIMENT 3 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Rec-Char 14 0 14 
Rec-Simba 54 10 
The means and standard deviations of correct responses in both age groups for object 
locations are shown in Table 5.6. Subjects in the Rec-Char conditions recall the toys' 
locations better than those in the Rec-Simba conditions. A two-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of condition on recall of the toys' location (F(,, 52) =: 7.03, 
p=0.039). There was a main effect due to age (F(,,, 2) = 4.50, p=0.039), and no 
interaction between age and condition (F(,, 52) = 0.28, n. s. ). 
TABLE 5.6 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS (EXCLUDING TEDDY) IN 
EXPERIMENT 3. 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Mean/3 S. D. n Mean/4 S. D. n 
Rec-Char 1.64 1.01 14 2.36 1.15 14 
Rec-Simba 1.07 1.0 14 1.5 1.85 14 
5.3.4.1 Recency 
Mean correct responses were plotted as a function of item presentation order, for the 
two conditions below in Figure 5.1 (3-year-olds) and Figure 5.2 (4-year-olds). 
The mean correct recall of the final (recency) item of both conditions for both age 
groups was compared with the mean probability correct recall of Teddy, presented in 
Table 5.7. 
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Figure 5.1 Probability of correct recall on items according to item presentation 
order in Experiment 3 (3-year-olds) 
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Figure 5.2 Probability of correct recall on items according to item presentation 
order in Experiment 3 (4-year-olds) 
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TABLE 5.7 MEAN CORRECT PROBABILITY OF RECALL OF THE MOST RECENT 
OBJECT AND OF TEDDY IN EXPERIMENT 3 
3-year olds 4-Year olds 
Condition last object Teddy last object Teddy 
Rec- Char 0.70(0.47) 1.00(0.00) 0.80 (0.36) 1.00(0-00) 
Rec-Simba 0.50(0.52) 0.30(0.50) 0.43(0.50) 0.29(0.50) 
n= 14 for every cell; standard deviations are in brackets. 
Table 5.8 compares the overall mean performance of all the subjects in Experiment 3. 
The means comprise the subjects' total over-all score on all the objects (out of three or 
four), plus their score on Teddy. A two-way between subjects ANOVA was computed 
indicating that there was an advantage for over-all performance for subjects in the 
Rec-Char conditions (F(,, 52) = 24.26), p=0.001). 
There was no age effect 
(F(1,52) = 3.59, n. s. ) or interaction (F(,, 52) = 0.40), n. s. 
). 
TABLE 5.8 MEAN OVER-ALL PROBABILITY OF RECALL OF THE LOCATION OF ALL 
ITEMS FOR CHILDREN IN EXPERIMENT 3 
3-year olds 4-year olds 
Mean/3 S. D. n Mean/4 S. D. n 
Character 2.64 1.00 14 3.36 1.15 14 
Object 1.43 1.22 14 1.79 0.80 14 
n= 14 for every cell; standard deviations are in brackets. 
5.3.5 Discussion 
The results replicated the previous two experiments with the basic Current State Buffer 
and Working Memory contrasts. One important change was that in the Rec-Simba 
condition the objects were referred to as Simba's toys. Although this may have led to an 
improvement in performance in the Rec-Simba condition by making the objects more 
important, performance in this condition was similar to that in the parallel conditions in 
the first two experiments. 
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The results also displayed recency effects for the objects, as indexed by an increase in 
memory for the final item (final with respect to presentation order - but actually the first 
item to be probed), as is clearly shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Although Teddy's 
location in the Rec-Character condition was probed last, performance was better than on 
the recency item of the toys (as is evident from Table 5.7). This goes against the 
prediction based on Watkins and Peynircioglu (1985), and suggests that the increased 
performance on the recall of Teddy's location by subjects in the Character condition 
does not have anything to do with recency effects. This is further strengthened by the 
finding that overall performance was worse in the "one category" recency condition of 
the Rec-Simba children, whereas Watkins and Peynircloglu (1985) would predict that 
the subjects in the "multiple recency" condition of the Rec-Character condition would 
have worse performance. 
5.4 Overview of Results of Experiments 1,2 and 3 
In Table 5.9 1 summarise the data from all three experiments on recall of objects. A 
three-way between subjects ANOVA on this data (factors: age, condition and 
Experiment) showed a significant effect of age (F(1,156) 7- 9.41, p<0.001) and of 
condition (F(,, 1,6) ,,:: 24.36, p<0.001) but no effect of Experiment 
(F(,,, 
56) = 
1-991 
n. s. ) and no significant interactions. Planned comparisons within the separate 
age-groups revealed significant differences between the Character and Object conditions 
for both (3-year-olds F(,,, 56) '::::: 9.69, p<0.002) and 4-year-olds (F(, A 56) = 14.96, 
p<0.001). 
TABLE 5.9 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS IN THE TWO EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS OF EXPERIMENTS 1,2 AND 3 
3-Year olds 4-year olds 
Experiment Character Object Character Object 
1 2.00 1.00 2.71 1.43 
2 2.21 1.43 2.71 1.93 
3 1.64 1.07 2.36 1.50 
5.4.1 Item Analyses 
The next two sub-sections summajise the probability recall of the individual stimuli 
used in the first three experiments. I check that there are no differences between the 
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three experiments in the recall of the individual toys (apart from Teddy in the Character 
conditions, of course) and receptacles. 
5.4.1.1 Toys 
TABLE 5.10 TOY PROBABILITY RECALL OF THE 3-YEAR-OLDS IN THE FIRST THREE 
EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment Experiment Experiment All 3 
1 2 3 Experiments 
Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch both 
car 0.36 0.57 0.43 0.64 0.36 0.57 0.38 0.62 0.50 
cat 0.21 0.71 0.50 0.79 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.67 0.51 
crayon 0.43 0.71 0.50 0.79 0.36 0.57 0.43 0.69 0.56 
Teddy 0.43 1.0 0.50 1.0 0.36 1.0 0.43 1.0 0.71 
TABLE 5.11 TOY PROBABILITY RECALL OF THE 4-YEAR-OLDS IN THE FIRST THREE 
EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment Experiment Experiment All 3 
123 Experiments 
Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch both 
car 0.29 0.64 0.43 0.64 0.43 0.86 0.38 0.71 0.54 
cat 0.36 0.86 0.57 0.79 0.50 0.57 0.48 0.74 0.61 
crayon 0.43 0.50 0.36 0.57 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.44 
Lego 0.36 0.71 0.58 0.71 0.21 0.50 0.38 0.64 0.51 
Teddy 0.50 1.0 0.64 1.0 0.29 1.0 0.48 1.0 0.74 
Table 5.10 sets out the probability recall of the 3-year-olds in the first three 
experiments, and Table 5.11 displays this for the 4-year-olds. For each experiment 
there are two conditions; for simplicity they are called Obj for the Teddy as Object 
conditions, and Ch for the Teddy as Character conditions. There is also a probability 
figure for the overall probability recall for each of the toys across all three experiments 
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divided into separate conditions, and grouped across both conditions (both). Note that 
Character conditions consistently have a higher recall over the Object conditions for all 
the toys. 
a. The 3-Year-Olds 
For the 3-year-olds, separate two-way split-plot ANOVAs with Experiment (1,2,3) as 
a between subjects factor and the toys as repeated measures, were conducted on the 
probability recalls for the two separate conditions (Obj and Ch). This was done so as to 
check that there was no variation on separate toy recall between experiments within the 
Object and Character conditions (there would be no point comparing the toy 
probabilities across conditions, as the Character conditions would generally perform 
better on all the toys - this analysis was just concerned with the recall of individual toys 
aeross the three experiments). 
For the Object conditions, the analysis showed no effects of Experiment (F(2,39) <1 
n. s. ) or toys (F (3,117) <I n. s. ) and there was no interaction (F (6,117) <I n. s. ). As a 
result of the effects of the increase in recall of Teddy, however, there was a main effect 
of toys in the Character conditions (F(3,,, 7) ::::: 10.1, p<0.000). There was no effect 
of Experiment (F(2,39) <I n. s. ) nor was there an interaction 
(F(6,,, 
7) <I n. s. ) in the 
Character conditions. 
b. The 4-Year-Olds 
The same ANOVA model was conducted on the 4-year-olds. The same pattern emerged 
with a significant effects of toys in the Character condition (F (4,1 -%) = 11.2 
p<0.000), but no effect of Experiment 
(F(2,39) <I n. s. ), and no interaction (F 
(8,156) <1n. s. ). Similarly there were no effects in the Object conditions (toys: 
F(4,156) <I n. s.; Experiment: 
F(2,39) <I n. s; interaction: 
F(8,,, 
6) <I n. s). 
5.4.1.2 Receptacles 
Table 5.12 below sets out the probability recall of the 3-year-olds in the first three 
experiments, and Table 5.13 displays this for the 4-year-olds. As with the above 
tables, for each experiment there are two conditions and a probability for the overall 
probabilities of recall across all three experiments; separate for the two conditions (ObJ 
and Ch) and combined across them (both). Note that with the exception of three cells in 
the tables, the subjects in the Character conditions consistently have a higher recall 
associated with all the receptacles compared to the subjects in the Object conditions. 
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TABLE5.12. RECEPTACLE PROBABILITY RECALL OF THE 3-YEAR-OLDS IN THE FIRST 
THREE EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment Experiment Experiment All 3 
1 2 3 Experiments 
Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch both 
bag 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.88 0.50 0.75 0.33 0.71 0.52 
basket 0.13 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.50 
bowl 0.38 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.46 0.75 0.60 
box 0.50 0.63 0.88 0.63 0.38 0.88 0.59 0.71 0.65 
cup 0.25 0.88 0.75 0.88 0.38 0.50 0.46 0.75 0.60 
hat 0.38 1.0 0.25 0.88 0.25 0.63 0.29 0.83 0.56 
sock 0.63 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.63 0.54 
TABLE 5.13 RECEPTACLE PROBABILITY RECALL OF THE 4-YEAR-OLDS IN THE FIRST 
THREE EXPERIMENTS. 
Experiment Experiment Experiment All 3 
123 Experiments 
Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch both 
bag 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.60 0.10 0.50 0.23 0.57 0.40 
basket 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.30 0.70 0.47 0.67 0.57 
bowl 0.60 1.0 0.60 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.53 0.90 0.72 
box 0.30 0.70 0.60 0.90 0.40 0.70 0.43 0.77 0.60 
cup 0.50 0.90 0.60 1.0 0.30 0.50 0.47 0.80 0.63 
hat 0.20 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.80 0.47 0.67 0.57 
sock 0.30 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.40 0.60 0.33 0.67 0.50 
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Two ANOVAs on the receptacles' probability recall were computed for each of the two 
age-groups, with Experiment (1,2,3) as a between subjects factor, and the seven 
receptacles as within subjects factors. 
a. The 3-Year-Olds 
For the 3-year-olds, the analysis showed no effects of Experiment (F(2,45) <I n. s. ) or 
receptacles 
(F(6,270) 
= 2.15 n. s. ), nor any interaction between them (F(I 2,270) < 1.6 
n. s. ). This implied that none of the receptacles were better recalled than any other for 
the 3-year-olds. Hence the possibility that the handkerchiefs placed over the cup, basket 
and bowl lead to confusions between these items, can be rejected. 
b. The 4-Year-Olds 
The analysis on the 4-year-olds' performance showed no effect of Experiment 
(F(2,57) <I n. s. ). However, there was an effect of receptacles (F (6,342) = 4.32 sig. 
p< . 0004), but no interaction between Experiment and receptacles (F(12,34. ) < 1.8 
n. s. ). This implied that there was a difference in the way that this age-group of subjects 
recalled the various receptacles (as opposed to the 3-year-old, who did not display this 
pattern). The fact that the three receptacles that were associated with the highest 
probability recall, were the ones that had handkerchiefs placed over them, ruled out the 
possibility that the handkerchiefs had lead to confusions between these receptacles. The 
different probability recall scores across all the different receptacles does not have a 
readily interpretable pattern. One possibility is that some receptacles offer stronger 
affordances to the subjects, from experience, for holding objects than other receptacles 
(and the ability to appreciate this is follows a developmental path, whereby older 
children are more able to do so). At first glance, this trend seems to be consistent, since 
the hat and the sock have low recall probabilities associated with them, and of all the 
items, objects are generally less likely to be placed in these items However, the fact that 
the bag -a very common receptacle for all types of objects - had the lowest probability 
recall of all the receptacles makes this suggestion less tenable. 
5.5 Conclusion to Chapters 4 and 5 
My starting point in Chapter 3 was the proposal that the representations of important 
features of the environment are tracked by a separate component to Working Memory 
termed the Current State Buffer. In Experiments 1,2 and 3,1 have shown that memory 
for the location of a character with whom children have engaged is independent of 
memory for the location of other objects. In theoretical terms, I have concluded that the 
Current State Buffer is distinct from the Visuospatial Sketchpad component of Baddeley 
& Hitch's (1993) current Working Memory model. 
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I have considered the possibility that the data could be accounted for on the basis of the 
von Restorff Isolation Effect (section 4.3.1), Levels of Processing (section 4.3.2), the 
effects of Organisation (section 4.3.3), or in terms of incidental versus intentional 
learning (section 4.3.4). These were ruled out since the basic pattern of data in the 
present experiments simply does not correspond to that found in the relevant literature 
on these topics. I also considered the data as a phenomenon involving an 
autobiographical memory record (section 4.3.5) and in terms of a generalised recency 
effect (section 5.3.1), along the lines of Baddeley and Hitch (1993). The modifications 
in procedure I introduced to Experiments 2 and 3 make these accounts relatively 
implausible, compared with the simple account based on the Current State Buffer. 
Now that the Current State Buffer has been established as independent from Working 
Memory, both the architecture of a system that would house such a component, and the 
nature of the component need to be explored. The remainder of this thesis attempts to 
achieve both of these aims through further use of the Tidy Emu Paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Model Testing 
6.1 Chapter Outline 
In the last two chapters, the independence of the Current State Buffer from Working 
Memory has been demonstrated through the use of the Tidy Emu Paradigm. Having 
done so, the focus of this thesis now moves on to examine the nature of the Current 
State Buffer. The aim of the present chapter is to utilise further the Tidy Emu Paradigm 
to explore the architecture of a memory system that features a Current State Buffer. 
A total of four experiments are reported in the chapter, and they all employ the Teddy as 
Character condition of the Tidy Emu Paradigm. However, the input and output order of 
the object and Teddy locations are varied. The rationale behind the chapter is first to 
consider versions of possible architectures (models) by which the data from the 
previous chapters can be supported Once this has been done, hypotheses can be 
generated based on these possibilities that will help to decide between the models. 
Finally the experiments are carried out, to test among these alternatives. 
6.2 Possible Architectures 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Let me recapitulate the account so far of what happens for subjects in the Tidy Emu 
Paradigm. When subjects are instructed to observe the objects being tidied into the 
receptacles, the theory is that the object locations are stored in the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad. If a subject is in the Object condition, then the representation of Teddy's 
location will also be registered in the Visuospatial Sketchpad along with the other object 
locations. 
When the child has interacted with Teddy in the Character condition, however, this has 
established Teddy as a "character", and thus the location (and mental state if the child is 
sufficiently capable) of Teddy is registered in the Current State Buffer. When Teddy 
then goes to sleep, his location is stored separately from the locations of the objects, 
which according to the hypothesis are located in the Visuospatial Sketchpad of Working 
Memory. Note that his location is stored, even though the children in this condition are 
not actually asked to remember where he goes to sleep. 
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For the moment, I shall simplify matters by referring to Working Memory as the 
Interpreter Buffer, in line with Barreau (1997). The rules for maintaining items in the 
Current State Buffer are unclear at present since only one item, namely Teddy, has been 
tracked by the Current State Buffer in the current design. " Given that every subject in 
the Character conditions remembered where Teddy was sleeping, the data suggests that 
when there is one item in the Current State Buffer, the information seems to be 
protected and maintained. 
6.2. LI Architectures Supported by the Existing Data Set 
A simple architecture that supports the existing data has input flowing into an input 
buffer that constructs an image of the current world (the Environmental Buffer). Then, 
depending on its status, representations of stimuli proceed to either the Interpreter 
Buffer (Working Memory) or to the Current State Buffer for short term storage. 
Representations are then output from these two components 
There are two important issues here that dictate the gross structure of this architecture: 
firstly, the nature of the output, and secondly, the placement of the Current State Buffer 
relative to the Interpreter Buffer. These issues will now be dealt with in turn before an 
explicit structure of the system can be sketched. 
1. Output from the System 
In Barreau's (1997) "Trucks" experiment, pre-school children watched an event 
involving the exchange of contents between two toy trucks, and they were asked 
questions about initial and final states of the contents of the trucks. Barreau (1997) 
observed that the order in which questions were presented determined the availability of 
items for recall, with different orders leading to loss of different items of information. 
Central to her explanation for this finding was that at output, all information flows 
through the Interpreter Buffer. Hence if there are any items being stored in the 
Interpreter Buffer, then their recall suffers interference if the retrieval of information 
from other parts of the system occurs prior to when items are being output. On the other 
hand, if the items in the Interpreter Buffer are probed first, then this change in question 
order allows these items to be recalled without interference. With this order of output, 
no other items have had to pass through the Interpreter Buffer and interfere with its 
contents, so both the items stored in the Interpreter Buffer, and the items in another part 
of the system are output successfully. 
33 The next chapter investigates this issue when multiple characters are tracked by the Current State 
Buffer in a standard Tidy Emu Paradigm. 
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In terms of the output in the simple architecture posited here therefore, consistent with 
the Trucks experiment it is assumed here that output flows directly out of the Interpreter 
Buffer if it is already being stored there. Similarly, if representations from other parts of 
the system (e. g. the Current State Buffer) are retrieved, then they proceed through the 
Interpreter Buffer as they are output from the system. 
2. The Position of the Current State Buffer relative to the Interpreter Buffer 
The essential question here is the path followed by sensory input after entering the 
Environmental Buffer. One possibility is that all representations pass straight into the 
Interpreter Buffer and then depending on their status into the Current State Buffer. The 
alternative is that this "decision" is made at the stage of the Environmental Buffer, 
passing "characters" into the Current State Buffer for tracking and "objects" to the 
Interpreter Buffer for storing. Both of these possibilities are viable for explaining the tn t: 1 
existing data set, and models with both of these structures will now be examined. The 
importance of having these two possibilities is that each Model predicts a different set 
of results. Model I is the name given to the arrangement whereby Current State Buffer 
representations must pass through the Interpreter Buffer on input, and Model 2 is 
where these representations pass directly into the Current State Buffer from the 
Environmental Buffer at input. These two models are depicted below in Figure 6.1 t-D 
Figure 6.1 Model 1 and Model 2 
input I MODEL 11 
0 
u 
output 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
Both Models I and 2 can accommodate the findings from the first set of experiments by 
making certain simple assumptions about what goes on in the Tidy Emu Paradigm. tý tn' 
Firstly, when interacting with the child a the start of the experiment, a representation of 
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Teddy together with his location enters the system at the Environmental Buffer and 
passes into the Current State Buffer, either via the Interpreter Buffer or directly from the 
Environmental Buffer. When hidden, the revised representation of Teddy in the new 
location is stored in the Current State Buffer, while the Environmental Buffer passes the 
representation of the object locations to be stored in the Intemreter Buffer. When the 
locations are probed, the representation of the object locations are directly output from 
the Interpreter Buffer, whereas the location of Teddy in the Current State Buffer passes 
through the Interpreter Buffer at output. 
6.3 How the Two Models Explain the Existing Data Set 
6.3.1 Model I 
Figure 6.2 How Model 1 explains Experiments 1,2 and 3 (T123 123T) 
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"EB" is Environmental Buffer, 11113" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
Figure 6.2 outlines the way in which Model I can account for the first set of three 
experiments using the 3-year-old design as an example, with 3 objects and Teddy. The 
Teddy as Character condition is illustrated throughout this discussion since the 
hypothesis is that subjects in this condition use the Current State Buffer, and the 
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placement of the Current State Buffer within the memory system is the point of 
discussion in this chapter. In the figure, 123 symbolises the representation of the 
location of the objects (even when they are probed in the order 321 as in 
Experiment 3 )34. Similarly, T denotes the representation of Teddy's location as it 
moves through the system. 
It is important to pay special attention to the order in which Teddy and the objects are 
both tidied and probed relative to one another. In this set of experiments the order can 
be denoted as T123 123T; in other words, Teddy goes to sleep first followed by the 
hiding of the three objects, and the objects are then probed first followed by Teddy. It is 
precisely because both the probing and tidying are in this order in Experiments I to 3 
that Model I does not give rise to any interference at input or at output. In Figure 6.2, 
the representation of Teddy's location is shown entering the Environmental Buffer in 
box 1, proceeding through the Interpreter Buffer in box 2, and ending up in the 
Current State Buffer in box 3. In box 4, the tidying of the objects is depicted as they 
enter the Environmental Buffer. In box 5 the objects enter into the Interpreter Buffer 
and remain there, as they do not have special status. In box 6 the objects can be seen 
being output from the Interpreter Buffer. Box 7 then shows Teddy's location being 
retrieved from the Current State Buffer into the Interpreter Buffer, and finally output 
from the Interpreter Buffer in box 8. Note here that there is no interference between the 
location of Teddy and the location of the objects because T is already in the Current 
State Buffer when the objects are hidden. Similarly, when T passes through the 
Interpreter Buffer, the objects have already been output. With different orders of input 
and output however, the model does predict interference. This approach will be taken 
shortly after having examined Model 2. 
6.3.2 Model 2 
The account for Model 2 is displayed in Figure 6.3, and is similar to Model I in that it 
does not produce interference at input or at output with this order of tidying and probing 
the objects and Teddy. In box I of Figure 6.3, T reaches the Environmental Buffer 
and flows straight into the Current State Buffer in box 2 (as opposed to going to the 
Current State Buffer via the Interpreter Buffer as in Model 1). Box 3 then shows the 
objects entering the Environmental Buffer, and box 4 shows how they proceed into the 
Interpreter Buffer before being retrieved in box 5. The start of the retrieval of T is 
pictured in box 6 as it passes through the Interpreter Buffer, cuhninating in its exit out 
of the system in box 7. Again, with this order there has been no interference between 
the representations of Teddy's and the objects' locations. 
' The simplifying assumption made here is that the object locations are stored together as one unit. 
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Figure 6.3 How Model 2 explains Experiments 1,2 and 3 (T123 123T) 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
6.4 Deciding Between Model 1 and Model 2 
If both Models I and 2 can readily account for the existing data set, then there must be a tn 
way of empirically deciding between these two options. The Tidy Emu Paradigm lends 
itself to achieving this, if the orders of the tidying and the probing of the objects and 
Teddy in the Character condition are varied. I shall now examine what these two 
models predict, when the input and output orders are varied. 
6.4.1 Varying Input Order 
Suppose the input order is changed from T123 (as was featured in the first three 
experiments) to 123T. With this design, the objects are tidied away prior to Teddy 
going to sleep, and the two models have differential predictions about whether there 
will be any interference at input. As sketched in Figure 6.4, Model I predicts input 
interference when Teddy goes to sleep. The reason for the interference is that when 
Teddy goes to sleep, the new location of Teddy is registered (boxes 3 and 4), and the 
representation of his location has to pass through the Interpreter Buffer, where the 
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representation of the location of the objects is stored (box 4). This disrupts the 
representation of the object locations that are being stored there. Model 2's architecture 
however (shown in Figure 6.5), allows the representation of Teddy's location to pass 
into the Current State Buffer without passing through the Interpreter Buffer (boxes 3 
and 4), and thus preventing interference with the representation of the object locations 
that are stored there. 
Figure 6.4 Input interference for Model 1 with input order 123T 
i nput 
I 3 
i nput 
4 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
Figure 6.5 No input interference for Model 2 with input order 123T 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and '1CSB11 is 
Current State Buffer. 
Hence with this new input order of 123T, and with the original output order of 
123T, Experiment 4 is a way of implicating one of the models as the better account 
of the data. If the perfon-nance of subjects in the Character condition on object locations 
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is equal to the performance of subjects in the Character conditions in the first set of 
experiments, where the order was T123 123T, then this lack of interference will 
implicate Model 2. If however, the object performance is lower than that of the first set 
of experiments, then this will implicate Model 1.35 
6.5 Experiment 4 
Experiment 4just used 3-year-old "Character" subjects, and varied the order of events 
in the existing Tidy Emu Paradigm from T123 123T to 123T 123T. As explained 
above, this was to try and induce input interference as predicted by Model 1. If 
successful, this interference would be indexed by a lower object location score relative 
to subjects in the first set of experiments. If the mean object location score was 
equivalent to that found in the first experiments then this lack of interference would be 
taken as evidence against Model 1, and in favour of supporting Model 2. 
6. S. I Method 
6.5.1.1 Design 
The design followed that of the first three experiments, except that there was only the 
Character condition and the experiment only involved 3-year-olds. The crucial change 
to the design was the change in input order of the stimuli to hiding the objects before 
Teddy. This condition was compared with the Character conditions of the 3-year-olds 
in the first three experiments (where the input order had Teddy sleeping before the 
object pairings). Thus the condition in this experiment is termed OT-OT, to denote that 
the objects ("0") were tidied before Teddy ("T"), and then that the objects were also 
probed before Teddy. The comparison condition (derived from the 3-year-old subjects 
in the Character conditions of the last three experiments) is thus labelled TO-OT. 
6.5.1.2 Participants 
The subjects were all 3-year-olds picked from North London nurseries. None of the 
subjects had participated in any of the other studies reported in this thesis. There were 
35 For both the models, the performance on the recall of Teddy's location should be equivalent to that 
found in the first set of experiments if there is no object interference induced by the new input order. If 
there is input interference, however, one prediction may be that because the Current State Buffer is still 
below capacity in having to track just one character, this is unlikely to inibate much of a drop in 
perfon-nance. This is the simple assumption made here. However, it should be noted that the matter 
may be more complex, because the representation of the object locations may benefit from active 
preservation by Working Memory, since the subjects are instructed to remember the locations. The 
representation of Teddy's location, on the other hand, has been tracked without instruction. The result 
of object interference may lead to a more complex trade-off between the incidental notion of Teddy's 
location and the preservation of the object locations, resulting in a possible decrease in the recall of 
Teddy's location. 
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14 subjects (2 in each of the 7 randomisations), and the mean age was 3; 8 (range, 3; 2 to 
3; 12). 
6.5.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to that used in the Character conditions of Experiments 1,2 
and 3. 
6.5.1.4 Procedure 
Note that there was no Object condition in the experiment, and thus the procedure just 
relates to a Character condition. 
The procedure was identical to that used in the Character condition of Experiment 3 
with two major exceptions. First, instead of Teddy going to sleep just before Emu tidies 
away his toys, Teddy stays out on the table as the toys are tidied away into the 
receptacles, and only then goes to sleep. Thus after they have interacted with him, the 
subjects are told that Teddy is tired, but Teddy is just left sitting on the table until after 
the toys have been tidied away. The subjects are given the identical "story" to that given 
in the Character condition of the previous experiments when Emu arrives and tidies the 
toys. Immediately after this, they are told that Teddy is going to go to sleep, and he is 
seen to walk to one of the receptacles as in the previous studies. 
The second difference with respect to Experiment 3 is that although the probing order 
is the same for the purposes of this study, with Teddy's location probed after the 
objects, the objects are probed in the order they were tidied (123) as in Experiments I 
and 2, and not in the reverse order (321) as in Experiment 3. 
6.5.2 Results 
The total number of correctly recalled object locations (out of three) for each subject 
was noted. The mean number of correctly recalled locations from this condition 
(OT-OT) was compared with that of the 3-year-old subjects in the Character conditions 
of the first three experiments (TO-OT). This is tabulated below in Table 6.1, together 
with the standard deviations and sample sizes for the two conditions. 
An independent samples t-test was carried out to test for a difference between the two 
means, which failed to show a significant difference between the two means (t = 0.38, 
df = 54, n. s. p>0.05). 
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TABLE 6.1 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS IN EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment/Condition Tidy and Probe order Mean/ S. D. n 
3 
Experiment 4 OT-OT 123T 123T 2.07 0.92 14 
Experiments 1-3 TO-OT T123 123T 1.95 1.03 42 
Data from Experiment 4 (OT-OT) is compared with the mean 
performance on object locations from the Character conditions of 
Experiments 1-3 (TO-OT). 
All the children remembered the location of Teddy. 
6.5.3 Discussion 
The fact that the mean correct object score was equivalent to the performance recorded 
in the first set of experiments, with the change of input order, indicates that there was 
no input interference. Therefore this provides evidence against Model 1, and in favour 
of Model 2 as an appropriate architecture for the system. Now that Model 2 has been 
implicated, it is important to gain further evidence in favour of Model 2 by testing the 
predictions that it makes about output interference. 
6.6 Gaining Further Support For Model 2 
6.6.1 Varying Output Order 
If the order of probing is now changed from that featured in the past set of experiments 
to T123, that is, asking for Teddy's location before asking for the location of the 
objects, Model 2 has explicit predictions. As shown in Figure 6.6, assuming that "T" 
and "123" are safely stored in the Current State Buffer and the Interpreter Buffer 
respectively (box 1), if Teddy 's location is retrieved first then this will lead to 
interference on object location performance (box 2) when the object locations are 
retfieved (box 4). 
Thus Experiment 5 is a way of gaining further support for the viability of Model 2. 
The firm prediction from Model 2 is that as a result of changing the output order of 
123T in Experiment 4, to T123 in Experiment 5, there will be a drop in the mean 
correct object locations recalled by the subjects. 
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Figure 6.6 Output interference for Model 2 when output order is T123 
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"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
6.7 Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was identical in every respect to Experiment 4, except that the order of 
probing was T123, instead of 123T. 4: 1 
6.7.1 Method 
6.7.1.1 Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 4, and the data from the new condition (123T 
T123) was also compared with the data from the first three studies. The new condition 
was termed OT-TO, and the comparison condition is still termed TO-OT. 
6.7.1.2 Participants 
The participants were 3-year-olds picked at random from nurseries in North London. 
None of the subjects had participated in any of the other studies reported in this thesis. 
There were 14 subjects (2 in each of the 7 randomisations), and the mean age was 3; 5 
(range, 3; 3 to 3; 11 ). 
6.7.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus in Experiment 5 was identical to that used in Experiment 4. 
6.7.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that employed in Experiment 4, except that instead of 
probing for Teddy's location after the objects, Teddy's location was probed first, 
before the objects. 
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6.7.2 Results 
The total number of correct object locations (out of three) for each subject was noted. 
The mean correct locations from this condition (OT-TO) was compared with the average 
correct locations of the 3-year-old subjects in the Character conditions of the first three 
experiments (TO-OT). This is tabulated in Table 6.2, together with the standard 
deviations and sample sizes for the two conditions. 
TABLE 6.2 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiment/Condition Tidy and Probe order Mean/3 S. D. n 
Experiment 5 OT-TO 123T T123 1.14 0.95 14 
Experiments 1-3 TO-OT T123 123T 1.95 1.03 42 
Data from Experiment 5 (OT-TO) is compared here with the mean 
performance on object locations from the Character conditions of 
Experiments 1-3 (TO-OT). 
An independent samples t-test was computed to test for a difference between the two 
means, revealing that there was a significant difference (t = 2.58, df = 54, sig. 
p<0.013). 
All the subjects recalled Teddy's location perfectly. 
6.7.3 Discussion 
The results suggest that there is output interference since the mean correct object 
location performance had dropped to 1.14. This was explicitly predicted by Model 2 
and thus gives further support to Model 2 as an appropriate version of the system 
architecture. However, before Model 2 can be fully accepted, one further combination 
of input and output order needs consideration. The predictions derived from Model 2 
regarding the performance of subjects on this hitherto untested order of tidying and 
probing will be articulated and then checked through its implementation in 
Experiment 6. 
6.8 The Final Test of Model 2 
Model 2 predicts output interference when the output order is T123, regardless of input 
order. Thus far, Model 2 has certainly been implicated since there was interference in 
Experiment 5 with the tidy and probe order: 123T TI 23. It follows therefore that if the 
tidy and probe order is T123 T123, even though the input order has reverted back to the 
original order in the first three experiments, there should still be output interference. 
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Figure 6.7 demonstrates this pictorially. Shown in boxes I to 4 is that Model 2 does 
not predict input interference. However, in boxes 5 to 8 it can be seen that output 
interference is still predicted. 
Figure 6.7 Output interference is still predicted by Model 2 when tidy 
and probe order are: T123 T123 
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"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, and "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer. 
6.9 Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 therefore runs this final test of Model 2, with the order of events - 
TI 23 TI 23. As mentioned above, the prediction from Model 2 is that the mean correct 
object location performance will still suffer from output interference, with a score 
equivalent to the OT-TO condition in Experiment 5. 
6.9.1 Method 
6.9.1.1 Design 
This was identical to the design of Experiment 5, except that tidying order was changed 
to the original sequence of the first set of experiments whereby Teddy goes to sleep 
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before his toys are tidied away. This condition was labelled TO-TO, and was compared 
with the TO-OT condition. 
6.9.1.2 PoWcipavs 
The participants were 3-year-olds picked at random from North London. None of the 
subjects had participated in any of the other studies reported in this thesis. There were 
14 subjects (2 in each of the 7 randomisations for the 2 conditions), and the mean age 
was 3; 4 (range, 3; 0 to 3; 11). 
6.9.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus used in Experiment 6 was identical to that used in Experiment 5. 
6.9.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that employed in Experiment 5, except that instead of 
Teddy going to sleep after the objects had been hidden, he goes to sleep before they are 
hidden, as in the first set of three experiment s. 
6.9.2 Results 
The total number of correctly recalled object locations (out of three) for each subject 
was noted. The mean correct locations from this condition (TO-TO) was compared with 
the average correct locations of the 3-year-old subjects in the Character conditions of the 
first three experiments (TO-OT). This is tabulated below in Table 6.3, together with the 
standard deviations and sample sizes for the two conditions. 
TABLE 6.3 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT LOCATIONS IN EXPERIMENT 6 COMPARED 
WITH THE CHARACTER CONDITIONS OF EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
Experiment/Condition Tidy and Probe order Mean/3 S. D. n 
Experiment 6 TO-TO T123 T123 1.86 1.01 14 
Experiments 1-3 TO-OT T123 123T 1.95 1.03 42 
Data from Experiment 6 (TO-TO) is compared here with the mean 
performance on object locations from the Character conditions of 
Experiments 1-3 (TO-OT) 
An independent samples t-test was carried out to test for a difference between the two 
means, failing to show any significant difference (t = 0.29, df = 54, n. s. p>0.05). 
All the subjects recalled Teddy's location correctly. 
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6.9.3 Discussion 
The results suggest that there was no input interference since the mean correct object 
location performance had not decreased as Model 2 had predicted. Thus even though 
Experiment 4 had ruled out Model 1, and implicated Model 2- which was then 
granted further support from its accurate prediction in Experiment 5- Experiment 6 
has demonstrated that Model 2 cannot give an accurate account of the data. A slightly 
more complex model, based on Model 2, is therefore necessary. This is Model 3, and 
I will now describe how it can accommodate the existing data set. During the course of 
this explanation, a prediction based on Model 3 will be made and Experiment 7 will be 
carried out to test this. 
6.10 Model 3 
Figure 6.8 Model 3 
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"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. 
Model 3 is pictured in Figure 6.8 and its structure is based on the overall architecture 
of Model 2, with the Current State Buffer receiving input from the Environmental 
Buffer. The data indicate that Teddy can be output without interference. The simplest 
change is to allow output from the Current State Buffer, bypassing the Interpreter 
Buffer. An Output Buffer in any case can allow for speeded output. This effectively 
will prevent the type of output interference predicted by Model 2. Similarly, because 
the position of the Current State Buffer in Model 3 is identical to its placement in 
Model 2, the input interference predicted by Model I is also avoided. Hence if all of 
this interference is avoided in Model 3, the one remaining finding to explain is that of 
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the decreased object performance in the OT-TO condition (Experiment 5, see section 
6-7), and this will be considered shortly. 
It will be noticed that there is a path from the Current State Buffer direct to the Output 
Buffer. Originally the assumption was made that at retrieval information flowed from 
the Current State Buffer and into the Interpreter Buffer. This was based on an 
experiment by Barreau (1997) in which she intentionally overloaded all the Buffers of 
her subjects. However in the current set of experiments the Current State Buffer is not 
at capacity, and so this assumption may not have to be made. 
6.10.1 How Model 3 can Explain the Existing Data Set 
Figure 6.9 Model 3 explaining Experiments 1-3 (TO-OT) 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. 
As I have noted, within Model 3, there is now no necessity for input or output 
interference with the current design, whatever the tidying or probing order. The main Zý' 
question therefore is why there is a decrease in mean correct object performance in 
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Experiment 5, and I shall explain this after I have described how the data from the 
other conditions can be readily explained by Model 3. 
6.10.1.1 Accountingfor Experiments 1-3: TO-OT 
Figure 6.9 describes the information flow in Model 3 during Experiments 1,2 and 3. 
At input, Teddy's location flows via the Envirom-nental Buffer into the Current State 
Buffer (boxes I to 2), and the representation of the object locations enters into the 
Interpreter Buffer, via the Environmental Buffer (boxes 3 to 4). At output, the 
representation of the object locations flow straight out of the Interpreter Buffer into the 
Output Buffer and out of the system (boxes 5 to 6), and Teddy's representation then 
proceeds straight into the Output Buffer from the Current State Buffer (box 7), and out 
of the system (box 8). 
Figure 6.10 Model 3 explaining Experiment 4 (OT-OT) 
11EB11 is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. 
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6.10.1.2 Accountingfor Experiment 4: OTOT 
Figure6.10 (above) displays how information flows through Model3 in 
Experiment 4. In boxes I to 2, the representation of the object locations enter the 
Environmental Buffer and pass into the Interpreter Buffer. In boxes 3 to 4, the 
representation of Teddy's location enters the Environmental Buffer and flows into the 
Current State Buffer. Boxes 5 to 6 show the safe exit of the representations of the 
object location from the system, and boxes 7 to 8 display the representation of Teddy 
leaving the system. 
Figure 6.11 Model 3 explaining Experiment 6 (TO-TO) 
DDEL 3 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. 
6.10.1.3 Accountingfor Experiment 6: TO-TO 
Figure 6.11 (above) displays how Model 3 can account for the entry and exit of the 
representations of the stimuli locations in Experiment 6. In boxes I to 2 the input of 
Teddy's representation is shown entering the system via the Environmental Buffer and t: 1 
flowing into the Current State Buffer. Boxes 3 to 4 show the entry of object location 
representations. The retrieval of the representation of Teddy is then displayed in boxes 
5 to 6, and then the retrieval of the object locations is shown in boxes 7 to 8. 
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6.10-1.2 Accountingfor Experiment 5: OT-TO 
The first thing to note about the tidying and probing order in this condition is that 
Teddy's location changes when he goes to sleep, and the subject is inunediately asked 
for his location. The reason for the drop in correct ob ect location performance in this j 
condition may have something to do with the amount of time between Teddy being 
tracked as going to sleep in a receptacle, and being probed for his location. Let me 
explore this further. 
Thus far, what I have not thought about is the process by which a Current State Buffer 
entry is actually made. In all Character conditions, I assumed that when the subject 
interacts with Teddy an entry is made for him in the Current State Buffer. This 
representation has not hitherto been mentioned, because it only codes for Teddy's 
location when he is awake, which is not in one of the receptacles. This representation of 
the awake Teddy is shown in Figure 6.12 in the Current State Buffer at the start of the 
event in box 1, as T, The (unintegrated) entry for Teddy sleeping is denoted as TS. 
Figure 6.12 How Model 3 may explain Experiment 5 (OT-TO) 
"EB" is Environmental Buffer, "IB" is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. "T A" denotes the 
representation of Teddy when he is awake, and "Ts" when he is asleep. 
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Other entries in the Current State Buffer would include the experimenter and Emu, 
when he appears. When Teddy goes to sleep after the objects have been tidied, and 
changes locations, the new location of Teddy enters the Environmental Buffer (in 
box 3). Normally, this representation would pass into the Current State Buffer, 
becoming integrated with the existing representation of Teddy, and updating his status 
in this way. For simplification purposes, the "representation of Teddy's location" when 
he is asleep has up until now, actually been referring to this integrated representation of 
Teddy's new location, registered in the Current State Buffer. 
However, if there is not sufficient time for this integration between the existing 
representation of Teddy in the Current State Buffer and his new sleeping location, as in 
Experiment 5, then if Teddy's sleeping location is probed it will be output straight from 
the Environmental Buffer (box 4), and out through the Interpreter Buffer (without ever 
entering the Current State Buffer), leading to interference with the objects that are stored 
there (box 5). In Experiment 5 this may have been what happened, due to the brief 
amount of time between Teddy sleeping and his location being probed. 
11 ExPeriment 7 
In order to test this account of events, Experiment 7 was carried out based on a 
prediction derived from this explanation. If there was insufficient time for Ts to become 
integrated with T Awhen Teddy sleeps and 
is immediately probed, then it should be 
possible to cause the two representations to become integrated, by inserting a pause 
between the two events. This is depicted in Figure 6.13. 
The way in which this is achieved in Experiment 7, is to have the design run identically 
to Experiment 5, but to have the child register a new character just after Teddy has 
gone to sleep (box 3). In this way, the Ts will have sufficient time to be able to flow 
into the Current State Buffer (box 4). To this end, when the location of Teddy is 
subsequently output, the integrated representation in the Current State Buffer which has 
Teddy's sleeping location coded, will be directly output into the Output Buffer in the 
usual way (box 5). Thus, activating another character before Teddy goes to sleep will 
prevent interference with the representation of the object locations that are stored in the 
Interpreter Buffer. An explicit prediction from Model 3, therefore, is that if the design 
is altered in the way that has been described, then the interference in OT-TO can be 
eliminated in the new design OT-H-TO (where H represents the activation/interaction 
with an additional character). 
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Figure 6.13 How Experiment 7 prevents interference from Ts 
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11EB11 is Environmental Buffer, "IB11 is Interpreter Buffer, "CSB" is 
Current State Buffer and "OB" is Output Buffer. TAdenotes the 
representation of Teddy's location when he is awake, and Ts when he is 
asleep. 
6.11.1 Method 
6.11.1.1 Design 
This was identical to the design of Experiment 6, except that after Teddy had gone to 
sleep, there was a short interaction with another character, Hans, who was not hidden 
in the receptacle set. This condition was labelled OT-H-TO (where H stands for the 
interaction with Hans) and was compared with the TO-OTcondition- 
6.11.1.2 Participanu 
The participants were 3-year-olds picked at random from nurseries in North London. 
None of the subjects had participated in any of the other studies reported in this thesis. 
There were 14 subjects (2 in each of the 7 randomisations), and the mean age was 3; 8 
(range, 3; 6 to 3; 10) - 
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6.11.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus used in Experiment 6 was identical to that used in Experiment 6, except 
for the addition of a young boy figure who was similar in size to Teddy (see 
photograph in Appendix 4). The figure is called Hans and is pictured in 
Photograph 6.1. 
Photograph 6.1: Hans 
6.11.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that employed in Experiment 5, except that just after 
Teddy has gone to sleep and before probing begins, the subject is introduced to Hans. 
The subject shakes hands with Hans and he says "pleased to meet you", mentioning the 
name of the subject. Hans then goes to sit to the side of the table for the duration of the 
trial. Immediately following this interaction, Probing begins with Teddy's location 
followed by that of the objects. 
6.11.2 Results 
The total number of correct object locations (out of three) for each subject was noted. 
The mean correct locations from this condition (OT-H-TO) was compared with the 
average correct locations of the 3-year-old subjects in the Character conditions of all the 
other experiments. This is tabulated below in Table 6.4, together with the standard 
deviations and sample sizes for the conditions. 
An independent samples t-test was carried out to test for a difference between the means 
of the first three experiments CFO-OT) and that of Experiment 7, which showed no 
significant difference (t = 0.30, df = 54, n. s. p>0.05). 
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TABLE 6.4 MEAN RECALL OF OBJECT PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 7 
Experiment/Condition Tidy and Probe order Mean/3 S. D. n 
Experiment 7 OT-H-TO T123 H T123 1.86 1.03 14 
Experiment 6 TO-TO T123 T123 1.86 1.01 14 
Experiment 4 OT-OT 123T 123T 2.07 0.92 14 
Experiments 1-3 TO-OT T123 123T 1.95 1.03 42 
Experiment 5 OT-TO 123T T123 1.14 0.95 14 
The means from Experiment 7 (OT H TO) are compared with the means 
from the subjects in the Character conditions in Experiments 1- 6. 
A between subjects ANOVA was then performed in order to compare the correct mean 
object performance in Experiment 5 with that of the other studies. A significant 
difference was found with F(1,93) = 7.03 sig p<0.0094, suggesting that the 
difference between 1.14 compared with the other scores, are due to interference. 
6.11.3 Discussion 
As predicted by Model 3, the activation of Hans lead to the integration of the 
representation of Teddy's sleeping location and his entry in the Current State Buffer, 
allowing output via the Current State Buffer and not through the Interpreter Buffer, 
which would have lead to interference (as in OT-TO). 
6.12 Summary 
This chapter began by examining two possible architectures that can accommodate the 
data in the first three experiments (section 6.3). Experiments 4 and 5 were performed 
and one of these models was implicated. However, an additional study (Experiment 6) 
indicated that a different model to this was necessary to accommodate all the findings. A 
third model was derived and specified, and a more complex explanation of the 
information processing in the Tidy Emu Paradigm was considered. This explanation 
lead to a prediction, which was then tested and confirmed in Experiment 7. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Multiple Characters 
7.1 Chapter Outline 
In the last chapter, I investigated the architecture of a system with a Current State 
Buffer. This chapter now goes on to explore the nature of the Current State Buffer and 
its interactions with Working Memory. Two studies are reported in the chapter, 
Experiments 8 and 9, both of which use the basic Tidy Emu paradigm. Instead of just 
Teddy interacting with the subjects in the Character condition, Experiment 8 introduces 
an additional character, Hans, who interacts with the child as well as Teddy. In 
Experiment 9 one further character, Bunny, joins Teddy and Hans in interacting with 
the child. 
Hence these two studies extend the first set of experiments, which all used one 
character, by systematically increasing the number of characters that the Current State 
Buffer must track. It is suggested that this increase in character load on the Tidy Emu 
Paradigm is an effective approach for investigating the nature of the Current State 
Buffer. It is then argued that the interactions between the Current State Buffer and 
Working Memory are a function of age and of the number of characters that are to be 
tracked by the Current State Buffer. 
7.1.1 The Effects of Increasing the Character Load 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the Current State Buffer. As mentioned in eadier 
chapters, this is a novel construct which, to date, has not been established as 
independent. Similarly, the nature of the Current State Buffer has not been investigated. 
Hence it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to have one set of solid predictions about 
the nature of the Current State Buffer and its interactions with Working Memory. What 
follows therefore is a consideration of what may be revealed when the character load is 
increased. 
First, the effect of introducing extra characters is important in assessing the capacity of 
the Current State Buffer. In the first set of experiments, for example, the subjects in the 
Character conditions used their Current State Buffers to track Teddy. It will be recalled 
that their performance on this task was at ceiling level, since all the subjects in the 
condition were able to recall Teddy's location correctly. From this particular result, only 
one thing can be said about the capacity of the Current State Buffer. This is that subjects 
in these two age groups are able to track at least one character location perfectly in their 
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Current State Buffers. It could be the case that they are unable to track more than one 
character, but the measure of Current State Buffer function that was employed in these 
experiments was simply not powerful enough to explore this. Clearly, adding extra 
characters for the subjects in the Character condition to track is a way of measuring the 
capacity of Current State Buffer performance in this task. Incrementing the character 
load to two characters in Experiment 8, and to three characters in Experiment 9, may 
allow a more accurate measure of Current State Buffer function. A simple hypothesis, 
of course, would be that both age-groups of children are able to track the locations of all 
of the characters (leading to further ceiling effects on character location performance). 
Another hypothesis is that they can only track one character location. A more likely 
hypothesis is that the capacity of the Current State Buffer is age-dependent. In other 
words, older subjects are able to track more character locations than younger subjects, 
but as with the younger the subjects, the older subjects cannot track all the character 
locations. 
In establishing the capacity of the Current State Buffer in this way, the increase in the 
number of character locations that the subjects have to register could mean that for a 
given number of characters, the Current State Buffer is overloaded to some extent. Note 
that this is consistent with the notion of a fixed capacity of the Current State Buffer. 
Will this overloading lead to any deleterious effects on Current State Buffer function, 
and are any effects age-dependent? A further question may also be answered by 
increasing the Current State Buffer load. That is, will the effect of increasing the load 
on the Current State Buffer have any effect on Working Memory performance? If the 
explicit Working Memory load in the task (three object locations for 3-year-olds, and 
four object locations for 4-year-olds) is held constant for the two age-groups, then with 
the increase in character load, any resultant effects on Working Memory can be 
scrutinised. Resources may be re-allocated from Working Memory to support the 
function of the Current State Buffer when the demands on the Current State Buffer have 
been increased through raising the Current State Buffer load. Age-dependent effects 
may once again emerge due to the differing meta-cognitive abilities of the two 
age-groups. The idea that the Current State Buffer tracks important stimuli in the 
environment, could well mean that in certain situations, the Current State Buffer would 
take precedence over Working Memory, and siphon-off some of its resources. 
The methods of Experiments 8 and 9 will now be described consecutively in sections 
7.2 and 7.3. Following this, I shall report the results from both sets of experiments 
together, and compare them with the one Character condition which featured in the first 
three experiments (sections 7.4 to 7.6). In the same way, all of these results will be 
dealt with as a whole in one discussion section (section 7.7). 
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7.2 Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 was identical in design to Experiment 3, with two major exceptions. The 
first was that a toy figure called Hans (used in Experiment 7) was added as another 
character. The number of objects remained the same as in the first three experiments, 
and the objects belonged to Hans and Teddy in the experimental condition, or to Simba 
in the control condition. Both age-groups were used: hence 3-year-olds watched two 
characters and three toys tidied away, and 4-year-olds watched two characters and four 
toys tidied away. The second way that Experiment 8 differed from Experiment 3 was 
that the order of object tidying and probing in Experiment 8 was TH123(4), (tidying 
order) and 123(4)TH (probing order), where H denotes the recall of Hans' location. 
This order therefore mirrored the order of object probing in Experiments 1 and 2 (see 
Table 5.1). Note that with the first three experiments, Teddy was tidied first and his 
location was probed last, after all the objects. However, in this experiment, although as 
a character his location is probed after that of the objects, the probing for his location is 
before that of Hans, so that as with the set of objects, the order of probing the 
characters proceeds in the same order as they are hidden. 
7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 3, except that the Character condition now 
contained two characters and the Object condition had these as two extra toys, and there 
was thus an additional dependent variable for remembering the location of the second 
character. The Character condition was renamed Two-C and the Object condition was 
renamed Two-C Simba. The possible hypotheses concerning memory for the characters 
and object locations were discussed above, but an additional hypothesis is that Working 
Memory scores (memory for object locations) should be better in 4-year-olds than 
3-year-olds. 
7.2.1.2 PoWcipants 
Individual participants were different to those used in previous experiments, but also 
consisted of 3- and 4-year-old pre-school children from a number of local North 
London nurseries. As with Experiments 1 to 3, there were 28 four year olds (2 in each 
of the 7 randornisations for the 2 conditions) and 28 3-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 
randomisations for the 2 conditions). The mean ages were 3; 6 (range 3; 3 to 3; 12) and 
4; 4 (range 4; 1 to 4; 11). 
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7.2.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was as employed in Experiments 2 and 3, with the addition of Hans who 
had already been used in Experiment 7 (see section 6.11.1.3). 
7.2.1.4 Procedure 
The basic procedure followed the design of Experiment 3, apart from the order of 
testing the objects, which proceeded in the order of tidying - as in Experiments I and 2 
(see Table 5.1). The main difference in the design involved the addition of an extra 
character for the Two-C conditions, and of an extra toy for Simba in the Two-C Simba 
conditions. These two conditions will be dealt with separately. 
1. Two-C Condition 
The procedure began in the same way as that of the Character condition in 
Experiment 3, except that instead of being introduced to just Teddy, the subject was 
introduced to Teddy and Hans (i. e. subjects were told they would be playing with 
"these two fellows" and were asked to shake their hands/paws). Subjects were told that 
the pile of toys (objects) belonged to both characters and that they would be inspected a 
little later on. The procedure continued as in Experiment 3, except that the digit span 
task with Teddy was replaced with a digit span task with Teddy and Hans. Hence the 
children were told that Teddy and Hans were good friends and that they phoned each 
other all the time. They were then told to repeat their phone-numbers in the same way as 
in Experiment 3, using "friends" numbers as well. Digit span was established 
according to the criterion documented in Experiment I (see section 4.2.1.4). The 
procedure continued as in Experiment 3, and instead of just Teddy feeling tired and 
going to sleep before the toys were tidied, both Hans and Teddy are tired and go to 
sleep, but in different receptacles, as dictated by the randomisation. The order of going 
to sleep was always Teddy followed by Hans. The procedure then continued as in 
Experiment 3, except that at probing, the object locations were probed in the order of 
hiding, and subjects were then asked where Teddy was sleeping, followed by being 
asked where Hans was sleeping. 
2. Two-C Simba Condition 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3, except for two major alterations. First, 
Hans was an addition to the pile of Simba's existing three toys for 3-year-olds, or four 
toys for 4-year-olds. Note that Teddy also featured as a toy in the pile for both age- 
groups making a total of five toys for 3-year-olds, and six toys for the 4-year-olds. 
During the naming phase, most children named Hans as Simba's "boy", but "man", 
"dolly" and "girl" were also accepted. Emu tidied up Simba's toys as in Experiment 3, 
but after tidying up the Teddy, Hans was also fidied into a separate receptacle, followed 
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by the rest of the toys. Hence the tidy order matched the Two-C condition (TH123(4)). 
The probe order also matched that of the Two-C condition (123(4)TH). After location 
probing, digit span was elicited by using Teddy and Hans, who "come to life" when the 
subject searches for them in the receptacle set. As was the case in Experiment 3, the 
subjects were administered the same digit span procedure as subjects in the parallel 
control condition. 
7.3 Experiment 9 
In Experiment 9, the effect of further loading the Current State Buffer with a third 
character, is explored. The resulting set of data will thus allow a full analysis of Current 
State Buffer performance with the Current State Buffer loaded with one, two and three 
characters. Similarly, character load effects on Working Memory performance can be 
investigated. 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 8, except that the Two-C condition now 
contained three characters, and therefore there was an additional dependent variable for 
remembering the location of the third character. The Two-C condition was renamed 
Aree-C and the Object condition was renamed Three-C Simba. The possible 
hypotheses were discussed above. 
7.3.1.2 Participants 
Individual participants were different to those used in previous experiments, but also 
consisted of 3- and 4-year-old pre-school children from a number of North London 
nurseries. As with the last set of experiments there were 28 four year olds (2 in each of 
the 7 randomisations for the 2 conditions) and 28 3-year-olds (2 in each of the 7 
randomisations for the 2 conditions). The mean ages were 3; 5 (range 3; 0 to 3; 10) and 
4; 2 (range 4; 1 to 4; 4). 
7.3.1.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to that employed in Experiments 8, with the addition of 
Bunny, a small rabbit figure who was similar in size to Teddy and Hans (see 
photograph in Appendix 4). Bunny is pictured in Photograph 7.2. 
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7.3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was essentially identical to the one employed in Experiment 8. The only 
differences resulted from the addition of Bunny as either another character (Three-C 
condition) or another object (Three-C Simba condition). 
1. Three-C Condition 
In the Three-C condition, Bunny featured as another character, along with Hans and 
Teddy. The procedure matched Experiment 8, except that the subject was now 
introduced to the three characters, and told that they were all best friends, and as a part 
of the initial interaction, the subject watched the three characters play "ring-a-ring 
-a-roses". The digit span task proceeded as in Experiment 8, except that Bunny now 
also has a telephone number, and his number and his friends numbers were rotated with 
the other telephone numbers (Teddy, Hans and their friends' numbers) in a random 
fashion, and digit span was established as in Experiment 8. Bunny went to sleep after 
Hans, and the object tidying order matched that of Experiment 8 (hence the tidying 
order was THB123(4)). The probing order also matched that of Two-C condition, with 
the addition of asking for Bunny's location following Hans' location item (hence the 
probing order was 123(4)THB). 
2. Three-C Simba Condition 
in the Three-C Simba condition the procedure was identical to Experiment 8's Two-C 
Simba condition, except that Bunny featured in the pile of objects with Simba's other 
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toys. He was named by the subjects as a "Rabbif' or as a "Bunny Rabbit", and he was 
tidied away by Emu after Teddy and Hans and before the objects (hence the tidying 
order was THB]23(4)). The tidying order thus matched the Three-C condition. The 
probing order also matched that of Three-C condition, with Bunny's location asked for 
as the last item (hence the probing order was 123(4)THB). The digit span task was 
administered at the end of the trials using the same technique used with subjects in the 
Three-C conditions. 
7.4 Results of Correct Responses in Experiments 8 and 9 
The total number of correct "objecf 'responses for each participant was collected (out of 
the number of objects paired excluding the character pairings). In addition, the number 
of character locations that subjects recalled correctly were recorded, and this was out of 
two in Experiment 8, and out of three in Experiment 9. A rough estimate of Working 
Memory was thus calculated as being equal to the ob ect scores for the Two-C and j 
Three-C conditions, and equal to the object plus the characters scores for the Two-C 
Simba and Three-C Simba. conditions. Overall Performance is a figure calculated from 
the sum of subjects' object and character scores. 
The mean of these three dependent variables for Experiments 8 and 9 are tabulated 
below in Table 7.1 for the 3-year-olds and in Table 7.2 for the 4-year-olds. In each 
table, the average performance of a one Character condition is also presented, and this 
is derived from the averages of correct object, character and Working Memory 
performance across the first three experiments for both age groups. Standard deviations 
are shown in brackets; for each cell in the "one Character" condition, n= 42, and for 
Experiments 8 and 9, each cell has n= 14. 
In section 7.4.1 1 will first present four separate ANOVAs computed on the four 
dependent variables, taking the two age-groups together. Following this I shall use 
these ANOVAs to examine the performance in the two age-groups separately (3-year- 
olds in section 7.4.2, and 4-year-olds in section 7.4.3). 
7.4.1 Comparison of 3- and 4-Year-Olds 
7.4. LI Perfonnance on Character Locations 
A three-way ANOVA with condition, age and number of characters (two or three") as 
between subjects factors was conducted on correctly recalled character scores. This 
36 The one Character conditions were not included in this analysis because the variance of both 3- and 
4-year-olds subjects in these Character conditions was zero - which not only violates an assumption of 
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TABLE 7.1 MEAN CORRECT OBJECT, CHARACTER, WORKING MEMORY AND 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE FOR 3-YEAR-OLDS IN EXPERIMENTS 8 AND 9 
No. of 
s 
Working 
character 
Condition object character Memory Overall and 
t locations/3 location(s) score Perf. Experimen 
one Character 1.95 1.00 1.95 2.95 
Character (1.03) (0.00) (1.03) (1.03) 
............ 
Experiments Object 
...... * ....... 
1.16 
......... --- ....... ........ 
0.43 
................. * ....... 
1.57 
............. * ....... 
1.59 
1-3 (1.03) (0.43) (1.25) (1.23) 
two Two-C 2.00 1.57 2.00 3.57 
Characters. (1.18) (0.51) (1.18) (1.40) 
.... 
Experiment 
............................... 
Two-C 
................................... 
1.07 
................................... 
0.64 
................................ 
1.71 
............................. 
1.71 
8 Simba (0.73) (0.63) (1.14) (1.14) 
three Three-C 1.21 1.21 1.21 2.43 
Characters: (1.05) (1.12) (1.05) (1.03) 
Three-C Experiment 1.07 0.64 1.71 1.71 
9 Simba (0.83) (0.75) (1.38) (1.38) 
"Overall Perf. " is Overall Performance. Standard deviations are in 
brackets. Data for two and three Character conditions are presented 
together with averaged figures for one Character, from Experiments 1-3. 
revealed an effect of condition 
(F(1,104) 
:: -- 26.68, sig., p<0.001) and an effect of the 
number of characters 
(F(,,,, 
4) 4.17, sig., p<0.05), but failed to reach significance 
for age (F(1,104) = 1.74, n. s. ). There were no interaction effects 
(F(,, 
104) < 1, n. s. ). It 
should be noted that there was a consistent trend in Experiments 8 and 9 for the 
character scores of the older subjects in the Character conditions to be higher. 
ANOVA, but means that the true difference in age-related performance cannot be measured since scores 
wer-e at ceiling. 
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TABLE 7.2 MEAN CORRECT OBJECT, CHARACTER, WORKING MEMORY AND 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE FOR 4-YEAR-OLDS IN EXPERIMENTS 8 AND 9 
No. of 
Working 
characters 
Condition object character Memory Overall and 
Experiment locations/3 location(s) score Perf. 
one 
Character 
.. 
Experiments 
1-3 
%, ýnaracter 
........... ................... 
Object 
Z. () 4) 
......... ................ ..... 
1.62 
(1.32) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
. ......................... ....... 
0.48 
(0.51) 
2.6 
(1.17) 
................ ........... 
2.10 
(1.49) 
3.60 
(1.17) 
.............. I ......... 
2.10 
(1.49) 
two Two-C 2.21 1.86 2.21 4.07 
Characters: (1.12) (0.36) (1.12) (1.27) 
Experiment Two-C 1.71 1.00 2.71 2.71 
8 Simba (1.38) (0.78) (1.68) (1.68) 
three Three-C 1.86 1.36 1.86 3.21 
Characters: (1.01) (1-08) (1.01) (1.42) 
.. 
Experiment 
................................... 
Three-C 
................................ 
1.57 
................................... 
0.64 
................................ 
2.21 
............................. 
2.21 
9 Simba (1.28) (0.75) (1.25) (1.25) 
"Overall Perf. " is Overall Performance. Standard deviations are in 
brackets. Data for two and three Character conditions are presented 
together with averaged figures for one Character, from Experiments 1-3. 
The frequencies of correct responses for the different characters in the two studies are 
shown below in Table 7.3. It should be noted that the location of no one character is 
markedly better recalled than any other. 
7.4.1.2 Working Memory Perfonnance 
A three-way ANOVA with condition, age and number of characters (one, two and 
three) as between subjects factors was conducted on Working Memory scores. This In 
revealed an effect of age (F 11.64, sig., p<0.0008) but did not reveal a (1,268) 
significant effect for condition (F < 1, n. s. ) or number of characters t) (1.268) 
(F(1,268) = 1.63, n. s. ). The analysis revealed that the interaction effect between the 
number of characters and condition was almost significant (F(I . 208) = 2.8 1, n. s., 
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TABLE 7.3 FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS RECALLING THE CORRECT LOCATIONS OF THE 
DIFFERENT CHARACTERS IN EXPERIMENTS 8 AND 9 
3-Year-Olds 4 -Year-Olds 
Experiment 8 Experiment 9 Experiment 8 Experiment 9 
Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj Ch Obj 
Teddy 12 4 65 14 7 54 
Hans 10 5 42 12 7 72 
Bunny - 72 -- 73 
Character and Object conditions are denoted by "Ch" and "Obj" 
respectively. Each cell's frequency is out of a possible 14 subjects. 
p=0.062), which when inspected, showed that taking both age-groups together", the 
Three-C conditions had significantly lower Working Memory performance than the 
other Teddy as Character conditions 
(F(,, 
26. ) = 4.36, Sig, p<0.05. The parallel 
difference was not evident in the "Object" conditions 
(F(,, 
26. ) < 1, n. s. ). No other 
interaction effects were significant 
(F(,, 
26. ) <I, n. s. ). 
7.4.1.3 Performance on Object Locations 
A three-way ANOVA with condition, age and number of characters (one, two and 
three) as between subjects factors was computed on the object scores for all 
age-groups. This revealed a main effect of condition 
(F(,, 
268) = 15.38, Sig., 
p<0.002) and age 
(F(I,, 
68) = 
11.25, Sig., p<0.001), but just missed significance 
for number of characters(F(,, 26. ) = 2.7, ii. s., p=0.07). 
No interaction effects were 
significant (F(,, 26. ) < 1.82, ii. s. ). 
7.4.1.4 Overall Performance 
A three-way ANOVA with condition, age and number of characters (one, two and 
three) as between subjects factors was conducted on Overall Performance scores. This 
revealed an effect of condition 
(F(1,, 
6, ) = 51.10, Sig., p<0.001), age 
(F(1,268) = 3.48, Sig., p<0.05) and number of characters (F(I 268) = 51.10, Sig., 
p<0.001). No interaction effects were significant 
(F(,,, 
6, ) < 1.3, n. s. ). 
37 Although this section is supposed to deal with comparisons between age-groups, this contrast is 
reported in this section because it follows neatly from this particular ANOVA. 
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7.4.1.5 Summary 
Subjects in the Character conditions recalled more character locations than subjects in 
the Object conditions, and as the number of characters to be recalled increased, this 
generally had an effect of increasing the number of characters recalled for subjects in 
both conditions. 
The 4-year-old subjects had higher Working Memory scores than their 3-year-old 
counterparts. There were no differences in Working Memory performance between 
conditions in the experiments, except that there was evidence that subjects in the 
Three-C conditions had lower Working Memory performance scores than the other 
Teddy as Character conditions. 
For performance on object locations and on Overall Performance, subjects in the 
Character conditions had better scores than subjects in the Object conditions, and the 
4-year-olds had higher scores than the 3-year-olds. 
7.4.2 The 3-Year-Olds 
7.4.2.1 Character Scores 
Since there was an effect of condition on character scores, as reported above (section 
7.4.1.1) in the three-way ANOVA, planned comparisons were computed, revealing a 
significant difference between the Two-C and Two-C Simba conditions 
(F(I' 104) =9.75, sig., p<0.003) and just failing to reach significance for the 
difference between the Three-C condition and Three-C Simba condition 
(F(I. 104) =-- 3.69, n. s., p=0.056). 
For each of the two experimental conditions in this age-group, separate analyses were 
carried out to compute whether the increase in the number of characters had resulted in a 
change in character location performance. Non-parametric techniques were employed 
for exploring the increase in character performance from one character to two 
characters, because the data for the one Character conditions had a standard deviation of 
zero. The increase from two to three characters will be dealt with separately in a 
parametric fashion, using the three-way ANOVA that I reported in section 7.4.1.1. 
1. Increasing one to two Characters 
Mann Whitney U tests revealed that there was a significant increase in character location 
performance in the Character conditions (U = 126, N, 42, N2 = 14, sig., 
p<0.001), but not in the Object conditions (U = 243, Ný 42, N, = 14, n. s. ). 
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Note that performance was no longer at ceiling level for the Two-C condition, when the 
character load was increased beyond one character. 
2. Increasing two to three Characters 
As mentioned above (in section 7.4.1-2), the three-way ANOVA on character scores 
revealed an effect of number of characters pooled across both age groups when 
increasing character load from two to three. When this decrease in character location 
scores for just 3-year-olds was computed as a simple effect, this showed that the 
decrease was not significant (F, 1,10, ) = 1.44, n. s). 
7.4.2.2 Working Memory Scores 
As reported above (section 7.4.1.2) in the three-way ANOVA on Working Memory 
scores, there was no difference in scores between Character and Object conditions on 
Working Memory performance. However, as I mentioned, inspecting the significant 
interaction between number of characters and condition revealed that with both age 
groups pooled together there was a significant decrease in Working Memory 
performance with three characters relative to one and two for the "Character" conditions 
only. This contrast was therefore computed for just 3-year-old "Character" subjects, 
revealing that the simple effect was significant (F(,, 268) = 3.86, sig., p<0.05). 
7.4.2.3 Object scores 
The difference in perforinance between the subjects in the Object and Character 
conditions for 3-year-olds in Experiments 8 and 9 were inspected by calculating simple 
effects in the three-way ANOVA on object scores reported above in section 7.4.1.5. 
This revealed a significant difference in Experiment 8 between the Two-C and Two-C 
Simba conditions (F(,, 26) = 4.73, sig., p<0.05), but no significant difference 
between the Three-C and Three-C Simba conditions in Experiment 9 (F( 1,268) < 
n. S. ). 
7.4.2.4 Overall Performance Scores 
Planned comparisons on just the 3-year-olds' Overall Performance scores were 
computed from the three-way ANOVA reported in section 7.4.1.4 for the one, two and 
three Character conditions. These compared the difference in Overall Performance 
between the "Character" and "Objecf' conditions. The simple effects were significant 
for the one Character (F(,, 26. ) = 21.74, sig., p<0.001) and two 
Character conditions 
(F (1,268) = 13.56, sig., p<0.001), 
but failed to reach significance in the three 
Character condition (F(1,26. ) = 2.0, n. s. ). 
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7.4.2.5 Summary 
The Two-C Simba condition recalled less of the character locations than did the Two-C 
condition, and this difference was evident between the Three-C and Three-C Simba 
conditions. The perfonnance on character locations by the 3-year-old subjects in the 
Character condition had increased to correctly recalling one and a half locations, when 
tracking two characters. When tracking three characters however, there was a drop in 
perforinance. 
Working Memory performance had dropped in the Three-C condition relative to the 
other Character conditions. Similarly, there was a difference between Character and 
Object conditions on object scores and Overall Performance in the one and two 
Character conditions, but not in the three Character conditions. 
7.4.3 The 4-Year-Olds 
7.4.3.1 Character Scores 
Since there was an effect of condition on character scores, as reported above in the 
three-way ANOVA in section 7.4.1.1, planned comparisons were computed, revealing 
a significant difference between the Two-C condition and Two-C Simba condition 
icant difference between the Three-C (F(1,104) 8.3 1, sig., p<0.004) and a signif 
condition and Three-C Simba condition (Fý1,104) = 5.77, si g., p<0.0 18). 
For both of the experimental conditions separate analyses were carried out to compare 
whether the increase in the number of characters had resulted in a change in 
performance. Non-parametric techniques were employed for exploring the increase in 
character performance from one character to two characters, because the data for the one 
Character conditions had a standard deviation of zero. The increase from two to three 
characters will be dealt with separately in a parametric fashion, using the three-way 
ANOVA discussed above in section 7.4.1.1. 
1. Increasing one to two Characters 
Mann Whitney U tests revealed that there was a significant increase in character location 
performance in the Character conditions (U = 42, N, 42, N2 14, sig., 
p<0.001), and in the Object conditions (U = 184, N, 42, N2 14, sig., 
p<0.04). Note that performance was just below ceiling level for the 4-year-olds in 
the Two-C condition, when the character load was increased. 
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2. Increasing two to three Characters 
As mentioned above, the three-way ANOVA on character scores revealed an effect of 
number of characters pooled across both age groups when increasing character load 
from two to three. When this decrease in mean character score was computed as a 
simple effect for just the 4-year-olds, this decrease just missed significance 
(F(I, 
104) = 2.83, n. s., p=. 10). 
7.4.2.2 Working Memory Scores 
As reported above in the three-way ANOVA on Working Memory scores (section 
7.4.1.2), no difference in scores was found between Character and Object conditions 
on Working Memory performance. However, on inspection of the significant 
interaction between the number of characters and condition, it was found that with both 
age groups pooled together there was a significant decrease in Working Memory 
performance when tracking three characters relative to one and two for the "Character" 
conditions only. This contrast was therefore computed for just 4-year-olds, but it did 
not reveal a significant simple effect (F(,,, 6, ) ,,,: 2.0, n. s. 
). A slightly different contrast 
was thus computed, comparing the Teddy as Character groups of the one Character 
with the two and three Character experimental (Teddy as Character) groups. This 
simple effect just failed to reach significance, with F(1,26. ) = 3.33, n. s., p=0.068. 
7.4.3.3 Object Scores 
The difference in performance between the Object and Character conditions for 
4-year-olds in Experiments 8 and 9 were inspected by calculating simple effects in the 
three-way ANOVA on object scores reported above in section 7.4.1.3. This revealed 
that there was no significant difference in Experiment 8 between the Two-C and 
Two-C Simba conditions (F(,, 26) :::: 1.3 
7, n. s. ), and no significant difference between 
the Three-C and Three-C Simba conditions in Experiment 9 (F(1,2613) <I, n. s. ). 
7.4.3.4 Overall Performance Scores 
Planned comparisons on just the 4-year-olds' Overall Performance scores were 
computed from the three-way ANOVA reported above (in section 7.4.1.4) for the one, 
two and three Character conditions. These compared the difference in Overall 
Performance between the "Character" and "Object" conditions. The simple effects were 
significant for the one Character (F(,, 268) = 
26.56, sig., p<0.001) and two Character 
conditions (F(,, 26. ) = 
7.25, sig., p<0.008), and also in the three Character condition 
(F(1,268) = 3.93, sig., p<0.05). 
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7.4.3.5 Summary 
As with the 3-year-olds, the 4-year-olds in the Two-C Simba condition recalled less of 
the character locations than did the Two-C condition, and this difference was evident 
between the Three-C and Three-C Simba conditions. The 4-year-olds however, coped 
better than the 3-year-olds in having to track two characters, and perfon-ned at almost 
ceiling level, but when tracking three characters, their performance dropped by about 
half a character location. 
There was a steady drop for the 4-year-old subjects in Working Memory performance 
as the number of characters to be tracked increased, but Overall Performance was better 
for subjects in the Character condition relative to subjects in the Object condition across 
all three character loads. 
7.5 Receptacle Confusion Errors in Experiments 8 and 9 
Thus far, the dependent variable has been the strict measure of whether, when probed 
for the location of a given stimulus, subjects remember the correct item in the correct 
location. However, error data is also a useful adjunct to this. Presented below in 
Table 7.4 are the location errors made by subjects in Experiments 8 and 9. Totals are 
given separately for all errors (Total Error) on character and object locations. These can 
then be further divided into the type of error made on the basis of the basis of these two 
categories of items. Hence there are character locations confused with the locations 
another character (C-c), character locations confused with location of an object (C-o), 
object locations confused with the location of an object (0-o), and object locations 
confused with the location of a character (O_C). 3'ln Table 7.4 these sub-categories of 
errors are given as proportions of the total character location errors (for C-c and Go) 
and object location errors (for O-o and 0-c). 
The left-hand-side of the table, which pertains to errors made on character locations is 
useful in identifying the fine-grained detail of Current State Buffer function when it is 
loaded beyond capacity. As reported above in Experiment 9 (section 7.4.2.1), the 
scores on correct character locations did not differ significantly between experimental 
conditions for the 3-year-olds, as they have done in studies using just one or two 
characters. For this reason, it is important to examine the 3-year-old subjects' character 
location performance Experiment 9. 
' In the Appendix 3, the total errors (i. e. not divided into character and object location errors) in 
Experiments 8 and 9, together with the class of error as a proportion, can be found. This includes C-e 
and O-e which are the character location errors and object location errors respectively, that indicate a 
"don't know" or a confusion of a location with a non-used receptacle. 
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TABLE 7.4 ERRORS OF SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENTS 8 AND 9. 
Character Probe Responses Object Probe Responses 
Type of Type of 
character object 
TOTAL TOTAL 
error as error as 
ERROR 
proportion 
ERROR 
proportion 
A E Errors on Errors on 
g x character object 
e p 
Cond locations C-c Go locations O-o O-c 
3 8 Ch 0.43 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.17 
3 8 Obj 1.34 0.08 0.61 1.93 0.35 0.36 
3 9 Ch 1.79 0.71 0.19 1.79 0.29 0.63 
3 9 Obj 2.36 0.33 0.48 1.93 0.19 0.46 
4 8 Ch 0.14 0.00 0.50 2.43 0.51 0.04 
4 8 Obj 1.00 0.35 0.50 2.57 0.30 0.32 
4 9 Ch 1.64 0.50 0.50 2.21 0.69 0.32 
4 9 Obj 2.36 1 0.48 0.52 2.64 0.32 0.55 
Errors are either on character or object locations, and the nature of these 
errors are given as proportions of the relevant error total. "Ch" and 
"Obj" refer to Character and Object conditions respectively. Other 
abbreviations are defined in the text. 
The C-c column in Table 7.4 displays a tendency for subjects to confuse character 
locations, and the Go column a tendency to attribute object locations to characters. Let 
me draw attention to the shaded region of Table 7.4. It should be noted that for the 
3-year-old subjects in the Character condition of Experiment 9, the distribution of the 
proportion of character errors that are C-c relative to Go are in a ratio of almost 4 to 1. 
This is in comparison to the Object condition of Experiment 9, where the C-o errors are 
greater than the C-c errors, although the ratio is much smaller. In order to try to explore 
this difference in error distributions between conditions statistically, the total frequency 
of subjects who made more C-c errors than Go errors was investigated in 
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each condition. This was then compared with the frequency of the number of subjects 
who made more C-o errors than C-c errors". The resulting contingency table is 
displayed below in Table 7.5. In this way the data had been transformed into nominal 
data, and since two independent groups are being compared a Chi Squared test is an 
appropriate way of testing this difference in error patterns. A standard Chi squared test 
revealed a significant difference with X' = 5.84 (df = 1, p=0.012), and with a 
Yates corrected test, the statistic was X' = 3.74 (df = 1, p=0.053). 
TABLE 7.5 FREQUENCY OF 3-YEAR-OLDS SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT 9 SHOWING THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF INTER- AND INTRA-CATEGORY TYPE ERRORS MADE ON 
CHARACTER LOCATIONS. 
Condition in Number of Number of 
Experiment 9 subjects where C-c subjects where Go 
greater than Go greater than C-c 
Three-C condition 
1 
Three-C Simba condition 136 
See text for abbreviations 
For the 4-year-olds in Experiment 9, it can be seen from Table 7.4 that the proportion 
of types of character location error are shared evenly between the C-c and C-o classes in 
both the Character and the Object conditions. This seems to indicate that although the 
3-year-olds made same category errors on character locations, the 4-year-olds did not 
display this pattern of responding. 
7.6 Digit Spans in one, two and three Character Conditions 
Table 7.6 below displays the digit spans of subjects in the one, two and three Character 
conditions (Experiments I to 3, and Experiments 8 an 9). Note that the mean of the 
digit span scores for one Character subjects has been taken as the average across 
Experiments 1 to 3. 
A three-way ANOVA, with age, condition and number of characters as independent 
variables was computed on digit span. This revealed a main effect of age 
(F(1,268) "1 46.55, sig., p<0.001), but not for condition 
(F(,, 
26. ) <I, n. s. ) or 
"' Where the two types of error were equal in number, the subject's data was not included. "Don't 
knows" and non-used receptacles were discounted in all subjects when detennining which of the error 
categories were in the majority. 
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number (F(,, 26. ) < 1.71, n. s. ). of characters (F (1,268) -,,: 2.28, n. s. ). No interaction 
effects were significant 
TABLE 7.6 DIGIT SPANS OF SUBJECTS IN ONE, TWO AND THREE CHARACTER 
CONDITIONS 
3-Year-Olds 4-Year-Olds 
No. of Characters! Experimental Digit Span Digit Span 
and Experiment Condition 
one Character: Character 3.33 4.31 
Experiments 1-3 Object 3.20 
.......... 
4.26 
two Characters: Two-C 3.68 4.14 
.... 
Experiment 8 
........................................................ 
Two-C Simba 
......................................... 
3.28 
................................... 
4.61 
three Characters: Three-C 3.54 4.86 
............................................................................................... ...... ....................................... 
Experiment 9 Three-C Simba 3.68 4.39 
All cells have n= 14 except the one Character cells, n= 42. 
7.7 Discussion 
7.7.1 Age Differences in Working Memory 
In trying to summarise the above results, there are a few clear findings. Working 
Memory performance is superior in 4-year-olds relative to 3-year-olds, which reflects 
the expected increase in Working Memory in general and the Visuospatial Sketchpad in 
particular. For this type of visuospatial task, the age-related difference seems to be 
around one half of an item location. 
It is of importance to note that in the three-way ANOVA reported in section 7.4.1.2 
there was only a main effect of age on Working Memory, and no overall effect of 
experimental condition on Working Memory - which approximates to the assumption 
that subjects in the two conditions of each age-group would have equal Working 
Memory capabilities. This age-related shift in Visuospatial Sketchpad performance is 
complemented by the increase in Phonological Loop span of about one digit, as indexed 
by the digit span task (-the normative data from the digit span task were consistent with 
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those of Chi (1978)). The ANOVA on digit span (section 7.6) also demonstrated that 
subjects in the Character condition did not differ from subjects in the Object condition 
on performance in this task, again indicating that subjects in the two conditions did not 
differ in general Working Memory capacity. 
7.7.2 Character Location Performance 
One of the aims of the present chapter was to explore the capacity of the Current State 
Buffer. From the results at hand, it seems that the capacity of the Current State Buffer 
for character locations in the Tidy Emu Paradigm is just over one and a half for 
3-year-olds, and just below two for 4-year-olds. The possibility that subjects are able to 
track as many characters as they are given can be clearly ruled out. 
However, an obvious question is why character location performance should drop in 
the Three-C condition in Experiment 9 relative to the Two-C condition in 
Experiment 8, if the capacity of the Current State Buffer is reached with only two 
characters. Although the drop in performance was not statistically significant for the 
individual age-groups (see section 7.4.2.1 for 3-year-olds, and 7.4.3.1 for 4-year- 
olds), the fact that it was found for both age-groups (see main effect of number of 
characters on correct character locations in section 7.4.1.1) is taken as an important 
trend. One of the possible answers to this question may have been that in 
Experiment 9, one of the characters was more salient than the others, leading to 
increased recall of that character and depressed recall of the others. From inspection of 
the distribution of correct responses in Table 7.3 this can be ruled out, and a different 
avenue of enquiry can be made. 
The three-way ANOVA on character scores (section 7.4.1.1) revealed that subjects in 
the Character conditions have better character performance relative to subjects in Object 
conditions. However, simple effects demonstrated that this was only so for the one and 
two Character conditions. In which case, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
advantage of being in the Character condition breaks down when tracking three 
characters. An account for this pattern of data may be that subjects in the Three-C 
conditions, when trying to track three characters, suffer from catastrophic interference 
in their Current State Buffers due to the overload, and their performance drops to below 
capacity. This account may explain the effect on the Current State Buffer when 
character load increases from two to three characters; but how does it relate to the 
effects on Working Memory that result from an increase in character load? 
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7.7.3 Working Memory Performance 
A clue to answering this may be gleaned from scrutiny of the three-way ANOVA on 
Working Memory performance (section 7.4.1.2). This revealed that performance had 
decreased in both age-groups in Experiment 9 for subjects in the Character conditions, 
but not for subjects in the Object conditions. Increasing character load therefore affected 
Working Memory performance, even though the explicit Working Memory load stayed 
constant in Experiments 8 and 9. 
7.7.3.1 The 3-Year-Olds 
For the 3-year-olds, the above account fits in well with this finding; and particularly 
because the relevant simple effect showing a decrease in Working Memory performance 
when tracking three characters is also significant (see section 7.4.2.2). As a result of 
the catastrophic interference introduced by the third character, the Current State Buffer 
is put under such stress that resources from Working Memory are deployed in order to 
accommodate tracking the extra character. As a consequence of this, Working Memory 
performance drops in Experiment 9 for the Three-C condition and not for the Three-C 
Simba condition. 
What also bolsters this explanation is the lack of difference on object location 
performance 40 between the Three-C condition and the Three-C Simba condition, that 
was evident when subjects had to track just one or two characters. The subjects in the 
Object conditions had to remember more objects and this resulted in interference. If the 
usual Character condition advantage has disappeared when tracking three characters in 
Experiment 9 then this hints that these subjects' Visuospatial Sketchpads are also being 
over-stretched, albeit for a different reason. 
If the increase in character load lead to catastrophic interference, with the result that 
resources were deployed from Working Memory, then it is pertinent to ask whether 
Current State Buffer function was totally impaired. In order to tackle this question, the 
receptacle confusion errors can answer what Two-C condition subjects were 
responding when probed for characters. If their decreased Overall Performance was 
coupled with many character-character location errors, and relatively few 
character-object location errors, then this would imply that these subjects are at least 
coding for "character locations", but not for specific characters in a given character 
location. Indeed this pattern of data was reported in section 7.5 and provides evidence 
that although the 3-year-olds are not performing so well on correct specific character 
locations, they are able to remember the receptacles where the characters are hidden. 
' And equally on Overall Perforinance. 
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In sum, this suggests an interesting approach taken by 3-year-olds when their Current 
State Buffers are overloaded with a third character. Rather thanjust track two characters 
(and "ignore" the third), the importance of the status of the characters leads to a shift in 
strategy in which subjects recall the character locations as a set without regard to 
individual characters. I have also suggested that the 3-year-olds benefit from an influx 
of resources that have been deployed from Working Memory. In this way their 
immature meta-cognitive skills are exposed since they lose sight of the task demands, as 
they are sacrificing performance on recalling the locations of the objects, which in fact 
the experimenter has instructed them to remember. What they gain from this sacrifice is 
coding the set of receptacles that the characters inhabit - something that they have not 
been told to do. 
7.7.3.2 The 4-Year-Olds 
The story for the 4-year-olds is somewhat different as they have better meta-cognitive 
skills and larger capacity buffers. Their Overall Performance is not sacrificed, to which 
the ANOVA on Overall Performance attests, in there still being a difference between 
Character and Object conditions with one, two and three characters. The 4-year-olds in 
the Character conditions similarly maintain an advantage over the 4-year-olds in the 
Object conditions on character location performance. So although there may be a little 
catastrophic interference in the 4-year-olds' Current State Buffers with a third character, 
their Current State Buffer capacities are sufficiently large to withstand the full blow of 
the detrimental effects of overload from a third character. 
It will be recalled that there is a more steady drop in Working Memory performance in 
the 4-year-old Character conditions (compared with the sudden drop in 3-year-olds 
subjects in Experiment 9), and that they did not display a receptacle confusion error 
pattern in the way that the 3-year-old Three-C condition subjects did. The drop in 
4-year-old subjects' Working Memory performance took away the advantage of 
Character condition subjects on object locations, as the character load was increased 
(see section 7.4.3.3). This may be indicative of a more mature system that has the 
meta-cognitive capabilities to adapt to the increasing needs of the Current State Buffer. 
As the Current State Buffer is incrementally loaded with characters, Working Memory 
then allocates enough resources to successfully code the actual item-location pairing of 
characters without interfering as drasticafty with task demands. It is quite probable that 
with four characters, the 4-year-olds would produce a data set equivalent to the 
3-year-olds with three characters. Hence task demands would not be adhered to, 
resulting in lower Working Memory performance, and specific character location 
performance would be reduced, but general character location performance as a set 
would not be impaired. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
From the data presented in the chapter, it seems that the 3-year-olds can only deal with 
tracking one character, whereas the 4-year-olds can more or less manage two 
characters. After the subjects in the Character conditions tracked one character perfectly 
in the earlier experiments in this thesis, the addition of one extra character produces 
interference for them (particularly for 3-year-olds), and the addition of two extra 
characters results in catastrophic interference 
In this chapter, the effect of increasing character load using the Tidy Emu Paradigm has 
proved to be an informative exercise. It has revealed the precise capacities of the 
Current State Buffer for the different age-groups. Similarly, it has been shown how the 
effects of catastrophic interference in the Current State Buffer are differentiaRy dealt 
with by the two age-groups in terms of differences in meta-cognitive strategies and the 
re-allocation of Working Memory resources. 
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CHAPTER8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Chapter Outline 
In this final chapter, I begin by summarising the main components and studies 
contained within this thesis (section 8.2). Then I proceed to consider specific limitations 
of some of the arguments that I have made (section 8.3). Following this, I consider the 
inter-relationships between the Current State Buffer and Working Memory (section 
8.4), and the issue of the capacity of the Current State Buffer (section 8.5). Finally, 
before concluding, I briefly discuss the Current State Buffer and development (section 
8.6). 
8.2 Summary of Thesis 
8.2.1 Working Memory and the Current State Buffer 
This thesis began with a discussion of theories of Short Term Memory in Chapter 1, 
and presented the Working Memory model (Baddeley and Flitch, 1974) as a framework 
that explains a great deal of the short term memory phenomena that have been explored 
to date. The Working Memory model was then examined in relation to the development 
of Short Term Memory (Chapter 2). It was noted in Chapter 3 however, that the theory 
seemed to lack specification of a functionally vital component of any model of Short 
Tenn Memory; namely the capacity to automatically keep track of important stimuli in 
an individual's immediate personal environment. The Current State Buffer (Morton, 
1997) was then discussed as a construct which fulfils this role, and which has already 
met with considerable experimental success as demonstrated by Barreau and Morton (in 
press). 
8.2.2 The Tidy Emu Paradigm 
I therefore started with the 6 priori assumption that the Current State Buffer exists as a 
separate entity from the specified components of Working Memory. The Tidy Emu 
Paradigm, which is based on dual-task methodology, was explicitly designed in order 
to test this basic premise. It constituted a visuospatial Working Memory task - 
remembering the location of objects in receptacles, concurrent with a Current State 
Buffer task - remembering the location of an animated Teddy in the same receptacle set. 
Pre-school children were selected as subjects in the paradigm because they do not 
phonologically recode spatial information. This ensured that object location storage 
would be restricted to the Visuospatial Sketchpad. Similarly, the Visuospatial 
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Sketchpad task was designed such that it loaded Working Memory to capacity, so that 
Working Memory could not be implicated in any way in contributing to the performance 
on the Current State Buffer component of the task. 
8.2.3 Experiment 1 
It is important to note that I formulated two clear hypotheses in Chapter 4 stemming 
from the fact that performance was predicted to show independence on the Current State 
Buffer and Working Memory tasks. The control group involved subjects remembering 
the same object locations plus the location of a non-animated Teddy. The predictions 
were a double-edged sword: the experimental condition would have superior 
performance on recall of Teddy's location, and of the object locations relative to the 
control group. This was because the subjects in the experimental condition would store 
Teddy's location in their Current State Buffers and the object locations in Working 
Memory. Subjects in the control condition would store all locations in an over-loaded 
Working Memory, and this would produce interference when recalling the objects' 
location and Teddy's location. The results of Experiment I supported both the 
experimental hypotheses, providing initial evidence for the independence of the Current 
State Buffer from Working Memory. What was impressive was not just that recall of 
Teddy's location was superior in the experimental condition, but that all the subjects in 
the condition recalled his location perfectly. Similarly, these subjects had not even been 
instructed to remember Teddy's locati on. 
8.2.4 Alternative Explanations to Experiment 1: Experiments 2 and 3 
Other explanations of this core finding were then carefully considered. Among these 
were the possibilities that the findings were explainable in terms of a von Restorff 
Isolation Effect (section 4.3.1), a Levels of Processing Effect (section 4.3.2), the 
effects of Organisation in memory (section 4.3.3), the effects of intentional and 
incidental learning (section 4.3.4), of Long Term Memory (section 4.3.5), and of 
phonological recoding at output (section 4.3.6). In Chapter 5, altemative options were 
tested experimentally and rejected (Experiment 2) and the findings of Experiment I 
were replicated: subjects in the experimental condition performed better both on 
recalling the object locations and Teddy's location (performance was at ceiling in the 
experimental condition again). Other explanations, including the possibility of multiple 
Recency effects (section 5.3.1) were considered in Experiment 3, and these too were 
rejected, and the findings of Experiments I and 2 were further replicated. Hence from a 
total of 168 subjects and two separate age-groups, it was clear that having to remember 
Teddy's location created no cost for subjects in the Teddy as Character condition, and 
all this had been predicted ex-hypothesi based on the existence of a Current State 
Buffer. 
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8.1.4.1 A Comment on Alternative Explanations 
As I mentioned before, the findings of Experiments 1,2 and 3 are pertinent because 
both recall of Teddy's location and the object locations were significantly better in the 
experimental conditions relative to the control conditions. Apart from the fact that these 
results were predicted by the theory, the strength of the Current State Buffer 
explanation lies in the fact that it accounts for the results as a pair. Any serious 
alternative explanation therefore needs to explain both aspects of the results. If a 
particular theory or explanation can account for only one half of the results, then for it 
to be valued as a viable alternative, it must also make sense of the other half of the 
findings. To illustrate this point, consider the following explanation of the success of 
Teddy as Character subjects on the recall of Teddy's location. Subjects were not 
incidentally remembering the location of Teddy, according to this explanation, but 
rather they intentionally rehearsed his location whilst the other objects were being 
hidden leading to better recall of his location. This account focuses solely on the recall 
of Teddy's location, and so much so that the account fails to recognise that since recall 
of the object locations is also due to intentional learning, then there is no reason to 
predict that there will be an advantage over subjects in the control condition where the 
learning is also all intentional. " Parenthetically, the other obvious weakness to this 
particular interpretation, is its mention of rehearsal - something that does not begin until 
seven years of age (e. g., Flavell et al., 1966). 
8.2.5 Architecture of the System 
Chapter 6 continued to use the Tidy Emu Paradigm to explore the Current State Buffer, 
since it had been established as independent of Working Memory. Various models of a 
system that housed the Current State Buffer and Working Memory were considered as 
possibilities in accommodating the data set from the previous chapters, and predictions 
were made based on the different architectures. Experiments 4,5,6 and 7 were thus 
empirical tests of the models using the Teddy as Character condition of the standard 
Tidy Emu Paradigm, but varying the input and output orders of the stimuli. In brief, the 
data are best described by an architecture where information enters an Environmental 
Input Buffer, and, depending on the nature of the stimulus, it passes either into the 
Current State Buffer or into an Interpreter Buffer (Working Memory). At retrieval, the 
contents of these buffers can independently proceed to an Output Buffer. 
" This explanation of the findings was suggested to me by the reviewer of a leading international 
journal of Psychology. 
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8.2.6 Multiple Characters 
Chapter 7 reported Experiments 8 and 9, in which the character load was systematically 
increased. This allowed for an accurate measure of the capacity of the Current State 
Buffer, since until Chapter 7, its performance had been at ceiling level - tracking just 
one character. What became apparent was that when the 3- and 4-year-olds track two 
characters they approach their Current State Buffer capacities for this task at just over 
one and a half characters (3-year-olds) and just under two characters (4-year-olds). 
Tracking three characters however, produces catastrophic interference in subjects' 
Current State Buffers, and more markedly so for 3-year-olds. This was evident from 
the subsequent fall in character location performance in subjects from both age-groups 
when they track three characters. I discussed the age-related strategies of the two 
age-samples in dealing with this overloading, and importantly the role of Working 
Memory in deploying resources to the Current State Buffer when necessary. Chapter 7 
also provided further evidence for the Visuospatial Sketchpad (Working Memory) 
performance differential expected between the two age-groups. 
8.3 Possible Limitations 
As I mentioned earlier, the Tidy Emu Paradigm was conceived with the specific goal of 
demonstrating the independence of Working Memory from the Current State Buffer and 
therefore certain constraints were intentionally built into the design. However, these 
constraints need consideration as they pose potential limitations on the work that I have 
reported in this thesis. 
8.3.1 Only Visuospatial Representations have been Investigated 
In order to restrict Working Memory representations to one sub-component of the 
system, a visuospatial task was selected with pre-school children as subjects, since they 
do not phonologically recode spatial representations. It could be argued therefore, that 
the findings cannot be generalised beyond visuospatial representations. This would 
mean that for the Current State Buffer to be fully recognised as independent from 
Working Memory, there would be a need to demonstrate its independence from the 
Phonological Loop. 
What tempers this particular limitation is a close consideration of the findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2. It will be recalled that one of the differences between the two 
experiments was that in Experiment 1, subjects could vocalise their responses, whereas 
in Experiment 2 subjects were encouraged to point at receptacles so as to prevent any 
possibility of causing phonological recoding at output (see section 4.3.6). The change 
in procedure was to counter the argument that the results were not showing the 
independence of the Visuospatial Sketchpad and the Current State Buffer, but of the 
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Visuospatial Sketchpad and the Phonological Loop. Since the results of Experiment I 
were replicated in Experiment 2, this demonstrated retroactively that the Current State 
Buffer could not have been equivalent to that part of the system involved in the verbal 
output of responses. 
What remains of this limitation relating to visuospatial representations however, is a 
valid issue that the results in the thesis cannot answer. This is that we still need 
enlightening as to whether phonological information in the Current State Buffer is 
independent from the Phonological Loop. A likely candidate for phonological 
representations that would enter the Current State Buffer may be mental states, in that 
they are certainly not visuospatial in nature. 
8.3.2 Age-group 
The developmental age-group was selected because of the reasons mentioned above 
pertaining to the Visuospatial Sketchpad as well as the fact that their less mature 
memory system is a more tractable substrate for investigating new constructs such as 
the Current State Buffer. The particular age-group was also appropriate because of the 
necessity for the Current State Buffer task to be automatic and therefore incidental. The 
result of this is that the task in its current format is limited in that it is only appropriate 
for 3- and 4-year-olds, and possibly 5- and 6-year-olds. 
The theory predicts that independence of the Current State Buffer from Working 
Memory should in principle be possible to demonstrate experimentally with older 
children and adults. Isolating a Working Memory component task to the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad is not a problem since subjects can perform articulatory suppression whilst 
performing the visuospatial and Current State Buffer task. However, the major problem 
in designing experiments that will achieve this is finding a Current State Buffer task that 
maintains the automaticity of an incidental teaming situation, while keeping the Current 
State Buffer stimulus important within the experimental design. 
B. 4 Relationship between Working Memory and the Current State 
Buffer 
In Chapter 7,1 discussed the way in which the Current State Buffer was found to 
interact with Working Memory. In the previous chapters, the case was made for the 
Current State Buffer being an independent entity to Working Memory. An issue here 
therefore, is the precise relationship between the Current State Buffer and Working 
Memory in terms of the existing architecture of the Working Memory model. What will 
follow in the next paragraph are a few thoughts, which remain speculative in nature, on 
possible relationships between the Current State Buffer and Working Memory. Note 
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that one of the central arguments of the thesis has been that the Working Memory model 
has not accounted for Current State Buffer functioning in its specification to date. Thus 
whether the Current State Buffer ultimately becomes an integrated part of the current 
Working Memory model account, or whether it remains relatively independent to it, 
remains relatively peripheral to the thrust of the thesis. 
An example of when the connectivity between the Current State Buffer and Working 
Memory becomes an issue arises from considering the effect of overloading the 
Current State Buffer with character locations, as in Chapter 7. For subjects in both 
age-groups, this lead to a decrease in Working Memory performance. It was suggested 
(in section 7.7.3) that there had been a re-allocation of resources from the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad into the Current State Buffer. A possible account for this is that when the 
Current State Buffer becomes overloaded, the additional character location or locations, 
cannot be registered in the Current State Buffer. The Central Executive may then be 
sensitive to the appearance of "floating" representations that have not been successfully 
entered into the Current State Buffer. This signals the Central Executive to deploy 
processing resources from the Visuospatial Sketchpad in order to help register and 
maintain the representation of the extra character locations. Hence with this conception, 
the Current State Buffer is only subject to the control processes of the Central 
Executive, in that it can receive support from the Visuospatial Sketchpad under the 
direction of the Central Executive. 
In this account, however, it would not be the case that the Central Executive has the 
ability to pull resources from the Current State Buffer. So that if the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad became overloaded from additional object locations, and required help for 
maintenance of the additional representations, the Central Executive would be unable to 
obtain these resources from the Current State Buffer. The justification for this is that the 
representations in Current State Buffer are of higher priority, and therefore 
representations in the Current State Buffer must remain independent to Working 
Memory functioning in this sense. 
Another rationale for a distinction between the Current State Buffer and the other 
sub-components of Working Memory, which seems to motivate this particular account, 
is in terrns of the processes that operate within it. Representations are thought to be 
automatically registered in the Current State Buffer, without the need for rehearsal, this 
is not the case in the Visuospatial Sketchpad and the Phonological Loop, which may 
have their own specialised components for maintenance rehearsal, as I described in 
Chapters I and 2. It could be claimed therefore, that Working Memory sub-components 
are most likely to be characterised by a "storage" component and a "rehearsal" 
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component. In this way, the sense is that the Current State Buffer's relationship to 
Working Memory is not equivalent to that of the Visuospatial Sketchpad and the 
Phonological Loop's relationship to Working Memory. 
In this conception, the Current State Buffer is not subjugated by the Central Executive 
in the same way as the Phonological Loop and Visuospatial Sketchpad (which have 
been termed the "slave systems", e. g. Baddeley, 1985) are. This account therefore 
conceives of the Current State Buffer as a relatively distinct entity to Working Memory. 
An alternative account is that the Current State Buffer somehow constitutes a more 
automated functioning of Working Memory, and that each sub-component of Working 
Memory has its own Current State Buffer in the same way that each component has a 
"storage" and "rehearsal" component. This follows from consideration of the fact that 
the independence of the Current State Buffer to Working Memory has been 
demonstrated with dual-task methodology, and is no different in many senses to the 
many demonstrations of the independence of the Visuospatial Sketchpad to the 
Phonological Loop. To this extent, the dissociation between the Visuospatial Sketchpad 
and the Current State Buffer may be no different to other dissociations within Working 
Memory. 
There is no d priori reason to reject the idea of Current State Buffer function having a 
modality-specific sub-component for each of the components of Working Memory. For 
this second account of the relationship between the Current State Buffer and Working 
Memory, these sub-components would be a part of the Visuospatial Sketchpad, or the 
Phonological Loop. However, they would remain more autonomous in their 
functioning in keeping with the ideas that I suggested above, that the Current State 
Buffer is relatively independent to Working MemorY42. 
What should become clear from this discussion, is that the extent to which the Current 
State Buffer and Working Memory are related lies on a theoretical continuum which 
describes the possible balance between the independence of the Current State Buffer 
and Working Memory on the one extreme, and the integration of the two constructs on 
the other. Whatever the actual balance turns out to be, the basic point that emerges from 
this thesis remains in place; namely that both Working Memory and Current State 
Buffer representations constitute separate parts of Short Term Memory. 
' If one were to conceive of one structurally distinct Current State Buffer, as in the first account, the 
buffer would have its own modality specific sub-components. 
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8.5 The Capacity of the Current State Buffer 
During the course of the thesis (notably in Chapter 7), 1 have talked about the capacity 
of the Current State Buffer as if it were able to track a finite number of character 
locations. It is very important to specify exactly what is meant by this. The absolute 
capacity of the adult Current State Buffer is conceived of being very large such that 
people are able to track a variety of different objects, mental states and the like without 
there being any interference. Where "capacity" has been used in the context of a number 
of characters being stored in the Current State Buffer, this has simply referred to the 
number of characters sleeping in the receptacle set of the experimental situation; i. e., it 
is task specific. It is crucial then to define not only what representations are worthy of 
Current State Buffer status for a given individual in a given situation, but also to 
demarcate capacity boundaries for different types of Current State Buffer 
representations. 
8.6 The Current State Buffer and Development 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the Current State Buffer. As I explained 
previously, the choice of a developmental subject population was for theoretical and 
practical reasons. Therefore, any large scale implications for cognitive development are 
more incidental than anything else, although the methodology may be useful in studying 
young children's visual Working Memory. The most significant theoretical finding of 
developmental interest, however, is that the age-related shift in Working Memory 
performance (both digit span and memory for object locations), is mirrored by a 
difference in Current State Buffer capacity, suggesting that it is a component of memory 
that will develop like any other. 
Apart from the change in the Current State Buffer's capacity to track character locations 
between the ages of three and four, it is difficult at this stage to say precisely what the 
nature of the change is. However, two things can be said in connection with this. 
Firstly, although there are many important developmental changes which occur between 
the ages of three and four (e. g. Karmiloff- Smith, 1992; Gopnik and Astington, 1988), 
it is not a certainty to assume that developmental differences related to Current State 
Buffer functioning will necessarily emerge across these ages. Secondly, as I noted in 
Chapter 7, there were some age-related differences in the strategies that subjects 
adopted when pushed beyond their Current State Buffer capacity (see section 7.7.3.1 
for 3-year-olds, and section 7.7.3.2 for 4-year-olds). 
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8.7 Conclusion 
This thesis began with a survey of Short Tenn Memory: a construct which is typically 
constrained by a limited capacity. The take-home message of this thesis may therefore 
be that the capacity of humans to remember information in the short term is actually a 
fair amount greater than previously reckoned, since in addition to any information 
temporarily stored in Short Term Memory, we are automatically tracking and updating 
important stimuli in our immediate environments. 
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Appendix 1: Experiments 1,2 and 3 
ObjectlToy Locations: Raw Data for Individual Items. 
CHI refers to Character condition of Experiment 1, and OBI to the 
Obje ct condition. CH2 refers to the Character condition in Experiment 2 
(i. e. Character2 condition) and so on. Each row represents an individual 
subject's responses (I - correct, 0- incorrect) on each type of 
toy/object. 
AGE CONDITION CAR CAT CRAYON LEGO TEDDY 
3 0131 0 0 1 1 
3 OBI 0 0 0 0 
3 OBI 0 0 0 1 
3 OB1 0 0 0 0 
3 0131 0 0 1 1 
3 OBI 0 0 0 
3 0131 1 1 1 1 
3 0131 0 0 0 0 
3 OBI 0 0 
3 0131 0 0 0 0 
3 0131 1 1 1 0 
3 0131 0 0 0 0 
3 OBI 1 1 1- I 
3 0131 1 0 0 0 
3 CHI 1 0 1 1 
3 CHI 0 0 0 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 0 1 0 1 
3 CHI I 1 1 1 
3 CHI 0 0 1 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 0 0 0 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 0 1 1 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 1 1 1 1 
3 CHI 0 1 0 1 
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AGE CONDITION CAR CAT CRAYON LEGO TEDDY 
3 OB2 0 0 0 1 
3 OB2 0 0 0 1 
3 OB2 1 1 0 1 
3 OB2 0 0 0 0 
3 OB2 1 1 1 0 
3 OB2 0 0 1 0 
3 OB2 1 1 1 1 
3 OB2 1 0 1 1 
3 OB2 1 1 1 1 
3 OB2 1 1 0 0 
3 OB2 0 1 1 0 
3 OB2 0 0 0 0 
3 OB2 0 1 1 1 
3 OB2 0 0 0 0 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 1 1 0 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 1 0 0 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 0 1 1 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 0 0 0 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 0 1 1 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 1 0 1 1 
3 CH2 1 1 1 1 
3 CH2 0 1 0 1 
3 OB3 1 1 1 1 
3 OB3 0 0 1 0 
3 OB3 1 0 1 1 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
3 OB3 1 0 0 1 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
3 OB3 1 1 1 0 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
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AGE CONDITION CAR CAT CRAYON LEGO TEDDY 
3 OB3 0 1 0 1 
3 OB3 0 0 0 0 
3 OB3 1 1 1 1 
3 OB3 0 1 0 0 
3 CH3 1 1 1 1 
3 CH3 1 1 1 1 
3 CH3 1 1 1 1 
3 CH3 1 1 1 1 
3 CH3 0 0 1 1 
3 CH3 0 0 1 1 
3 CH3 1 0 0 1 
3 CH3 1 0 0 1 
3 CH3 0 1 1 1 
3 CH3 0 0 0 1 
3 CH3 1 1 1 1 
3 CH3 1 0 0 1 
3 CH3 0 1 0 1 
3 CH3 0 0 0 1 
4 OBI 0 0 1 1 1 
4 OBI 0 0 1 0 0 
4 OBI 1 1 0 0 1 
4 OB1 0 0 0 0 1 
4 OBI 0 0 1 0 1 
4 OBI 0 0 1 0 1 
4 OBI 0 1 1 1 1 
4 OB1 0 1 0 0 0 
4 OB1 1 0 0 1 1 
4 OB1 0 1 0 1 0 
4 OB1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 OB1 0 1 0 0 0 
4 OB1 1 0 1 0 0 
4 OBI 1 0 0 0 0 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 0 0 0 0 1 
4 CH1 1 1 1 1 1 
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AGE CONDITION CAR CAT CRAYON LEGO TEDDY 
4 CHI 0 1 0 0 1 
4 CHI 1 1 1 1 1 
4 CHI 0 1 0 0 1 
4 CHI I 1 0 1 1 
4 CHI 0 0 0 1 
4 CHI 1 0 1 1 
4 CHI 0 0 0 1 1 
4 OB2 0 1 0 0 1 
4 OB2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 082 1 1 0 1 1 
4 OB2 1 1 0 1 0 
4 OB2 1 1 1 0 1 
4 OB2 0 1 0 0 1 
4 OB2 0 1 1 1 0 
4 OB2 0 0 0 1 1 
4 OB2 1 1 1 1 1 
4 OB2 1 0 0 0 0 
4 OB2 1 1 1 1 1 
4 082 0 0 1 1 0 
4 OB2 0 0 0 1 1 
4 OB2 0 0 0 0 
4 CH2 I 1 1 1 
4 CH2 0 0 0 0 
4 CH2 I 1 1 0 1 
4 CH2 0 1 0 0 1 
4 CH2 1 1 1 1 
4 CH2 0 1 0 1 
4 CH2 1 1 1 1 
4 CH2 1 0 1 1 
4 CH2 I I I I 
4 CH2 1 1 1 
4 CH2 1 0 1 
4 CH2 0 0 0 1 
4 CH2 1 1 1 
4 CH2 0 0 0 1 
4 OB3 0 1 1 0 
4 OB3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 OB3 1 0 0 0 1 
OB3 0000 
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AGE CONDITION CAR CAT CRAYON LEGO TEDDY 
4 OB3 1 1 0 1 0 
4 OB3 1 1 0 0 0 
4 OB3 1 1 1 1 1 
4 OB3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 OB3 1 1 0 0 1 
4 OB3 0 1 0 0 0 
4 OB3 0 0 1 1 0 
4 OB3 0 0 1 0 0 
4 OB3 1 1 1 0 0 
4 OB3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 CH3 1 1 1 1 1 
4 CH3 1 1 0 0 1 
4 CH3 1 1 1 1 1 
4 CH3 1 0 0 0 1 
4 CH3 1 1 0 1 
4 CH3 0 1 0 0 
4 CH3 1 0 1 0 
4 CH3 1 0 0 0 
4 CH3 1 1 1 1 1 
4 CH3 0 1 0 0 1 
4 CH3 I 1 1 1 
4 CH3 1 0 0 0 
4 CH3 1 0 1 1 
4 CH3 1 0 0 1 
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Correct Receptacles: Raw Data for Individual Items. 
Each column represents the times that each of the receptacles was used 
to contain an object, with a1 or 0 denoting whether the object was 
recalled correctly or incorrectly, respectively. 
Condition 
3-YEAR-OLDS 
EXPERIMENT 1 
OBJECT 
CONDITION 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3-YEAR-OLDS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EXPERIMENT 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CHARACTER 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
CONDITION 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3-YEAR-OLDS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EXPERIMENT 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
OBJECT 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
CONDITION 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
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Condition Bag Basket Bowl Box Cup Hat Sock 
3-YEAR-OLDS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EXPERIMENT 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CHARACTER 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
CONDITION 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3-YEAR-OLDS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
EXPERIMENT 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
OBJECT 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
CONDITION 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
3-YEAR-OLDS 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
EXPERIMENT 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 
CHARACTER 0 0 1 0 0 
CONDITION 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4-YEAR-OLDS 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
OBJECT 0 0 1 1 1 0 
CONDITION 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
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Condition 
4-YEAR-OLDS 
EXPERIMENT 1 
CHARACTER 
CONDITION 
1 
0 
I 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4-YEAR-OLDS 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
OBJECT 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
CONDITION 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4-YEAR-OLDS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 
CHARACTER 1 1 1 1 1 
CONDITION 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 
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Condition 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
4-YEAR-OLDS 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 3 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
OBJECT 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CONDITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 
0 1 0 
4-YEAR-OLDS 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHARACTER 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CONDITION 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2: Experiments 41 51 6 and 7 
Each row represents an individual subject's response to the probing for 
the location of the three objects, given as correct (1) or incorrect (0). 
SUBJECT CONDITION OBJECT 1 OBJECT 2 OBJECT 3 
1 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
2 EXPERIMENT 4 1 0 0 
3 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
4 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
5 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
6 EXPERIMENT 4 0 0 1 
7 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
8 EXPERIMENT 4 0 0 1 
9 EXPERIMENT 4 1 0 1 
10 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 0 
11 EXPERIMENT 4 0 1 0 
12 EXPERIMENT 4 0 1 0 
13 EXPERIMENT 4 1 1 1 
14 EXPERIMENT 4 0 1 1 
15 EXPERIMENT 5 1 1 1 
16 EXPERIMENT 5 1 0 0 
17 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 0 
18 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 1 
19 EXPERIMENT 5 1 0 0 
20 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 0 
21 EXPERIMENT 5 1 0 1 
22 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 1 
23 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 1 
24 EXPERIMENT 5 0 1 0 
25 EXPERIMENT 5 1 1 1 
26 EXPERIMENT 5 0 1 0 
27 EXPERIMENT 5 1 0 0 
28 EXPERIMENT 5 0 0 0 
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SUBJECT CONDITION OBJECT 1 OBJECT 2 OBJECT 3 
29 EXPERIMENT 6 1 0 0 
30 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 1 
31 EXPERIMENT 6 0 0 1 
32 EXPERIMENT 6 1 0 1 
33 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 1 
34 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 1 
35 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 1 
36 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 1 
37 EXPERIMENT 6 0 0 0 
38 EXPERIMENT 6 1 0 1 
39 EXPERIMENT 6 0 0 0 
40 EXPERIMENT 6 1 0 0 
41 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 0 
42 EXPERIMENT 6 1 1 0 
43 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 1 
44 EXPERIMENT 7 0 1 0 
45 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 1 
46 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 1 
47 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 0 
48 EXPERIMENT 7 0 0 0 
49 EXPERIMENT 7 1 0 0 
so EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 0 
51 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 1 
52 EXPERIMENT 7 1 0 0 
53 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 0 
54 EXPERIMENT 7 0 1 0 
55 EXPERIMENT 7 0 0 1 
56 EXPERIMENT 7 1 1 1 
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Appendix 3: Experiments 8 and 9 
Raw Data for each Subject's Recall of the Object and Character 
Locations 
Each row represents an individual subject's response to the object 
location probes (T1 to T4) and character location probes (Cl to C3). The 
responses are in terms of which (used) receptacle they indicated that the 
probed object or character was hidden in. NA denotes "not applicable", 
DK denotes a "don't know" response, and 0 denotes the response of a 
receptacle that did not have anything hidden inside it. 2CHAR-CH 
denotes the Character condition in Experiment 8, and 2CHAR-OB the 
Object condition, 3CHAR-CH and 3CHAR-OB are the Character and 
Object conditions in Experiment 9, respectively. 
SUBJECT AGE CONDITION T1 T2 T3 T4 Ci C2 C3 
13 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 T3 NA Ci 0 NA 
23 2CHAR-CH TI T2 T3 NA Ci C2 NA 
33 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 0 NA Ci C2 NA 
43 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 T3 NA C1 TI NA 
53 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 T3 NA C1 C2 NA 
63 2CHAR-CH TI 0 T3 NA Ci C2 NA 
73 2CHAR-CH C1 T3 0 NA 0 C2 NA 
83 2CHAR-CH T3 T2 T3 NA C1 C2 NA 
93 2CHAR-CH 0 T3 TI NA C1 C2 NA 
10 3 2CHAR-CH TI T2 T3 NA C1 C2 NA 
11 3 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 C1 NA C1 T2 NA 
12 3 2CHAR-CH T2 T3 T1 NA T2 C2 NA 
13 3 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 0 NA C1 0 NA 
14 3 2CHAR-CH T1 T2 T3 NA C1 C2 NA 
is 3 2CHAR-OB T2 C2 Ci NA TI C2 NA 
16 3 2CHAR-013 T1 T2 DK NA Ci DK NA 
17 3 2CHAR-013 T1 C1 TZ NA C2 T3 NA 
18 3 2CHAR-013 T3 T2 Ci NA T3 C2 NA 
19 3 2CHAR-013 C2 0 T3 NA Ci 0 NA 
20 3 2CHAR-OB T1 0 T2 NA 0 C2 NA 
21 3 2CHAR-013 T2 0 T3 NA T1 Ci NA 
22 3 2CHAR-013 T3 T2 Ci NA T1 C2 NA 
23 3 2CHAR-OB 0 T1 TI NA C1 T2 NA 
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SUBJECT AGE CONDITION Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C2 C3 
24 3 2CHAR-OB Tl Tl 0 NA T2 T3 NA 
25 3 2CHAR-OB Tl T3 C2 NA 0 0 NA 
26 3 2CHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 NA ci C2 NA 
27 3 2CHAR-OB Cl C2 T3 NA Tl T3 NA 
28 3 2CHAR-OB C2 0 T3 NA Tl T3 NA 
29 3 XHAR-CH Cl C3 C2 NA T3 0 C2 
30 3 XHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 NA Cl C2 C3 
31 3 XHAR-CH C3 T2 T2 NA ci ci ci 
32 3 XHAR-CH Tl T3 T2 NA C2 C3 Cl 
33 3 XHAR-CH T3 T2 ci NA C2 C3 Tl 
34 3 XHAR-CH C3 T3 Tl NA C3 C2 Cl 
35 3 XHAR-CH Tl C3 Cl NA C2 ci C3 
36 3 XHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 NA ci C2 C3 
37 3 3CHAR-CH Cl T2 T3 NA C2 ci C3 
38 3 3CHAR-CH C2 Tl ci NA T3 C3 0 
39 3 XHAR-CH Tl T2 C3 NA Cl 0 C2 
40 3 3CHAR-CH Tl DK T3 NA C2 ci C3 
41 3 3CHAR-CH Cl C2 C3 NA Cl C2 C3 
42 3 3CHAR-CH Tl C3 T2 NA Cl Tl C3 
43 3 3CHAR-OB DK T2 DK NA ci TI ci 
44 3 3CHAR-OB Tl T2 DK NA C3 C2 ci 
45 3 XHAR-OB C3 T2 T2 NA C3 T3 C3 
46 3 3CHAR-OB C3 C2 0 NA T3 ci T2 
47 3 3CHAR-OB T3 ci 0 NA T3 ci C2 
48 3 XHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 NA ci C2 0 
49 3 XHAR-OB Tl DK C2 NA Cl T2 T3 
so 3 XHAR-OB DK 0 T3 NA C2 Tl T3 
51 3 3CHAR-OB C3 Tl T3 NA T2 Tl ci 
52 3 XHAR-OB C2 C3 T3 NA Cl T2 Tl 
53 3 3CHAR-08 0 T3 Tl NA c2 DK ci 
54 3 3CHAR-OB Tl C2 T2 NA ci T3 C3 
55 3 3CHAR-OB Tl T2 C3 NA DK DK 0 
56 3 3CHAR-OB Tl C3 C2 NA 0 ci T3 
57 4 2CHAR-CH T4 T2 Tl T3 Cl C2 NA 
58 4 2CHAR-CH Tl T4 T2 T4 ci C2 NA 
59 4 2CHAR-CH 0 T2 Tl T3 Cl T3 NA 
60 4 2CHAR-CH T3 T2 Tl T4 ci C2 NA 
61 4 2CHAR-CH Tl T4 T3 C2 Cl 0 NA 
62 4 2CHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
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SUBJECT AGE CONDITION Tl T2 T3 T4 Cl C2 C3 
63 4 2CHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
64 4 2CHAR-CH T2 T3 T4 T4 ci C2 NA 
65 4 2CHAR-CH T2 Tl T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
66 4 2CHAR-CH T4 T3 T3 Tl ci C2 NA 
67 4 2CHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
68 4 2CHAR-CH T2 Tl T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
69 4 2CHAR-CH DK T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
70 4 2CHAR-CH T2 0 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
71 4 2CHAR-OB Tl T2 0 ci T3 C2 NA 
72 4 2CHAR-08 Tl T4 DK T3 C2 ci NA 
73 4 2CHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 T4 C2 ci NA 
74 4 2CHAR-OB Tl C2 T3 ci 0 T4 NA 
75 4 2CHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
76 4 2CHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 C2 Cl 0 NA 
77 4 2CHAR-OB Tl C2 0 T3 ci T2 NA 
78 4 2CHAR-OB T2 ci 0 ci Tl C2 NA 
79 4 2CHAR-08 T3 0 ci T4 ci T4 NA 
80 4 2CHAR-OB Cl T3 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
81 4 2CHAR-OB Cl 0 T4 Tl ci C2 NA 
82 4 2CHAR-OB T3 T4 0 C2 T2 ci NA 
83 4 2CHAR-OB T2 T2 T3 T4 ci C2 NA 
84 4 2CHAR-OB T4 T2 Tl 0 C2 C2 NA 
85 4 XHAR-CH T4 T2 T3 Cl Tl C2 T2 
86 4 3CHAR-CH Tl T2 T4 T3 Tl ci C2 
87 4 3CHAR-CH T4 T2 ci T4 T2 T3 C3 
88 4 3CHAR-CH c2 T2 T3 T4 Tl C3 C2 
89 4 XHAR-CH C2 T4 Tl T2 ci Tl C3 
90 4 3CHAR-CH T3 C3 C2 T3 T2 C2 C3 
91 4 XHAR-CH Tl T2 T4 T3 C2 Cl C3 
92 4 XHAR-CH Tl C3 T4 T2 C2 C2 T3 
93 4 XHAR-CH C3 ci T2 T4 C2 C2 ci 
94 4 XHAR-CH Tl T2 T4 T3 ci C2 C3 
95 4 3CHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 T4 ci C3 C2 
96 4 3CHAR-CH Tl T2 C3 Cl T4 C3 ci 
97 4 XHAR-CH Tl T2 T3 DK ci C2 C3 
98 4 3CHAR-CH Tl T3 C3 T4 ci C2 C3 
99 4 3CHAR-OB C2 ci T2 C2 ci T4 C3 
100 4 3CHAR-OB Tl C3 T2 T3 C2 T4 ci 
101 4 3CHAR-OB Tl T4 T3 T2 C2 ci ci 
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102 4 3CHAR-OB C2 T2 T3 T4 C3 cl TI 
103 4 3CHAR-OB cl T2 C3 T2 T3 TI C3 
104 4 3CHAR-OB T2 T4 Tl C2 C3 Cl T3 
105 4 3CHAR-OB T3 T2 C2 T4 cl C2 Tl 
106 4 3CHAR-OB TI T2 T3 T4 C3 ci T4 
107 4 3CHAR-OB TI T2 cl C2 C3 T4 C2 
108 4 3CHAR-OB T2 T4 C3 C2 C3 T4 C3 
109 4 3CHAR-OB Tl T2 T3 cl C3 C2 T3 
110 4 3CHAR-OB C3 T2 C3 T4 cl C3 Cl 
111 4 3CHAR-OB Tl T2 C3 C2 C2 T4 T3 
112 4 3CHAR-OB C2 Cl T4 T3 Cl TI T2 
Mean Total Errors in Experiments 8 and 9 and Class of Error as 
a Proportion of Total Error 
"O-e" denotes the confusion of the location of an object to either a 
non-used receptacle or the response of 'don't know' to an object probe. 
"Ge" denotes the same type of errors, but following a probe for a 
character location. See section 7.5 for other abbreviations. 
Proportion of total Errors 
Age No. Of Condition Error O-o C-c 0-c C-0 O-e C-e 
Characters Total 
I 
32 CHAR 1 43 
............ 32 OBJ 3.29 
0.27 
0.21 
0.01 
0.04 
0.08 
0.21 
0.18 
0.24 
0.31 
0.07 
0.18 
0.13 
33 CHAR 3.57 0.15 0.3 7 0.33 0.0 0.03 0.06 
33 OBJ 4.29 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.15 
42 CHAR 1.93 0.76 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.03 
............................................................. 42 OBJ 3.29 0.30 0.14 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.06 
43 CHAR 3.79 
.................................................................................... 43 OBJ 4.79 
0.32 1 
0.18 
1 0.2 4 I 
0.2 81 
0.2 0 
0.3 01 
0.16 
0.2 31 
0.07] 
0. 
0.00 
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Appendix 4: Miscellaneous 
Photograph of All the "Characters" together 
Bunny, Simba, Hans and Teddy (from left to right) are all of equal size 
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n 
£periment 1 (Stimulus Randomisation #1) 
EXPERIMENT 1: RANDOMISATION I 
3-year-olds 
TEDDY BOX 
CAR BASKET 
CRAYON BOWL 
CAT HAT 
DOB D. S. CAR CRAYON CAT TEDDY 
Character 
condition 
Object 
C ondition 
4-year-olds 
TEDDY BOX 
CAR BASKET 
CRAYON BOWL 
CAT HAT 
LEGO CUP 
DOB D. S. CAR CRAYON CAT TEDDY 
Character 
condition 
r- 
Obj ect 71 
condition 
ýý(BIBL 
14 
;ý 
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